certification requirement in District of Columbia

2006Indeed, this court has previously rejected arguments "to strictly construe the certification requirement imposed by § 23-104(a)(1) against the government," United States v. Jackson, 441 A.2d 937, 939 (D.C.1982), and held that the certification "is not subject to attack so as to defeat the appeal." Id. (holding that court had jurisdiction over government's appeal of pretrial suppression of evidence, even though United States Attorney did not make required certification); see also In re F.K., 768 A.2d 1018 , 1020 n. 5 (D.C.2001) (holding that court had jurisdiction to consider merits of appeal,

2006Indeed, this court has previously rejected arguments "to strictly construe the certification requirement imposed by § 23-104(a)(1) against the government," United States v. Jackson, 441 A.2d 937, 939 (D.C.1982), and held that the certification "is not subject to attack so as to defeat the appeal." Id. (holding that court had jurisdiction over government's appeal of pretrial suppression of evidence, even though United States Attorney did not make required certification); see also In re F.K., 768 A.2d 1018 , 1020 n. 5 (D.C.2001) (holding that court had jurisdiction to consider merits of appeal,

2006Indeed, this court has previously rejected arguments "to strictly construe the certification requirement imposed by § 23-104(a)(1) against the government," United States v. Jackson, 441 A.2d 937, 939 (D.C.1982), and held that the certification "is not subject to attack so as to defeat the appeal." Id. (holding that court had jurisdiction over government's appeal of pretrial suppression of evidence, even though United States Attorney did not make required certification); see also In re F.K., 768 A.2d 1018 , 1020 n. 5 (D.C.2001) (holding that court had jurisdiction to consider merits of appeal,

2005Indeed, this court has previously rejected arguments “to strictly construe the certification requirement imposed by § 23-104(a)(l) against the government,” United States v. Jackson, 441 A.2d 937, 939 (D.C.1982), and held that the certification “is not subject to attack so as to defeat the appeal.” Id. (holding that court had jurisdiction over government’s appeal of pretrial suppression of evidence, even though United States Attorney did not make required certification); see also In re F.K., 768 A.2d 1018 , 1020 n. 5 (D.C.2001) (holding that court had jurisdiction to consider merits of. appeal,

2022Cf. Williams v. United States, 33 A.3d 358, 360 (D.C. 2011) (“Verbs such as ‘must’ or ‘shall’ denote mandatory requirements . . . .” (brackets omitted)).

2022Cf. Williams v. United States, 33 A.3d 358, 360 (D.C. 2011) (“Verbs such as ‘must’ or ‘shall’ denote mandatory requirements . . . .” (brackets omitted)).

2000The court observed that the certification requirement “serves the very important purpose of ensuring that the prosecutor carefully analyzes the case before deciding to appeal,” and “furthers the vital underlying goal of preventing needless delay and prolonged worry in criminal proceedings.” Id. at 1207 .

2000The court observed that the certification requirement "serves the very important purpose of ensuring that the prosecutor carefully analyzes the case before deciding to appeal," and "furthers the vital underlying goal of preventing needless delay and prolonged worry in criminal proceedings." Id. at 1207 .

2010See Jung, supra, 844 A.2d at 1107-08 (bad faith sanctions serve to “award ... attorneys’ fees to punish abuses of the judicial process and deter future misconduct”); Schlank v. Williams, 572 A.2d 101, 108 (D.C.1990) (“The intent of [bad faith sanctions] is not to compensate worthy litigants but to deter abusive litigation in the future, thereby avoiding harassment and protecting the integrity of the judicial process.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Chambers, supra, 501 U.S. at 46 n. 10, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (stating that the court’s inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct is similar t

2010See Jung, supra, 844 A.2d at 1107-08 (bad faith sanctions serve to “award ... attorneys’ fees to punish abuses of the judicial process and deter future misconduct”); Schlank v. Williams, 572 A.2d 101, 108 (D.C.1990) (“The intent of [bad faith sanctions] is not to compensate worthy litigants but to deter abusive litigation in the future, thereby avoiding harassment and protecting the integrity of the judicial process.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Chambers, supra, 501 U.S. at 46 n. 10, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (stating that the court’s inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct is similar t

2010See Jung, supra, 844 A.2d at 1107-08 (bad faith sanctions serve to “award ... attorneys’ fees to punish abuses of the judicial process and deter future misconduct”); Schlank v. Williams, 572 A.2d 101, 108 (D.C.1990) (“The intent of [bad faith sanctions] is not to compensate worthy litigants but to deter abusive litigation in the future, thereby avoiding harassment and protecting the integrity of the judicial process.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Chambers, supra, 501 U.S. at 46 n. 10, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (stating that the court’s inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct is similar t

1974D.C.Code 1973, § 29-933(b), exempts such activities as those performed by Rohe from the certification requirement. 2 The rule is that “[t]he soliciting of orders for goods within a state by the agent of a foreign corporation, and the shipment of the goods pursuant to such orders by the corporation from another state to the purchasers, do not constitute doing business within the state so as to subject the corporation or its agent to a local statute prescribing conditions of doing business within the state since such transactions are in interstate commerce and are not subject to regulation by th