articulated standard in New Jersey

2022Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), the Court articulated the standard for summary review by holding that: [T]he determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. [Id. at 523.] In the case at bar, the record reveals the abs

1998Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 , 666 A.2d 146 (1995), the Court articulated the standard for determining whether there is a genuine issue of fact.

2003In V.C. v. M.J.B., this Court articulated' the standard to be applied when determining whether a party, on the basis of his or her claimed status as a psychological parent, should be awarded custody of, and visitation with, a former domestic partner’s biological children. 163 N.J. 200 , 205, 748 A.2d 539 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 , 121 S.Ct. 302 , 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000).

2003In V.C. v. M.J.B., this Court articulated the standard to be applied when determining whether a party, on the basis of his or her claimed status as a psychological parent, should be awarded custody of, and visitation with, a former domestic partner's biological children. 163 N.J. 200 , 205, 748 A. 2d 539 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 , 121 S.Ct. 302 , 148 L.Ed. 2d 243 (2000).

2003In V.C. v. M.J.B., this Court articulated' the standard to be applied when determining whether a party, on the basis of his or her claimed status as a psychological parent, should be awarded custody of, and visitation with, a former domestic partner’s biological children. 163 N.J. 200 , 205, 748 A.2d 539 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 , 121 S.Ct. 302 , 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000).

2003In V.C. v. M.J.B., this Court articulated' the standard to be applied when determining whether a party, on the basis of his or her claimed status as a psychological parent, should be awarded custody of, and visitation with, a former domestic partner’s biological children. 163 N.J. 200 , 205, 748 A.2d 539 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 , 121 S.Ct. 302 , 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000).

2003In V.C. v. M.J.B., this Court articulated' the standard to be applied when determining whether a party, on the basis of his or her claimed status as a psychological parent, should be awarded custody of, and visitation with, a former domestic partner’s biological children. 163 N.J. 200 , 205, 748 A.2d 539 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 , 121 S.Ct. 302 , 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000).

2003In V.C. v. M.J.B., this Court articulated' the standard to be applied when determining whether a party, on the basis of his or her claimed status as a psychological parent, should be awarded custody of, and visitation with, a former domestic partner’s biological children. 163 N.J. 200 , 205, 748 A.2d 539 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 , 121 S.Ct. 302 , 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000).

2012Any hazardous substance in any quantity will open the floodgates of liability, and will do so even if the hazardous substance disposed of by the party is not causing any harm, is not threatening to cause any harm, and is not any part of the reason a response is needed and costs of that response are incurred____ Plaintiffs’ theory is not supported by statute, by precedent, or on policy grounds consistent with statutes and precedents. [ 629 F.Supp.2d at 186 (quoting Acushnet Co. v. Coaters Inc., 937 F.Supp. 988, 993 (D.Mass.1996)).] Similarly, in Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corp., 272

2012Any hazardous substance in any quantity will open the floodgates of liability, and will do so even if the hazardous substance disposed of by the party is not causing any harm, is not threatening to cause any harm, and is not any part of the reason a response is needed and costs of that response are incurred____ Plaintiffs’ theory is not supported by statute, by precedent, or on policy grounds consistent with statutes and precedents. [ 629 F.Supp.2d at 186 (quoting Acushnet Co. v. Coaters Inc., 937 F.Supp. 988, 993 (D.Mass.1996)).] Similarly, in Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corp., 272

2009In Parsons , this court articulated that standard for evaluating materiality when the defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea on a claimed Brady violation. 341 N.J.Super. at 454-56 , 775 A. 2d 576 .

2009In Parsons , this court articulated that standard for evaluating materiality when the defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea on a claimed Brady violation. 341 N.J.Super. at 454-56 , 775 A. 2d 576 .

2008Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394, 401 , 895 A. 2d 1143 (2006) (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 , 625 A. 2d 1110 (1993)).

2008Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394, 401 , 895 A. 2d 1143 (2006) (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 , 625 A. 2d 1110 (1993)).

2008Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394, 401 , 895 A. 2d 1143 (2006) (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 , 625 A. 2d 1110 (1993)).

2008Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394, 401 , 895 A. 2d 1143 (2006) (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 , 625 A. 2d 1110 (1993)).

2006In Cunningham, supra, the Court recognized that a person facing the deprivation of a property interest may be “entitled to a hearing as a matter of fundamental fairness and administrative due process,” apart from the due process guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. 69 N.J. at 26 , 350 A.2d 58 .

2006In Cunningham, supra, the Court recognized that a person facing the deprivation of a property interest may be “entitled to a hearing as a matter of fundamental fairness and administrative due process,” apart from the due process guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. 69 N.J. at 26 , 350 A.2d 58 .

2005The court articulated the test to be employed in determining whether each facility was used for hospital purposes as “whether the property is ‘reasonably necessary’ for such purposes.” Id. at 532, 351 A.2d 756 .

2003In imposing the elevated burden, we draw on our prior case law, principally State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 238 , 495 A.2d 90 (1985) (Sugar II), in which this Court articulated a standard to be used when evaluating the “inevitable-discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule.

2003In imposing the elevated burden, we draw on our prior case law, principally State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 238 , 495 A.2d 90 (1985) (Sugar II), in which this Court articulated a standard to be used when evaluating the “inevitable-discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule.

2003In State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65 , 560 A. 2d 1198 (1989), this Court articulated a standard for evaluating an expert's testimony when such a question is presented.

2003In State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65 , 560 A. 2d 1198 (1989), this Court articulated a standard for evaluating an expert's testimony when such a question is presented.

2001This Court articulated the requirement in State v. Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 289 , 558 A. 2d 833 .

2001This Court articulated the requirement in State v. Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 289 , 558 A. 2d 833 .

1995The Court held “it is necessary to consider whether the ‘practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression’ and whether ‘the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.’ ” Id. at 32 , 104 S.Ct. at 2207, 81 L.Ed.2d at 26 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 , 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811 , 40 L.Ed.2d 224, 240 (1974)).

1995The Court held “it is necessary to consider whether the ‘practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression’ and whether ‘the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.’ ” Id. at 32 , 104 S.Ct. at 2207, 81 L.Ed.2d at 26 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 , 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811 , 40 L.Ed.2d 224, 240 (1974)).

1987The Court ruled that its decisions “construing the Fourth Amendment [are] to be applied retroactively to all convictions that [are] not yet final at the time the decision [is] rendered.” United States v. Johnson, supra, 457 U.S. at 562 , 102 S.Ct. at 2594 , 73 L.Ed. 2d at 222 . 4 However, the Court articulated an exception to this general proposition, holding that a new rule of criminal procedure that represents a “clear break with the past” should not be given retroactive effect.

1987The Court ruled that its decisions “construing the Fourth Amendment [are] to be applied retroactively to all convictions that [are] not yet final at the time the decision [is] rendered.” United States v. Johnson, supra, 457 U.S. at 562 , 102 S.Ct. at 2594 , 73 L.Ed. 2d at 222 . 4 However, the Court articulated an exception to this general proposition, holding that a new rule of criminal procedure that represents a “clear break with the past” should not be given retroactive effect.

1981Plaintiff urges that New Jersey follow the lead of the New York Court of Appeals in Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y. 2d 35 , 364 N.Y.S. 2d 859 , 324 N.E. 2d 338 (1974), in which the court considered whether a parent owes a legal duty to supervise his child gave rise to an action for damages for negligent performance of that duty. 36 N.Y. 2d at 44 , 364 N.Y.S. 2d at 866 , 324 N.E. 2d at *291 345.

1981Plaintiff urges that New Jersey follow the lead of the New York Court of Appeals in Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y. 2d 35 , 364 N.Y.S. 2d 859 , 324 N.E. 2d 338 (1974), in which the court considered whether a parent owes a legal duty to supervise his child gave rise to an action for damages for negligent performance of that duty. 36 N.Y. 2d at 44 , 364 N.Y.S. 2d at 866 , 324 N.E. 2d at *291 345.