articulated standard in Texas

2017The court also articulated the standard as “limit[ing] a claimant’s recovery of medical expenses to those which have been or must be paid by or for the claimant.” Id. at 398 .

2017The court also articulated the standard as “limit[ing] a claimant’s recovery of medical expenses to those which have been or must be paid by or for the claimant.” Id. at 398 .

2025Servs., L.L.C., 356 S.W.3d 613 , 628–29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (holding sufficient evidence supported a jury finding that the hospital’s negligence in failing to implement policies and procedures relating to post-operative patients proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury). 13 A. The amended report adequately articulates Dr. Patterson’s opinions regarding causation because it explains “how and why” the Hospital’s alleged breach of the articulated standard of care led to the patient’s death.

2016Id.

2012Regarding the sufficiency of the articulated standard of care, CVS argues that Dr. Pittman’s citations to the Texas Occupations Code and the rules promulgated by the Texas Pharmacy Board are “irrelevant” because courts “have declined to hold that even specific provisions regulating pharmacist conduct impose a standard of care.” See, e.g., Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455 , 466–67 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) (holding that administrative rules did not impose legal duty on pharmacists to warn purchasers of potential side effects).

2006With respect to the claims allegedly occurring on or after February 27, 2000, to survive the no-evidence summary-judgment challenge, Streich must have adduced competent evidence that Dr. Dougherty deviated from the articulated standard of care. (1) See Hightower , 54 S.W.3d at 389 ; Rodriguez , 730 S.W.2d at 21 .

2006With respect to the claims allegedly occurring on or after February 27, 2000, to survive the no-evidence summary-judgment challenge, Streich must have adduced competent evidence that Dr. Dougherty deviated from the articulated standard of care. (1) See Hightower , 54 S.W.3d at 389 ; Rodriguez , 730 S.W.2d at 21 .

1998Webb, 766 S.W.2d at 245 .

1998App. 1991), the court articulated the test for legal sufficiency in a case in which self-defense is raised: "whether after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against [the defendant] on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt." Id . ( citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).

1998App. 1991), the court articulated the test for legal sufficiency in a case in which self-defense is raised: "whether after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against [the defendant] on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt." Id . ( citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).

1993In Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), this Court articulated the analysis to be done when evidence has been excluded via the erroneous limitation of cross-examination.

1993In Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), this Court articulated the analysis to be done when evidence has been excluded via the erroneous limitation of cross-examination.

1992In the words of the Court, it applies in those instances “where the trial court either knows or should know of the former proceedings, such as in those cases where the former jeopardy arose in the same case.” Id. 1 Additionally, in the recent case of State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing Ex parte Jewel, 535 S.W.2d at 365), the Court again explicated, “[Wjhere a plea of jeopardy is before the same court and judge, as in the case at bar, statutory requirements concerning the plea are relaxed.” We do note that in Ex parte Myers, 618 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), cert.

1992In the words of the Court, it applies in those instances “where the trial court either knows or should know of the former proceedings, such as in those cases where the former jeopardy arose in the same case.” Id. 1 Additionally, in the recent case of State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing Ex parte Jewel, 535 S.W.2d at 365), the Court again explicated, “[Wjhere a plea of jeopardy is before the same court and judge, as in the case at bar, statutory requirements concerning the plea are relaxed.” We do note that in Ex parte Myers, 618 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), cert.

1992In the words of the Court, it applies in those instances “where the trial court either knows or should know of the former proceedings, such as in those cases where the former jeopardy arose in the same case.” Id. 1 Additionally, in the recent case of State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing Ex parte Jewel, 535 S.W.2d at 365), the Court again explicated, “[Wjhere a plea of jeopardy is before the same court and judge, as in the case at bar, statutory requirements concerning the plea are relaxed.” We do note that in Ex parte Myers, 618 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), cert.

1992In the words of the Court, it applies in those instances “where the trial court either knows or should know of the former proceedings, such as in those cases where the former jeopardy arose in the same case.” Id. 1 Additionally, in the recent case of State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing Ex parte Jewel, 535 S.W.2d at 365), the Court again explicated, “[Wjhere a plea of jeopardy is before the same court and judge, as in the case at bar, statutory requirements concerning the plea are relaxed.” We do note that in Ex parte Myers, 618 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), cert.

1992In the words of the Court, it applies in those instances “where the trial court either knows or should know of the former proceedings, such as in those cases where the former jeopardy arose in the same case.” Id. 1 Additionally, in the recent case of State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing Ex parte Jewel, 535 S.W.2d at 365), the Court again explicated, “[Wjhere a plea of jeopardy is before the same court and judge, as in the case at bar, statutory requirements concerning the plea are relaxed.” We do note that in Ex parte Myers, 618 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), cert.

1989In addition, the Court articulated a standard for materiality, left unexplained in Brady , by stating that “if ‘the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury,’ ” id., then it was sufficiently material to require a new trial.

1989In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the Court established several different standards of materiality.

1989In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the Court established several different standards of materiality.