defect defense in Connecticut

1994"Because 30-102 is remedial in nature, it should be interpreted liberally `to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.'" Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241 , 251 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 (1957); Belanger v. Village Pub I, Inc., supra. "Even where notice requirements have not been literally met . . . if under all the circumstances it nevertheless appears that the party entitled to notice was neither misled nor hampered by that defect, then he may not avail himself of the defect in his defense of the action." Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc., 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 (19

1993CT Page 6471-JJ Although "[p]roper notice is a condition precedent to an action under the Dram Shop Act;" Id. citing Thompson v. Bristol Lodge No. 712, 31 Conn. Sup. 405 , 406 , 372 A.2d 985 (C.P. 1974); "[t]he purpose of the notice required by 30-102 is to enable a prospective defendant to begin marshalling his evidence while memories are still fresh"; Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc, 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 , 499 A.2d 85 (1985 Corrigan, J.), citing Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 , 428 (2d Cir. 1964). "[W]here notice requirements have not been literally met, [however,] if under all the

1993CT Page 6471-JJ Although "[p]roper notice is a condition precedent to an action under the Dram Shop Act;" Id. citing Thompson v. Bristol Lodge No. 712, 31 Conn. Sup. 405 , 406 , 372 A.2d 985 (C.P. 1974); "[t]he purpose of the notice required by 30-102 is to enable a prospective defendant to begin marshalling his evidence while memories are still fresh"; Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc, 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 , 499 A.2d 85 (1985 Corrigan, J.), citing Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 , 428 (2d Cir. 1964). "[W]here notice requirements have not been literally met, [however,] if under all the

1993CT Page 6471-JJ Although "[p]roper notice is a condition precedent to an action under the Dram Shop Act;" Id. citing Thompson v. Bristol Lodge No. 712, 31 Conn. Sup. 405 , 406 , 372 A.2d 985 (C.P. 1974); "[t]he purpose of the notice required by 30-102 is to enable a prospective defendant to begin marshalling his evidence while memories are still fresh"; Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc, 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 , 499 A.2d 85 (1985 Corrigan, J.), citing Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 , 428 (2d Cir. 1964). "[W]here notice requirements have not been literally met, [however,] if under all the

2016In Kitchens , the court responded to this same, now recycled argument by observing that the concept of implied waiver under Justice Palmer's definition very likely would be "eviscerate[d]" because "there appears to be no way that counsel may clearly demonstrate such knowledge except by expressly informing the court." 27 State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 485 n.25, 10 A.3d 942 .

2016In Kitchens , the court responded to this same, now recycled argument by observing that the concept of implied waiver under Justice Palmer's definition very likely would be "eviscerate[d]" because "there appears to be no way that counsel may clearly demonstrate such knowledge except by expressly informing the court." 27 State v. Kitchens , supra, 299 Conn. at 485 n.25, 10 A.3d 942 .

2014Id., 847 n.2. 8 In her main appellate brief, the plaintiff argues that the trial court did not construe the complaint to allege that solely the steep downhill grade rendered the road defective. ‘‘The plaintiff submits, however, that her dis- agreement on this issue is ultimately irrelevant given the Appellate Court’s recognition of the plaintiff’s actual defect claim, which involves a defective road design and/or layout combined with the absence of adequate warning signs and other safety measures on or attached to the roadway.’’ (Empha- sis added.) 9 For the purposes of oral argument only, thi

2008“We repeatedly have held that when a plaintiffs claim alleges a defect in the instruction that relates only to the theory of negligence, leaving the contributory negligence route untainted, the general verdict rule applies.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 211 .

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2004Sandow v. Eckstein, 67 Conn. App. 243, 248 , 786 A.2d 1223 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919 , 791 A.2d 566 (2002); see also Stone v. Bastarache, supra, 188 Conn. 205 ; Harris v. United Technologies Corp., 76 Conn. App. 421, 424-25 , 819 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 910 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003); D’Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn. App. 177, 181 , 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

2001“It is axiomatic that we are bound by our Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Otero, 49 Conn. App. 459 , 468 n.9, 715 A.2d 782 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 910 , 719 A.2d 905 (1998).

2001“It is axiomatic that we are bound by our Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Otero, 49 Conn. App. 459 , 468 n.9, 715 A.2d 782 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 910 , 719 A.2d 905 (1998).

2001Ill The plaintiff further contends that this court should abandon the specific defect rule; see part I of this opinion; and its principles as enunciated by our Supreme Court in Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 234-35 , 397 A.2d 1335 (1978). 7 “As an intermediate appellate court, ‘[i]t is not . . . within our province to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court.’ ” Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 54 Conn. App. 11 , 13 n.1, 734 A.2d 571 , cert. granted on other grounds, 251 Conn. 919 , 742 A.2d 358 (1999); see Hanes v. Board of Education, 65 Conn. App. 224 , 230 n.6, 783 A.2d

2001Ill The plaintiff further contends that this court should abandon the specific defect rule; see part I of this opinion; and its principles as enunciated by our Supreme Court in Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 234-35 , 397 A.2d 1335 (1978). 7 “As an intermediate appellate court, ‘[i]t is not . . . within our province to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court.’ ” Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 54 Conn. App. 11 , 13 n.1, 734 A.2d 571 , cert. granted on other grounds, 251 Conn. 919 , 742 A.2d 358 (1999); see Hanes v. Board of Education, 65 Conn. App. 224 , 230 n.6, 783 A.2d

2001“It is axiomatic that we are bound by our Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Otero, 49 Conn. App. 459 , 468 n.9, 715 A.2d 782 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 910 , 719 A.2d 905 (1998).

2001“It is axiomatic that we are bound by our Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Otero, 49 Conn. App. 459 , 468 n.9, 715 A.2d 782 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 910 , 719 A.2d 905 (1998).

2001Ill The plaintiff further contends that this court should abandon the specific defect rule; see part I of this opinion; and its principles as enunciated by our Supreme Court in Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 234-35 , 397 A.2d 1335 (1978). 7 “As an intermediate appellate court, ‘[i]t is not . . . within our province to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court.’ ” Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 54 Conn. App. 11 , 13 n.1, 734 A.2d 571 , cert. granted on other grounds, 251 Conn. 919 , 742 A.2d 358 (1999); see Hanes v. Board of Education, 65 Conn. App. 224 , 230 n.6, 783 A.2d

2001Ill The plaintiff further contends that this court should abandon the specific defect rule; see part I of this opinion; and its principles as enunciated by our Supreme Court in Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 234-35 , 397 A.2d 1335 (1978). 7 “As an intermediate appellate court, ‘[i]t is not . . . within our province to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court.’ ” Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 54 Conn. App. 11 , 13 n.1, 734 A.2d 571 , cert. granted on other grounds, 251 Conn. 919 , 742 A.2d 358 (1999); see Hanes v. Board of Education, 65 Conn. App. 224 , 230 n.6, 783 A.2d

2001Ill The plaintiff further contends that this court should abandon the specific defect rule; see part I of this opinion; and its principles as enunciated by our Supreme Court in Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 234-35 , 397 A.2d 1335 (1978). 7 “As an intermediate appellate court, ‘[i]t is not . . . within our province to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court.’ ” Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 54 Conn. App. 11 , 13 n.1, 734 A.2d 571 , cert. granted on other grounds, 251 Conn. 919 , 742 A.2d 358 (1999); see Hanes v. Board of Education, 65 Conn. App. 224 , 230 n.6, 783 A.2d

2001Ill The plaintiff further contends that this court should abandon the specific defect rule; see part I of this opinion; and its principles as enunciated by our Supreme Court in Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 234-35 , 397 A.2d 1335 (1978). 7 “As an intermediate appellate court, ‘[i]t is not . . . within our province to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court.’ ” Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 54 Conn. App. 11 , 13 n.1, 734 A.2d 571 , cert. granted on other grounds, 251 Conn. 919 , 742 A.2d 358 (1999); see Hanes v. Board of Education, 65 Conn. App. 224 , 230 n.6, 783 A.2d

1994"Because 30-102 is remedial in nature, it should be interpreted liberally `to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.'" Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241 , 251 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 (1957); Belanger v. Village Pub I, Inc., supra. "Even where notice requirements have not been literally met . . . if under all the circumstances it nevertheless appears that the party entitled to notice was neither misled nor hampered by that defect, then he may not avail himself of the defect in his defense of the action." Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc., 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 (19

1994"Because 30-102 is remedial in nature, it should be interpreted liberally `to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.'" Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241 , 251 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 (1957); Belanger v. Village Pub I, Inc., supra. "Even where notice requirements have not been literally met . . . if under all the circumstances it nevertheless appears that the party entitled to notice was neither misled nor hampered by that defect, then he may not avail himself of the defect in his defense of the action." Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc., 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 (19

1994"Because 30-102 is remedial in nature, it should be interpreted liberally `to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.'" Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241 , 251 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 (1957); Belanger v. Village Pub I, Inc., supra. "Even where notice requirements have not been literally met . . . if under all the circumstances it nevertheless appears that the party entitled to notice was neither misled nor hampered by that defect, then he may not avail himself of the defect in his defense of the action." Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc., 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 (19

1993CT Page 6471-JJ Although "[p]roper notice is a condition precedent to an action under the Dram Shop Act;" Id. citing Thompson v. Bristol Lodge No. 712, 31 Conn. Sup. 405 , 406 , 372 A.2d 985 (C.P. 1974); "[t]he purpose of the notice required by 30-102 is to enable a prospective defendant to begin marshalling his evidence while memories are still fresh"; Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc, 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 , 499 A.2d 85 (1985 Corrigan, J.), citing Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 , 428 (2d Cir. 1964). "[W]here notice requirements have not been literally met, [however,] if under all the

1993CT Page 6471-JJ Although "[p]roper notice is a condition precedent to an action under the Dram Shop Act;" Id. citing Thompson v. Bristol Lodge No. 712, 31 Conn. Sup. 405 , 406 , 372 A.2d 985 (C.P. 1974); "[t]he purpose of the notice required by 30-102 is to enable a prospective defendant to begin marshalling his evidence while memories are still fresh"; Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc, 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 , 499 A.2d 85 (1985 Corrigan, J.), citing Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 , 428 (2d Cir. 1964). "[W]here notice requirements have not been literally met, [however,] if under all the

1993CT Page 6471-JJ Although "[p]roper notice is a condition precedent to an action under the Dram Shop Act;" Id. citing Thompson v. Bristol Lodge No. 712, 31 Conn. Sup. 405 , 406 , 372 A.2d 985 (C.P. 1974); "[t]he purpose of the notice required by 30-102 is to enable a prospective defendant to begin marshalling his evidence while memories are still fresh"; Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc, 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 , 499 A.2d 85 (1985 Corrigan, J.), citing Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 , 428 (2d Cir. 1964). "[W]here notice requirements have not been literally met, [however,] if under all the

1993CT Page 6471-JJ Although "[p]roper notice is a condition precedent to an action under the Dram Shop Act;" Id. citing Thompson v. Bristol Lodge No. 712, 31 Conn. Sup. 405 , 406 , 372 A.2d 985 (C.P. 1974); "[t]he purpose of the notice required by 30-102 is to enable a prospective defendant to begin marshalling his evidence while memories are still fresh"; Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc, 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 , 499 A.2d 85 (1985 Corrigan, J.), citing Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 , 428 (2d Cir. 1964). "[W]here notice requirements have not been literally met, [however,] if under all the

1993CT Page 6471-JJ Although "[p]roper notice is a condition precedent to an action under the Dram Shop Act;" Id. citing Thompson v. Bristol Lodge No. 712, 31 Conn. Sup. 405 , 406 , 372 A.2d 985 (C.P. 1974); "[t]he purpose of the notice required by 30-102 is to enable a prospective defendant to begin marshalling his evidence while memories are still fresh"; Kirby v. Rusty Nail Cafe of Bristol, Inc, 40 Conn. Sup. 331 , 332 , 499 A.2d 85 (1985 Corrigan, J.), citing Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 , 428 (2d Cir. 1964). "[W]here notice requirements have not been literally met, [however,] if under all the