certification requirement in Florida

2008Comm'n, 436 So.2d 383, 387 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (quoting stipulation amongst the parties articulating the purpose of the certification hearing).

2008Comm’n, 436 So.2d 383, 387 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (quoting stipulation amongst the parties articulating the purpose of the certification hearing).

2025See Katha, LLC v. SHEDDF3-AE, LLC, 394 So. 3d 707 , 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). 2 Campbell v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 204 So. 3d 476, 479-80 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)); § 702.015(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“The Legislature intends that this section expedite the foreclosure process by ensuring initial disclosure of a plaintiff's status and the facts supporting that status, thereby ensuring the availability of documents necessary to the prosecution of the case.”) See also § 673.3011, Fla. Stat. (2018) (providing in pertinent part that the term “person entitled to enforce” an instrument means: “(1) The holder of th

2017“The certification requirement of the statute was not intended to be a prerequisite to suit but was instead intended to expedite the foreclosure process.” Campbell, 204 So.3d at 479 -80 (citing § 702.015(1) (“The Legislature intends that this section expedite the foreclosure process by ensuring initial disclosure of a plaintiffs status and the facts supporting that status, thereby ensuring the availability of documents necessary to the prosecution of the case.”)).

2025See Katha, LLC v. SHEDDF3-AE, LLC, 394 So. 3d 707 , 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). 2 Campbell v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 204 So. 3d 476, 479-80 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)); § 702.015(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“The Legislature intends that this section expedite the foreclosure process by ensuring initial disclosure of a plaintiff's status and the facts supporting that status, thereby ensuring the availability of documents necessary to the prosecution of the case.”) See also § 673.3011, Fla. Stat. (2018) (providing in pertinent part that the term “person entitled to enforce” an instrument means: “(1) The holder of th

2025See Deakter v. Menendez, 830 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“There is no requirement that [plaintiff] prove exactly how he lost possession of the note . . . .”); Boumarate v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 172 So. 3d 535, 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (noting that there is no requirement that the bank establish “exactly when, how, and by whom the note was lost.”); Beltway Cap., LLC v. Nigel Lucombe, 211 So. 3d 328, 330 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“The certification requirement of the statute was not intended to be a prerequisite to suit but was instead intended to expedite the foreclosure process.”) (quoting 1 W

2025See Deakter v. Menendez, 830 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“There is no requirement that [plaintiff] prove exactly how he lost possession of the note . . . .”); Boumarate v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 172 So. 3d 535, 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (noting that there is no requirement that the bank establish “exactly when, how, and by whom the note was lost.”); Beltway Cap., LLC v. Nigel Lucombe, 211 So. 3d 328, 330 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“The certification requirement of the statute was not intended to be a prerequisite to suit but was instead intended to expedite the foreclosure process.”) (quoting 1 W

2025See Deakter v. Menendez, 830 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“There is no requirement that [plaintiff] prove exactly how he lost possession of the note . . . .”); Boumarate v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 172 So. 3d 535, 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (noting that there is no requirement that the bank establish “exactly when, how, and by whom the note was lost.”); Beltway Cap., LLC v. Nigel Lucombe, 211 So. 3d 328, 330 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“The certification requirement of the statute was not intended to be a prerequisite to suit but was instead intended to expedite the foreclosure process.”) (quoting 1 W

2012Specifically, the certification requirement helps to “assure that ‘a court ... never issue[s] an ex parte order without notice to defendants and without a hearing, unless an immediate threat of irreparable harm exists, which forecloses opportunity to give reasonable notice.’” See United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Quincy Corp., 681 So.2d 773, 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (quoting Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So.2d 120, 125 (Fla.1970)).

2012Specifically, the certification requirement helps to “assure that ‘a court ... never issue[s] an ex parte order without notice to defendants and without a hearing, unless an immediate threat of irreparable harm exists, which forecloses opportunity to give reasonable notice.’” See United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Quincy Corp., 681 So.2d 773, 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (quoting Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So.2d 120, 125 (Fla.1970)).

2012Specifically, the certification requirement helps to “assure that ‘a court ... never issue[s] an ex parte order without notice to defendants and without a hearing, unless an immediate threat of irreparable harm exists, which forecloses opportunity to give reasonable notice.’” See United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Quincy Corp., 681 So.2d 773, 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (quoting Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So.2d 120, 125 (Fla.1970)).

2012Specifically, the certification requirement helps to “assure that ‘a court ... never issue[s] an ex parte order without notice to defendants and without a hearing, unless an immediate threat of irreparable harm exists, which forecloses opportunity to give reasonable notice.’” See United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Quincy Corp., 681 So.2d 773, 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (quoting Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So.2d 120, 125 (Fla.1970)).

2012Consistent with this reasoning, the Fourth District in Sunplus Credit, Inc. v. Office of the Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Legal Affairs, 752 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), expressly characterized a movant’s failure to certify under rule 1.610(a)(1)(B) as an issue regarding prior issue, stating: Appellants argue that the motion for temporary injunction was deficient because it did not contain certification by plaintiffs counsel describing the efforts made to give notice and reasons why notice should not be required.

2008See Sun Sentinel & Tribune Co. v. Petrovich, 744 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (dismissing workers' compensation appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order did not include the certification required by rule 9.180(b)(1)(C)).

2005Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 661 So.2d 319, 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). "[T]he trial court may look beyond the pleadings and, without resolving disputed issues, determine how disputed issues might be addressed on a classwide basis." Earnest, 859 So.2d at 1257-58 ; see also In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 688 (N.D.Ga.2003)(stating that the court will scrutinize the evidence plaintiffs propose to use in proving their claims, ensuring through information submitted outside the pleadings that the requirements of the certification rule are met, not whether plaintiff's claim

2005Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 661 So.2d 319, 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). "[T]he trial court may look beyond the pleadings and, without resolving disputed issues, determine how disputed issues might be addressed on a classwide basis." Earnest, 859 So.2d at 1257-58 ; see also In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 688 (N.D.Ga.2003)(stating that the court will scrutinize the evidence plaintiffs propose to use in proving their claims, ensuring through information submitted outside the pleadings that the requirements of the certification rule are met, not whether plaintiff's claim

2005Croix County, Wisc., 219 F.R.D. 607, 617 (W.D.Wis.2003) (stating that the judge should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary for certification, and when these questions overlap with the merits of the case, the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits).