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7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Woodgreen2 sentences2002In State v. Wood, this Court articulated the exception as follows: “On direct appeal in capital cases, it is the established rule that this Court will review an error, even though no proper objection was made at trial and even though the error was not raised on appeal, if the error was manifest and prejudicial.” 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982). 2002In State v. Wood , this Court articulated the exception as follows: "On direct appeal in capital cases, it is the established rule that this Court will review an error, even though no proper objection was made at trial and even though the error was not raised on appeal, if the error was manifest and prejudicial." 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Brunetti v. Mascarogreen2 sentences1998In Brunetti,. 854 P.2d at 558-59, the trial court had determined that “[o]n the basis” of the defendant’s “good faith” efforts to respond to the requests for admission and his “reasonable oversight” as to when his response was required, “the merits of the action would be undermined unless the admissions were withdrawn.” While the court of appeals upheld this decision, it is difficult to see how an explanation of the movant’s reasons for delay is relevant to the presentation of the merits, 3 although these proffered excuses showing good cause for delay may influence a judge in the exercise of d 1998In Brunetti, 854 P.2d at 558-59 , the trial court had determined that "[o]n the basis" of the defendant's "good faith" efforts to respond to the requests for admission and his "reasonable oversight" as to when his response was required, "the merits of the action would be undermined unless the admissions were withdrawn." While the court of appeals upheld this decision, it is difficult to see how an explanation of the movant's reasons for delay is relevant to the presentation of the merits, [3] although these proffered excuses showing good cause for delay may influence a judge in the exercise of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re E.R.
green
2 sentences2019Moreover, we have previously rejected the assertion that due process requires a more stringent standard of review in termination cases, In re S.Y.T., 2011 UT App 407 , ¶¶ 31–37, 267 P.3d 930 , reaffirming the principle that the juvenile court’s superior opportunity to make witness-credibility determinations entitles it to a high degree of deference and that we should overturn termination decisions only “if the clear weight of that evidence is against the juvenile court’s determination,” id. ¶¶ 36–37. 20190184-CA 5 2019 UT App 208 In re E.R. that termination of the parent’s rights is in the bes 2019Moreover, we have previously rejected the assertion that due process requires a more stringent standard of review in termination cases, In re S.Y.T., 2011 UT App 407 , ¶¶ 31–37, 267 P.3d 930 , reaffirming the principle that the juvenile court’s superior opportunity to make witness-credibility determinations entitles it to a high degree of deference and that we should overturn termination decisions only “if the clear weight of that evidence is against the juvenile court’s determination,” id. ¶¶ 36–37. 20190184-CA 5 2019 UT App 208 In re E.R. that termination of the parent’s rights is in the bes | 1 | 2019–2019 |
D.T. v. C.M.
green
2 sentences2019Moreover, we have previously rejected the assertion that due process requires a more stringent standard of review in termination cases, In re S.Y.T., 2011 UT App 407 , ¶¶ 31–37, 267 P.3d 930 , reaffirming the principle that the juvenile court’s superior opportunity to make witness-credibility determinations entitles it to a high degree of deference and that we should overturn termination decisions only “if the clear weight of that evidence is against the juvenile court’s determination,” id. ¶¶ 36–37. 20190184-CA 5 2019 UT App 208 In re E.R. that termination of the parent’s rights is in the bes 2019Moreover, we have previously rejected the assertion that due process requires a more stringent standard of review in termination cases, In re S.Y.T., 2011 UT App 407 , ¶¶ 31–37, 267 P.3d 930 , reaffirming the principle that the juvenile court’s superior opportunity to make witness-credibility determinations entitles it to a high degree of deference and that we should overturn termination decisions only “if the clear weight of that evidence is against the juvenile court’s determination,” id. ¶¶ 36–37. 20190184-CA 5 2019 UT App 208 In re E.R. that termination of the parent’s rights is in the bes | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Tenorio
green
2 sentences2019However, we are not in a position to overturn the supreme court’s articulated standard of review, see State v. Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92, ¶ 9 , 156 P.3d 854 (“Vertical stare decisis compels a court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court.” (quotation simplified)), which instructs us to afford the juvenile court’s termination decision “a high degree of deference,” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12 , 171 P.3d 435 . 2019However, we are not in a position to overturn the supreme court’s articulated standard of review, see State v. Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92, ¶ 9 , 156 P.3d 854 (“Vertical stare decisis compels a court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court.” (quotation simplified)), which instructs us to afford the juvenile court’s termination decision “a high degree of deference,” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12 , 171 P.3d 435 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange
green
1 sentence2019Instead, the Court articulated this principle as an appellate court's prerogative to request additional information from the trial court to facilitate meaningful appellate review of the court's grant of a new trial. 3 Otherwise, appellate courts would have to resort to speculation, see Crookston , 817 P.2d at 804 , and could potentially affirm on a basis not relied on by the trial court. 4 Even conclusions of legal error are in most cases followed by inquiries into whether the "error ... had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Utah R. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State Ex Rel. Br
green
2 sentences2019However, we are not in a position to overturn the supreme court’s articulated standard of review, see State v. Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92, ¶ 9 , 156 P.3d 854 (“Vertical stare decisis compels a court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court.” (quotation simplified)), which instructs us to afford the juvenile court’s termination decision “a high degree of deference,” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12 , 171 P.3d 435 . 2019However, we are not in a position to overturn the supreme court’s articulated standard of review, see State v. Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92, ¶ 9 , 156 P.3d 854 (“Vertical stare decisis compels a court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court.” (quotation simplified)), which instructs us to afford the juvenile court’s termination decision “a high degree of deference,” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12 , 171 P.3d 435 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Keigley v. Bench, City Recorder
green
2 sentences2012In Keigley v. Bench (Keigley II), 97 Utah 69 , 89 P.2d 480 (1939), for example, this court articulated a standard that correctly linked the people's article VI power with the constitutional principle of separation of powers. 2012In Keigley v. Bench (Keigley II), 97 Utah 69 , 89 P.2d 480 (1939), for example, this court articulated a standard that correctly linked the people's article VI power with the constitutional principle of separation of powers. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.
green
2 sentences1992At one point, the court found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress “because the theoretical basis [sic] for the two claims are separate and distinct,” id. at 21 , while at another, the court found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for negligent supervision because it “may encompass more than acts defined to be ‘discriminatory or prohibited employment practices’ under the Utah Act,” id. at 22 . 1992At one point, the court found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress “because the theoretical basis [sic] for the two claims are separate and distinct,” id. at 21 , while at another, the court found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for negligent supervision because it “may encompass more than acts defined to be ‘discriminatory or prohibited employment practices’ under the Utah Act,” id. at 22 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review
green
2 sentences1990This court clearly articulated the standard for reviewing factual findings under the UAPA in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct.App.1989). “[I]t is clear that the Board’s findings of fact will be affirmed only if they are ‘supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.’ ” Id. at 67 . 1990This court clearly articulated the standard for reviewing factual findings under the UAPA in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct.App.1989). “[I]t is clear that the Board’s findings of fact will be affirmed only if they are ‘supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.’ ” Id. at 67 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.