35 California opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Whitegreen2 sentences1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance 1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance | 2 | 2 |
People v. Boernergreen2 sentences1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance 1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance | 2 | 2 |
People v. Floresgreen2 sentences1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance 1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance | 2 | 2 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance 1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance | 2 | 2 |
Orange County Social Services Agency v. Jamie W.green2 sentences2016(In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80-81 (Helen W.).) In Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 575 , the court articulated a test for determining whether a child would benefit from continuing a parental relationship. 2013(In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80-81 .) In Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 575 , the court articulated a test for determining whether a child would benefit from continuing a parental relationship. | 1 | 2 |
People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupegreen2 sentences2003“In the leading case of People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal.2d 283 [ 231 P.2d 832 ], the court articulated that test to be whether the type of case at issue was identical to—or similar to—those categories of cases in which litigants enjoyed the right to jury trial under the English common law as of the time California became a state in 1850.” (In re Javier A., supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at p. 930 . ) “ ‘It is the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law which is preserved; arad what that right is, is a purely historical question, a fact which is to be ascertained like any oth 2003“In the leading case of People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal.2d 283 [ 231 P.2d 832 ], the court articulated that test to be whether the type of case at issue was identical to—or similar to—those categories of cases in which litigants enjoyed the right to jury trial under the English common law as of the time California became a state in 1850.” (In re Javier A., supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at p. 930 . ) “ ‘It is the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law which is preserved; arad what that right is, is a purely historical question, a fact which is to be ascertained like any oth | 1 | 2 |
People v. Guthriegreen1 sentence2025(See People v. Guthrie (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 832, 843 [trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on defense of mistake of fact to charge of first degree burglary because it was “manifestly inconsistent” with defense theory of mistaken identity].) Second, there is no substantial evidence in the record to support an instruction on self-defense. “‘Self-defense, when based on a reasonable belief that killing [or attempted killing] is necessary to avert an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury, is a complete justification, and such a killing [or attempted killing] is not a crime.’” ( | 1 | 1 |
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruengreen1 sentence2024Because the State of New York issues public-carry licenses only when an applicant demonstrates a special need for self-defense, we conclude that the State’s licensing regime violates the Constitution.”].) The Court emphasized, though, that “nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of ... licensing regimes” that “require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety course,” as these “are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’ ” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. City of Long Beachgreen1 sentence2023(Allen v. City of Long Beach (1955) 45 Cal.2d 128, 131 (Allen I).) Two years ago, in Alameda, the Court reaffirmed that test with an added component: “In evaluating the constitutionality of modifications to a public employee pension plan, Allen I requires a court first to determine whether the modification imposes disadvantages on affected employees, relative to the preexisting pension plan, and, if so, whether the disadvantages are accompanied by comparable new advantages. | 1 | 1 |
Western Union Financial Services, Inc. v. First Data Corp.green2 sentences2010Appeals Bd., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1426 .) Further, the stated consequence of the articulated presumption demonstrates that it modifies the burden of proof. “[T]he obvious and only effect of the presumption created by section 17071” is to require the defendant “to go forward with proof to negate the presumption of wrongful intent.” (Western Union Financial Services, Inc. v. First Data Corp. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1540 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 ], italics added.) “[T]he allocation of evidentiary burdens [under section 17071 is] as follows: ‘Assuming proof of injury to a competitor has bee 2010Appeals Bd., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1426 .) Further, the stated consequence of the articulated presumption demonstrates that it modifies the burden of proof. “[T]he obvious and only effect of the presumption created by section 17071” is to require the defendant “to go forward with proof to negate the presumption of wrongful intent.” (Western Union Financial Services, Inc. v. First Data Corp. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1540 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 ], italics added.) “[T]he allocation of evidentiary burdens [under section 17071 is] as follows: ‘Assuming proof of injury to a competitor has bee | 1 | 1 |
| Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co.green | 1 | 1 |
Lucas v. Hammgreen2 sentences2010(Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 589 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ] [lawyer drafting a will had duty to intended beneficiary where lawyer failed to properly draft the will].) More recent cases have been reluctant to expand the Biakanja holding. 2010(Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 589 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ] [lawyer drafting a will had duty to intended beneficiary where lawyer failed to properly draft the will].) More recent cases have been reluctant to expand the Biakanja holding. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pay Less Drug Storegreen | 1 | 1 |
Dooley's Hardware Mart v. Food Giant Markets, Inc.green1 sentence2010The defendant then has the burden of negating the inference of illegal intent or establishing an affirmative defense.’ . . . [Citation.]” (Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA *465 Transportation, Inc., supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 811, 824-825 .) The presumption “may be rebutted by establishing one of the statute’s affirmative defenses, such as meeting competition, see Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 17050, or by showing that the sales ‘were made in good faith and not for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition.’ [Citation.]” (William Inglis, etc. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., supra, 668 F.2d 10 | 1 | 1 |
| Coral Construction Company v. King Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.green | 1 | 1 |
| Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hollowaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Doziergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Popegreen | 1 | 1 |
| McMann v. Richardsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dean v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| North v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sneedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Autumn H.
green
2 sentences2016(In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80-81 (Helen W.).) In Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 575 , the court articulated a test for determining whether a child would benefit from continuing a parental relationship. 2014There was no error requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights.11 11 In Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 575 , the court articulated a test for determining whether a child would benefit from continuing a parental relationship. | 3 | 2013–2016 |
Amwest Surety Insurance v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2019Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 , our Supreme Court analyzed a similar initiative provision-one that permitted legislative amendments only " 'to further [the initiative's] purposes.' " ( Id. at p. 1251, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 .) The Court explained that "[s]uch a limitation upon the power of the Legislature must be strictly construed, but it also must be given the effect the voters intended it to have." ( Id. at pp. 1255-1256, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 .) Balancing these concerns and "starting with the *1000 presumption that the Legis 2019Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 , our Supreme Court analyzed a similar initiative provision-one that permitted legislative amendments only " 'to further [the initiative's] purposes.' " ( Id. at p. 1251, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 .) The Court explained that "[s]uch a limitation upon the power of the Legislature must be strictly construed, but it also must be given the effect the voters intended it to have." ( Id. at pp. 1255-1256, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 , 906 P.2d 1112 .) Balancing these concerns and "starting with the *1000 presumption that the Legis | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Aguilar
green
2 sentences2019II ANALYSIS A. Assault with an Object Used as a Deadly Weapon (Aguilar) Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) ( section 245(a)(1) ) prohibits assaulting a person "with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm." (Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.) In Aguilar , the Court articulated the standard for determining whether an object constitutes a deadly weapon for purposes of section 245(a)(1). "[A] 'deadly weapon' is 'any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury. 2019II ANALYSIS A. Assault with an Object Used as a Deadly Weapon (Aguilar) Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) ( section 245(a)(1) ) prohibits assaulting a person "with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm." (Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.) In Aguilar , the Court articulated the standard for determining whether an object constitutes a deadly weapon for purposes of section 245(a)(1). "[A] 'deadly weapon' is 'any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Perez
green
2 sentences1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance 1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge’s remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Bolton
green
2 sentences1982(See In re Perez, supra, 84 Cal. App.3d at p. 172 .) But even assuming the judge's remarks were erroneous, any error was harmless because in light of the other articulated factors relied on by the trial judge, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would occur upon resentencing. ( People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant's reliance 1982(People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 506, 509-510 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 629 ]; People v. White (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 270, 281 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 612 ]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 67, 80 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 365 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant’s reliance in this context on People v. Bolton, supra, 23 Cal.3d 208 , is misplaced. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Clark
green
2 sentences2026Without deciding whether Clark was a major participant in the underlying robbery, the Supreme Court noted there is significant overlap between the major participant requirement and the reckless indifference requirement, “‘for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 .) This overlap was further elucidated when the court articulated the factors it considered pertinent to the reckless indifference analysis, namely, “the defendant’s knowledge of weapons, and the use 2026Without deciding whether Clark was a major participant in the underlying robbery, the Supreme Court noted there is significant overlap between the major participant requirement and the reckless indifference requirement, “‘for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 .) This overlap was further elucidated when the court articulated the factors it considered pertinent to the reckless indifference analysis, namely, “the defendant’s knowledge of weapons, and the use | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In re Tyrone A. Miller On Habeas Corpus
green
1 sentence2026Without deciding whether Clark was a major participant in the underlying robbery, the Supreme Court noted there is significant overlap between the major participant requirement and the reckless indifference requirement, “‘for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 .) This overlap was further elucidated when the court articulated the factors it considered pertinent to the reckless indifference analysis, namely, “the defendant’s knowledge of weapons, and the use | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Beck
green
1 sentence2025(See People v. Guthrie (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 832, 843 [trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on defense of mistake of fact to charge of first degree burglary because it was “manifestly inconsistent” with defense theory of mistaken identity].) Second, there is no substantial evidence in the record to support an instruction on self-defense. “‘Self-defense, when based on a reasonable belief that killing [or attempted killing] is necessary to avert an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury, is a complete justification, and such a killing [or attempted killing] is not a crime.’” ( | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024In that case, the statute of limitations for that cause of action will be tolled until such time as a reasonable investigation would have revealed its factual basis.” (Id. at p. 803.) 15 A plaintiff seeking to invoke the discovery rule “ ‘must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’ [Citation.]” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808 .) “ ‘When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a ca[u]se of action or application of the delayed discovery r | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Black
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1221 ; People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 815 .) The trial court articulated the factors in aggravation, and this record amply demonstrates why the court elected to impose an aggravated sentence. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Livingston
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1221 ; People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 815 .) The trial court articulated the factors in aggravation, and this record amply demonstrates why the court elected to impose an aggravated sentence. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Alexander v. Exxon Mobil
green
1 sentence2024In that case, the statute of limitations for that cause of action will be tolled until such time as a reasonable investigation would have revealed its factual basis.” (Id. at p. 803.) 15 A plaintiff seeking to invoke the discovery rule “ ‘must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’ [Citation.]” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808 .) “ ‘When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a ca[u]se of action or application of the delayed discovery r | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Superior Court (Romero)
green
1 sentence2023Applicable Law i. The Three Strikes Law “[I]f a defendant has two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d) that have been pled and proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greatest of: [¶] … [t]hree times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions [or] [i]imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years.” (§ 667, subd. (e) | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Strong
green
1 sentence2023Applicable Law i. The Three Strikes Law “[I]f a defendant has two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d) that have been pled and proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greatest of: [¶] … [t]hree times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions [or] [i]imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years.” (§ 667, subd. (e) | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Hall
green
2 sentences2011Analysis In People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 718 P.2d 99 ], this court articulated the standard California courts apply in determining the admissibility of third party culpability evidence. 2011Analysis In People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 718 P.2d 99 ], this court articulated the standard California courts apply in determining the admissibility of third party culpability evidence. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Gee v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Turnbull & Turnbull v. Ara Transportation, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010The defendant then has the burden of negating the inference of illegal intent or establishing an affirmative defense.’ . . . [Citation.]” (Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA *465 Transportation, Inc., supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 811, 824-825 .) The presumption “may be rebutted by establishing one of the statute’s affirmative defenses, such as meeting competition, see Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 17050, or by showing that the sales ‘were made in good faith and not for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition.’ [Citation.]” (William Inglis, etc. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., supra, 668 F.2d 10 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. Itt Continental Baking Company, Inc., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. Itt Continental Baking Company, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010The defendant then has the burden of negating the inference of illegal intent or establishing an affirmative defense.’ . . . [Citation.]” (Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA *465 Transportation, Inc., supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 811, 824-825 .) The presumption “may be rebutted by establishing one of the statute’s affirmative defenses, such as meeting competition, see Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 17050, or by showing that the sales ‘were made in good faith and not for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition.’ [Citation.]” (William Inglis, etc. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., supra, 668 F.2d 10 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Biakanja v. Irving
green
1 sentence2010In extending the duty of care to the beneficiary of the will in the absence of privity, the court articulated factors to be considered in such a decision: “the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.” (Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 650 .) Later cases have considered additional factors, i | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Javier A. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| In Re Daedler green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Gentry green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Kapellas v. Kofman green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Loder v. City of Glendale green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Block v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Whaler's Village Club v. Califonia Coastal Commission green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Marshall green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Fort Worth Lloyds v. Garza green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| In Re Burns green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| United States v. Willie Decoster, Jr. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Little green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Edwards green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.