articulated standard in Virginia

2024Further, we noted that the articulated factors were not exhaustive, as “[i]t would be difficult to catalog all factors pertinent to a resolution of such jury requests or to enunciate a bright line test suitable to every instance.” Id.

2024On balance, “[a] court may not ‘simply refuse to grant the jury’s request for fear of placing too much emphasis on the testimony of one or two witnesses.’” Id. (quoting People v. Howe, 221 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Mich. 1974)).

2012In Fancher , this Court articulated a rule allowing relief where trees encroaching onto the land of another constitute a nuisance, and held that trees encroaching upon the property of another are a nuisance where they cause actual harm or the imminent danger of actual harm. 274 Va. at 555-56 , 650 S.E.2d at 522 .

2012In Fancher , this Court articulated a rule allowing relief where trees encroaching onto the land of another constitute a nuisance, and held that trees encroaching upon the property of another are a nuisance where they cause actual harm or the imminent danger of actual harm. 274 Va. at 555-56 , 650 S.E.2d at 522 .

2010Id. at 175 .

2005Instead of an articulated standard or a requirement that helmets be limited to only those certified as being in compliance with the standards recognized by the General Assembly, it reads: “The windshields, face shields, glasses or goggles, and protective helmets required by this section shall meet or exceed the standards and specifications of the Snell Memorial Foundation, the American National Standards Institute, Inc. or the federal Department of Transportation.” (Emphasis supplied.) To prevail on his argument that this law is unconstitutionally vague, the defendant must demonstrate that the

2005Instead of an articulated standard or a requirement that helmets be limited to only those certified as being in compliance with the standards recognized by the General Assembly, it reads: “The windshields, face shields, glasses or goggles, and protective helmets required by this section shall meet or exceed the standards and specifications of the Snell Memorial Foundation, the American National Standards Institute, Inc. or the federal Department of Transportation.” (Emphasis supplied.) To prevail on his argument that this law is unconstitutionally vague, the defendant must demonstrate that the

1993The court recognized that the duty to protect from self-injury arises when “the defendants knew, or reasonably should have known, of the detainee’s suicidal tendencies.” Id. (quoting Elliot v. Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7 , 10-11 (1st Cir. 1991) (citation omitted)).

1993In finding that all but the assistant supervisor were entitled to summary judgment, the court articulated the standard that “[p]rison officials violate the civil rights of inmates when they display ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs’.” Id. at 1094 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).

1993In finding that all but the assistant supervisor were entitled to summary judgment, the court articulated the standard that “[p]rison officials violate the civil rights of inmates when they display ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs’.” Id. at 1094 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).

1993The court recognized that the duty to protect from self-injury arises when “the defendants knew, or reasonably should have known, of the detainee’s suicidal tendencies.” Id. (quoting Elliot v. Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7 , 10-11 (1st Cir. 1991) (citation omitted)).