certification hearing in California

2019"It is far better from a fairness perspective to determine class certification independent of threshold questions disposing of the merits, and thus permit defendants who prevail on those merits, equally with those who lose on the merits, to obtain the preclusive benefits of such victories against an entire class and not just a named plaintiff." ( Brinker , at p. 1034, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 , 273 P.3d 513 .) "Although predominance of common issues is often a major factor in a certification analysis, it is not the only consideration.

2019"It is far better from a fairness perspective to determine class certification independent of threshold questions disposing of the merits, and thus permit defendants who prevail on those merits, equally with those who lose on the merits, to obtain the preclusive benefits of such victories against an entire class and not just a named plaintiff." ( Brinker , at p. 1034, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 , 273 P.3d 513 .) "Although predominance of common issues is often a major factor in a certification analysis, it is not the only consideration.

2013(See, e.g., § 5250, subd. (a) [additional intensive 14-day treatment period if person remains “a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled”]; § 5260 [second intensive 14-day treatment period if the person is suicidal]; § 5270.15 [additional 30-day treatment period if person remains gravely disabled, he or she is unwilling to voluntarily accept treatment, and the county board of supervisors authorized 30-day treatment periods]; § 5300 [additional 180-day commitment if person is imminently dangerous]; § 5304, subd. (b) [second 180-day commitment if person remains imminently

2013(See, e.g., § 5250, subd. (a) [additional intensive 14-day treatment period if person remains “a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled”]; § 5260 [second intensive 14-day treatment period if the person is suicidal]; § 5270.15 [additional 30-day treatment period if person remains gravely disabled, he or she is unwilling to voluntarily accept treatment, and the county board of supervisors authorized 30-day treatment periods]; § 5300 [additional 180-day commitment if person is imminently dangerous]; § 5304, subd. (b) [second 180-day commitment if person remains imminently

2017(See § 5001; Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 423 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 794 ].) For example, the Act limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. (§ 5150; Sorenson , at p. 423.) Commitments longer than the initial 72-hour detention require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause for confinement, unless the detainee has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276; se

2017(See § 5001; Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 423 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 794 ].) For example, the Act limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. (§ 5150; Sorenson , at p. 423.) Commitments longer than the initial 72-hour detention require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause for confinement, unless the detainee has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276; se

2017(See § 5001; Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 423 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 794 ].) For example, the Act limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. (§ 5150; Sorenson , at p. 423.) Commitments longer than the initial 72-hour detention require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause for confinement, unless the detainee has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276; se

2017(See § 5001; Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 423 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 794 ].) For example, the Act limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. (§ 5150; Sorenson , at p. 423.) Commitments longer than the initial 72-hour detention require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause for confinement, unless the detainee has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276; se

2017(See § 5001; Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 423 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 794 ].) For example, the Act limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. (§ 5150; Sorenson , at p. 423.) Commitments longer than the initial 72-hour detention require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause for confinement, unless the detainee has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276; se

2017(See § 5001; Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 423 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 794 ].) For example, the Act limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. (§ 5150; Sorenson , at p. 423.) Commitments longer than the initial 72-hour detention require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause for confinement, unless the detainee has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276; se

2013The proposed conservatee is entitled to appointed counsel, a jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a unanimous verdict on the question of whether the person is gravely disabled. (§§ 5350, subd. (d), 5365; Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 604, 611 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 ].) Before July 1, 2012, an LPS conservator had the power to place the conservatee in a state developmental center or other locked treatment facility if the conservator determined it was the least restrictive placement. 3 (§§ 5353, 5358, 6000, subd. (a)(1); In re Violet C. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 8

2013The proposed conservatee is entitled to appointed counsel, a jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a unanimous verdict on the question of whether the person is gravely disabled. (§§ 5350, subd. (d), 5365; Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 604, 611 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 ].) Before July 1, 2012, an LPS conservator had the power to place the conservatee in a state developmental center or other locked treatment facility if the conservator determined it was the least restrictive placement. 3 (§§ 5353, 5358, 6000, subd. (a)(1); In re Violet C. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 8

2023In certifying a class action, the court must also conclude that litigation of individual issues, including those arising from affirmative defenses, can be managed fairly and efficiently. [Citation.] ‘[W]hether in a given case affirmative defenses should 11 lead a court to approve or reject certification will hinge on the manageability of any individual issues.’ ” (Duran v. U.S. Bank Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 28-29 .) “ ‘Individual issues do not render class certification inappropriate so long as such issues may effectively be managed.’ ” (Id. at p. 29.) “Trial courts must pay careful attentio

2019In certifying a class action, the court must also conclude that litigation of individual issues, *450 including those arising from affirmative defenses, can be managed fairly and efficiently. [Citation.] '[W]hether in a given case affirmative defenses should lead a court to approve or reject certification will hinge on the manageability of any individual issues. [Citation.]' In wage and hour cases where a party seeks class certification based on allegations that the employer consistently imposed a uniform policy or de facto practice on class members, the party must still demonstrate that the i

2019"After the initial 72-hour detention, the 14-day and 30-day commitments each require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine probable cause for confinement unless the detainee has filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. (§[§] 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276.) A 180-day commitment requires a superior court order. (§ 5301.)" ( Conservatorship of Susan T., supra , 8 Cal.4th at p. 1009 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 884 P.2d 988 .) We note the immunity claims raised under Government Code sections 820.2, 854.8, and 855.6 each appear to hinge on factual disput

2019"After the initial 72-hour detention, the 14-day and 30-day commitments each require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine probable cause for confinement unless the detainee has filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. (§[§] 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276.) A 180-day commitment requires a superior court order. (§ 5301.)" ( Conservatorship of Susan T., supra , 8 Cal.4th at p. 1009 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 884 P.2d 988 .) We note the immunity claims raised under Government Code sections 820.2, 854.8, and 855.6 each appear to hinge on factual disput

2022(See Issakhani v. Shadow Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 917 , 934 [“the meaning and purpose of a legislative enactment is a question of law for the court; an expert’s opinion on such matters is an inadmissible legal conclusion”].) 32 In Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pages 999–1002, the Supreme Court quoted from the appellate court’s factual description of the case and concluded that the appellate court had properly determined that total compliance with the certification requirement was not necessary.

2019He points to a statement in Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at page 1001 , that the “plain meaning” of the certification requirement “is that the policy must contain the requirement.” However, although the policy in Ramirez happened to contain the certification requirement, the issue there was whether “every peace officer must meet the requirement,” not whether the requirement must be contained within the four corners of the pursuit policy itself.

2017(See § 5001; Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 423 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 794 ].) For example, the Act limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. (§ 5150; Sorenson , at p. 423.) Commitments longer than the initial 72-hour detention require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause for confinement, unless the detainee has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276; se

2017(See § 5001; Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 423 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 794 ].) For example, the Act limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. (§ 5150; Sorenson , at p. 423.) Commitments longer than the initial 72-hour detention require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause for confinement, unless the detainee has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276; se

2013The proposed conservatee is entitled to appointed counsel, a jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a unanimous verdict on the question of whether the person is gravely disabled. (§§ 5350, subd. (d), 5365; Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 604, 611 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 ].) Before July 1, 2012, an LPS conservator had the power to place the conservatee in a state developmental center or other locked treatment facility if the conservator determined it was the least restrictive placement. 3 (§§ 5353, 5358, 6000, subd. (a)(1); In re Violet C. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 8

2013The proposed conservatee is entitled to appointed counsel, a jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a unanimous verdict on the question of whether the person is gravely disabled. (§§ 5350, subd. (d), 5365; Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 604, 611 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 ].) Before July 1, 2012, an LPS conservator had the power to place the conservatee in a state developmental center or other locked treatment facility if the conservator determined it was the least restrictive placement. 3 (§§ 5353, 5358, 6000, subd. (a)(1); In re Violet C. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 8

2025(Id., subd. (c); Peake 13 v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 440 (Peake).) Such a sanction must “be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of [the violation] or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” (§ 128.7, subd. (d); Peake, at p. 441.) To obtain sanctions under this section, the moving party is required to show the opposing party pursued a claim that was legally or factually frivolous.

2020(See People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1010 [“It is a settled axiom of statutory construction that significance should be attributed to every word and phrase of a statute, and a construction making some words surplusage should be avoided”].) We disagree with each of the Department’s arguments.

2020Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459, subd. (a); Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 934, fn. 19 [departmental enrolled bill reports]; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Andreini & Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1413 , 1420-1424 & fn. 10 [legislative committee reports].) These documents demonstrate that the purpose of the 1987 amendment was technical in nature, did not intend to make substantive changes, and was designed to make the chief psychiatrist’s certification conform to the criteria used at the certification hearing.

2020There is “ ‘ “no agency discretion to promulgate a regulation which is inconsistent with the governing statute.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re McGhee (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 902, 911 (McGhee).) Requiring the Department to promulgate regulations consistent with the Amendment does not render the certification requirement surplusage of no legal effect, as the Department contends. “ ‘[S]urplusage’ in this context means surplusage as to other statutory language, not as to some possible judicial interpretation.” (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658 .) Our interpretation of the Amendment still requires th

2019(California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1043 [“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions that are not considered.”].)7 Riley points to nothing in the language of section 17004.7 providing that the certification requirement must be stated in the pursuit policy itself.

2018The distinction between a CLRA and non-CLRA class action is that a non-CLRA class action plaintiff must also establish that pursuit of the class action will result in substantial benefit to the litigants and the court, while a CLRA class action plaintiff need not do so." (In re Vioxx Class Cases (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 116, 128, fn. 12 .) 17 (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 1106 ; see Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1024 .) "Although predominance of common issues is often a major factor in a certification analysis, it is not the only consideration.

2016With regard to the second point, Tracy argued in her writ petition that the stipulation did not allow Perkovich to hear a motion to enforce ‘“an agreement in which she had no role.” Urging that the jurisdiction of a temporary judge, circumscribed by the stipulation, is limited to matters that are ‘“a continuation of the stipulated cause or question its finality, such as motions to vacate or reconsider” and not to ‘“ancillary” matters ‘“heard on a separate record” and seeking “an independent judgment or reviewable order” (Orange County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Superior Court (2005) 12

2016With regard to the second point, Tracy argued in her writ petition that the stipulation did not allow Perkovich to hear a motion to enforce “an agreement in which she had no role.” Urging that the jurisdiction of a temporary judge, circumscribed by the stipulation, is limited to matters that are “a continuation of the stipulated cause or question its finality, such as motions to vacate or reconsider” and not to “ancillary” matters “heard on a separate record” and seeking “an independent judgment or reviewable order” (Orange County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Ca

2015(Koval v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1062-1063 (Koval) [holding that "the existence of a uniform policy is not the sole deciding factor in a certification analysis" and certification was properly denied where company's supervisors differed in implementing meal period policies].) Indeed, as the trial court aptly detailed (see ante, part I), there were numerous variances in whether, when and how putative class members received meal breaks.