articulated doctrine in District of Columbia

1988The Supreme Court has also made plain that we are authorized to reexamine the sentencing process where it is alleged that the judge totally failed to exercise his discretion in imposing sentence. [16] 180 U.S.App.D.C. at 213 , 553 F.2d at 1389 .

1988The Supreme Court has also made plain that we are authorized to reexamine the sentencing process where it is alleged that the judge totally failed to exercise his discretion in imposing sentence. [16] 180 U.S.App.D.C. at 213 , 553 F.2d at 1389 .

2001Quoting Ellis , the court stated that “ ‘a defendant adversely affected in fact has standing to bring such departure from the judicial province to the appellate court for review and correction.’ ” Lyons, 683 A.2d at 1084 (quoting Ellis, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 44 , 416 F.2d at 800 ) (emphasis added).

2001Quoting Ellis , the court stated that “ ‘a defendant adversely affected in fact has standing to bring such departure from the judicial province to the appellate court for review and correction.’ ” Lyons, 683 A.2d at 1084 (quoting Ellis, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 44 , 416 F.2d at 800 ) (emphasis added).

2001Quoting Ellis , the court stated that “ ‘a defendant adversely affected in fact has standing to bring such departure from the judicial province to the appellate court for review and correction.’ ” Lyons, 683 A.2d at 1084 (quoting Ellis, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 44 , 416 F.2d at 800 ) (emphasis added).

1995In Dunn v. Profitt, 408 A.2d 991 (D.C.1979), this court articulated the factors that a trial judge must consider in ruling on a rule 60(b) motion to vacate a default judgment entered upon a defendant’s failure to appear and respond to a complaint: Each case must be evaluated after considering the following factors: 1) was there actual notice of the proceeding? 2) did movant act in good faith? 3) was a prima facie adequate defense presented? and 4) did the movant act promptly?

1990See Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203 [ 84 S.Ct. 699 , 11 L.Ed.2d 636 ] (1964) (per curiam), reversing 116 U.S.App.D.C. 127 , 321 F.2d 393 (1963) (per curiam); Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 384, 386 , 84 S.Ct. 397, 398 , 11 *451 L.Ed.2d 404 (1964) (per curiam).

1990See Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203 [ 84 S.Ct. 699 , 11 L.Ed.2d 636 ] (1964) (per curiam), reversing 116 U.S.App.D.C. 127 , 321 F.2d 393 (1963) (per curiam); Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 384, 386 , 84 S.Ct. 397, 398 , 11 *451 L.Ed.2d 404 (1964) (per curiam).

1990In In re Alexander, supra, 428 A.2d at 815 n. 3, this court articulated that doctrine as follows: [In] limited circumstances, when a party fails to file a timely notice of appeal in reliance on a statement or action of the trial court indicating that the party has timely filed a postjudgment motion that tolls the appeal period, that motion, although in fact untimely, does stop the running of that period.

1990In In re Alexander, supra, 428 A.2d at 815 n. 3, this court articulated that doctrine as follows: [In] limited circumstances, when a party fails to file a timely notice of appeal in reliance on a statement or action of the trial court indicating that the party has timely filed a postjudgment motion that tolls the appeal period, that motion, although in fact untimely, does stop the running of that period.

1986The court articulated the test as “whether there was such involvement on the part of the arresting officer ... that responsibility for the search and seizure *443 must be attributed to the police authorities.” Id.

1985The benefits could be traced with some accuracy, and there was reason for confidence that the costs could indeed be shifted with some exactitude to those benefitting.” Alyeska, supra, 421 U.S. at 264 n. 39, 95 S.Ct. at 1625 . 10 In his October 4, 1984 Memorandum and Order, the trial judge in this case concluded that Noble had “ably demonstrated” that all three of these criteria had been met.

1985The benefits could be traced with some accuracy, and there was reason for confidence that the costs could indeed be shifted with some exactitude to those benefitting.” Alyeska, supra, 421 U.S. at 264 n. 39, 95 S.Ct. at 1625 . 10 In his October 4, 1984 Memorandum and Order, the trial judge in this case concluded that Noble had “ably demonstrated” that all three of these criteria had been met.

1978Id., at 388 , 288 F.2d at 172 .

1978Id., at 388 , 288 F.2d at 172 .

1976In United States v. Sheard, 154 U.S. App.D.C. 9, 473 F.2d 139 (1972), the court articulated the standard that applies in reviewing the trial court ruling.