certification hearing in Louisiana

2006Cotton , 96-1958 at p. 13, 691 So.2d at 768 .

2006Cotton , 96-1958 at p. 13, 691 So.2d at 768 .

2012Singleton , 01-0447 at p. 9, 826 So.2d at 62 ; Boyd , 03-1840 at p. 11, 898 So.2d at 457 .

2004Singleton v. Northfield Insurance Company, 01-0447, p. 9 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/15/02), 826 So.2d 55, 62 , writ denied, 02-1660 (La.9/30/02), 825 So.2d 1200 .

2013“Implicit in this deferential standard is recognition of the essentially factual basis of the certification inquiry and of the district court’s inherent power to manage and control pending litigation.” Dupree , 2009-2602, p. 7; 51 So.3d at 681 ; Brooks , 2008-2035, p. 11; 13 So.3d at 554 (internal citations omitted).

2012Co., 2009-2602 (La.11/30/10), 51 So.3d 673, 681 .

2012Answering that question in the negative, the court explained that “[t]he clear wording of Article 592(A)(1) requires that a motion to certify the action as a class action must be filed ‘within ninety days after service on all adverse parties of the initial pleading.’ ” Martello, 04-90 at p. 4, 886 So.2d at 648 .

2012The court l^thus concluded that “Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 592(A)(1) does not require that a new certification hearing be requested each time a petition is amended, either to add an additional defendant or to set forth a new cause of action.” Martello, 04-90 at pp. 3-4, 886 So.2d at 648 .; see also Sellers v. El Paso Indus.

2011“Implicit in this deferential standard is recognition of the essentially factual basis of the certification inquiry and of the district court’s inherent power to manage and control pending litigation.” Id. at 325 (citing Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 , 408 95th Cir.1998).

2010“Implicit in this deferential standard is recognition of the essentially factual basis of the certification inquiry and of the district court’s inherent power to manage and control pending litigation.” Id., p. 11 (quoting Gene and Gene L.L.C. v. BioPay L.L.C., 541 F.3d 318, 325 (5th Cir.2008)).

1999Id.

1998Cotton v. Gaylord Container, 96-1958, p. 13 (La.App. 1 Cir.3/27/97), 691 So.2d 760, 768 , writs denied, 97-0800 and 0830 (La.4/8/97), 693 So.2d 147 .

2023Id., 2014- 2243, p. 12, 167 So.3d at 538 (quoting Brooks, 2008-2035, p. 11, 13 So.3d at 554).

2023Id., 2014- 2243, p. 12, 167 So.3d at 538 (quoting Brooks, 2008-2035, p. 11, 13 So.3d at 554).

2019In response, the Fifth Circuit opted to exercise the certification privilege: In Stemcor USA Inc. v. Cia Siderurgica do Para Cosipar, 870 F.3d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 2017), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 895 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2018), we interpreted, inter alia, a matter of Louisiana law: whether the state non-resident attachment statute, La.

2018An expert in Alexander had testified at the certification hearing that the dose of exposure to ethyl acrylic fumes that had escaped from a railroad tank car "would be impacted by important individual variables, such as the specific location of the plaintiff at the time of the exposure, and whether plaintiff moved from location to location during the exposure." Id.

2018Another expert in Alexander testified that "the symptoms complained of by the plaintiffs, such as irritation of the eyes and nose, respiratory irritation, coughing, nausea, and vomiting, are not specific or unique to ethyl acrylate exposure, but are common symptoms with a myriad of causes." Id.

2017In invoking the certification privilege granted by Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII, the Court of Appeals stated that it was “not prepared to speculate about how the Louisiana Supreme Court would define ‘good faith’ as used in the whistleblower statute.” Id.

2012“Implicit in this deferential standard is recognition of the essentially factual basis of the certification inquiry and of the district court’s inherent power to manage and control pending litigation.” Id., p. 11 (quoting Gene and Gene L.L.C. v. BioPay L.L.C., 541 F.3d 318, 325 (5th Cir.2008)).

2012Energy, L.P., 08-403, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/10/09), 8 So.3d 723, 729 .

2012Singleton , 01-0447 at p. 9, 826 So.2d at 62 ; Boyd , 03-1840 at p. 11, 898 So.2d at 457 .

2011Recognizing the myriad sources of PAHs and dioxins in the community that could account for and/or contribute to the contamination of dust in plaintiffs’ attics, the district court acknowledged that “[a]t this stage in the suit, plaintiffs have not provided evidence that the PAHs and dioxins found on certain pieces of property derived solely from the Dura-Wood facility.” Citing Marshall v. Air Liquide-Big Three, Inc., 08-0668 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/17/08) ; 2 So.3d 541, 546 , writ denied, 09-0105, 09-0111 (La.3/13/09), 5 So.3d 125 , the district court in this case excused this evidentiary lapse bas

2011Recognizing the myriad sources of PAHs and dioxins in the community that could account for and/or contribute to the contamination of dust in plaintiffs’ attics, the district court acknowledged that “[a]t this stage in the suit, plaintiffs have not provided evidence that the PAHs and dioxins found on certain pieces of property derived solely from the Dura-Wood facility.” Citing Marshall v. Air Liquide-Big Three, Inc., 08-0668 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/17/08) ; 2 So.3d 541, 546 , writ denied, 09-0105, 09-0111 (La.3/13/09), 5 So.3d 125 , the district court in this case excused this evidentiary lapse bas

2008Id., at 888 . |7At the certification hearing in the instant case, deposition testimony taken on December 1, 2005 of Terry Lisotta, Chief Executive Officer of LCPIC, was introduced.

2007Id.

2007Mathews v. Hixson Bros., Inc., 02-124 (La.App. 3rd Cir 7/31/02), 831 So.2d 995, 1000 .

2007Andry v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 97-0793 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1998), 710 So.2d 1126, 1128-29 , writ denied, 98-1158 (La.6/19/98), 720 So.2d 1214 .