certification hearing in Texas

2011Greenwell, 159 S.W.3d at 649 (noting that “[t]he purpose of the certification requirement is to efficiently sort appealable cases from non-appealable cases.

2011Greenwell, 159 S.W.3d at 649 (noting that “[t]he purpose of the certification requirement is to efficiently sort appealable cases from non-appealable cases.

2022See id.

2021See Butler, 270 S.W.3d at 758 .

2015The Rules of Appellate Procedure require compliance with Article 44.01, including this certification requirement, for a notice of appeal to be “sufficient.” Riewe, 13 S.W.3d at 411 ; TEX.R.APP.P. 25.2(c)(2).

2014State v. Riewe, 13 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) ("The certification requirement is in Art. 44.01, and we have held that the failure to comply with Art. 44.01 is a substantive defect which deprives the court of *156 appeals of jurisdiction.

2010See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex.1996).

2010See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex.1996).

1998In the Matter of D.W.L., 828 S.W.2d 520, 525 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).

1998In the Matter of D.W.L., 828 S.W.2d 520, 525 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).

2014See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Pena v. State, 323 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.) (citing Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 614 (noting that ap- pellate rule 37.1 is the vehicle for amending defective certifications where a correctable error impedes a defendant’s right to appeal)).

2002See City of Pharr, 962 S.W.2d at 646-48 (the appellate court found that notice of the certification hearing was sufficient despite the alteration of class representative and additional request for certification as an opt-out rather than as a mandatory class four days before the hearing because alteration did not adversely affect appellant or class members); In the Interest of 981 S.W.2d 72, 85-87 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (the appellate court found that the certification hearing was insufficient where the record of the initial hearing could not meet the representative’s burden of es

2002See City of Pharr , 962 S.W.2d at 646-48 (the appellate court found that notice of the certification hearing was sufficient despite the alteration of class representative and additional request for certification as an opt-out rather than as a mandatory class four days before the hearing because alteration did not adversely affect appellant or class members); In the Interest of M.M.O. , 981 S.W.2d 72, 85-87 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (the appellate court found that the certification hearing was insufficient where the record of the initial hearing could not meet the representative's b

1982In the Matter of S.E.C., 605 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); In the Matter of P.A.C., 562 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1978, no writ); In the Matter of Honsaker, 539 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1982In the Matter of S.E.C., 605 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); In the Matter of P.A.G., 562 S.W.2d 913 , 915 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1978, no writ); In the Matter of Honsaker, 539 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2002See City of Pharr, 962 S.W.2d at 646-48 (the appellate court found that notice of the certification hearing was sufficient despite the alteration of class representative and additional request for certification as an opt-out rather than as a mandatory class four days before the hearing because alteration did not adversely affect appellant or class members); In the Interest of 981 S.W.2d 72, 85-87 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (the appellate court found that the certification hearing was insufficient where the record of the initial hearing could not meet the representative’s burden of es

2002See City of Pharr , 962 S.W.2d at 646-48 (the appellate court found that notice of the certification hearing was sufficient despite the alteration of class representative and additional request for certification as an opt-out rather than as a mandatory class four days before the hearing because alteration did not adversely affect appellant or class members); In the Interest of M.M.O. , 981 S.W.2d 72, 85-87 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (the appellate court found that the certification hearing was insufficient where the record of the initial hearing could not meet the representative's b

2011See Pena v. State, 323 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.) (citing Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 614 (noting that ap- pellate rule 37.1 is the vehicle for amending defective certifications where a correctable error impedes a defendant’s right to appeal)).

2011Certification allows appealable cases to move through the system unhindered while eliminating, at an early stage, the time and expense associated with non-appealable cases.”); Pena, 323 S.W.3d at 527 (concluding that appellate court may dismiss appeal from a defective certification when a defendant lacks the ability to appeal); but see Menjivar v. State, 264 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (concluding that when the certification is defective by stating that a right of appeal exists where the record affirmatively shows no right of appeal, appellate court must still

2004See Bloom v. Texas State Bd. of Exam’rs of Psychologists, 492 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Tex.1973) (“purpose of grandfather provisions in licensing acts is to exempt from statutory regulations those members who have acceptably followed their profession or trade for a required period of years”).

2004See Bloom v. Texas State Bd. of 9 Exam’rs of Psychologists, 492 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Tex. 1973) (“purpose of grandfather provisions in licensing acts is to exempt from statutory regulations those members who have acceptably followed their profession or trade for a required period of years”).

2003“If construction of the Texas statute justifies the application of Texas rather than [foreign] law, and that does not offend the constitution, it is not necessary to engage in the choice of law analysis based on the significant relationships set out in [section 6(2) of the Restatement].” Busse v. Pacific Cattle Feeding Fund, 896 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied) (citing Siskind v. Villa Found, for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.1982)). 8 At the certification hearing, the district court heard extensive argument on whether the Securities Act contains a statutory directive

2003AIf construction of the Texas statute justifies the application of Texas rather than [foreign] law, and that does not offend the constitution, it is not necessary to engage in the choice of law analysis based on the significant relationships set out in [section 6(2) of the Restatement].@ Busse v. Pacific Cattle Feeding Fund, 896 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Tex. 15 App.CTexarkana 1995, writ denied) (citing Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1982)).8 At the certification hearing, the district court heard extensive argument on whether the Securities Act contains a statutory direct

2002See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Forbush v. J.C.

2002See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir.1999) (citing Forbush v. J.C.

1995M.A.V., Jr. v. Webb County Court at Law, 842 S.W.2d 739, 748 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (citing In re G.B.B., 638 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ)); see also Matter of S.E.C., 605 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ) (since a certification hearing is not an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court does not consider admissibility of a confession).

1982In the Matter of S.E.C., 605 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); In the Matter of P.A.C., 562 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1978, no writ); In the Matter of Honsaker, 539 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1991See In the Matter of B.V., 645 S.W.2d 334 , 336 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (the signing of the order by the judge in his capacity of presiding judge of the juvenile court is sufficient to comply with the certification requirement of § 54.02(h)).

1991See In the Matter of B.V., 645 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (the signing of the order by the judge in his capacity of presiding judge of the juvenile court is sufficient to comply with the certification requirement of § 54.02(h)).

2025In re C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858–59.

2022See In re C.R., 571 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (holding that “[T]he objective of a certification hearing is not to determine ultimate guilt or innocence, but rather to determine if there is probable cause to believe the child committed the offense alleged . . .

2022Dist., 770 S.W.2d 621, 627 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (In determining whether to certify a class, trial courts may consider the pleadings and other material in the record, along with the evidence presented at the certification hearing.). 9 The order includes findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a trial plan.10 In finding predominance, the trial court’s class certification order states “the Foundation made uniform promises to [members of the putative class] and that the Foundation breached these promises in a uniform manner.” In its order, the trial court rejected the Fo

2022Dist., 770 S.W.2d 621, 627 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (observing that in determining whether to certify a class, trial courts may consider the pleadings and other material in the record, together with the evidence presented in the certification hearing). 18Tex.

2012See French v. State, 484 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (“[A]n officer may administer a breath test even though he is not otherwise qualified to interpret the results, and the standards required to qualify one to administer the test are far less than those qualifying to interpret the result[.]”); 37 Tex. Admin.

2012See French v. State , 484 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. Crim.

2009Although representations made by counsel at a certification hearing may be considered "materials" for purposes of a class certification decision, see Tall , 972 S.W.2d at 899 , we decline to credit the vague speculations and unsubstantiated complaints of counsel in light of the almost complete absence of any other evidence of numerosity.

2009Although representations made by counsel at a certification hearing may be considered "materials" for purposes of a class certification decision, see Tall, 972 S.W.2d at 899 , we decline to credit the vague speculations and unsubstantiated complaints of counsel in light of the almost complete absence of any other evidence of numerosity.

2009Cf. Hall , 278 S.W.3d at 542 (explaining that failure to make specific objection waives complaint).

2009Cf. Hall, 51 The testimony referred to revealed that the objective of the settlement was to provide restitution for individuals who had paid excess premiums, had been the victim of discriminatory practices, or had not received notice that their premiums were increased due to their credit histories. 52 The Hookses further contend that although Farmers was a party to the Geter class action and, therefore, knew of its existence, no party informed the Hookses about the certification proceeding occurring in this case. 73 278 S.W.3d at 542 (explaining that failure to make specific objection waives c

2005Greenwell v. Court of Appeals , No. AP-75,017, 2005 Tex. Crim.

2005Greenwell v. Court of Appeals, No. 5 AP-75,017, 2005 Tex. Crim.

2003Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v. City of Pharr, 962 S.W.2d 631, 640 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet'n dism'd w.o.j.); Employers Casualty Company v. Texas Association of School Boards Workers' Compensation Self-Insurance Fund, 886 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.).

2003Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v. City of Pharr, 962 S.W.2d 631, 640 (TexApp.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet’n dism’d w.o.j.); Employers Casualty Company v. Texas Association of School Boards Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurance Fund, 886 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, writ dism’d w.o.j.).

2000The Bernal opinion "reject[s] this approach of certify now and worry later," Bernal , 2000 Tex. LEXIS 50 at *23 , and requires a rigorous analysis now be made at the initial certification hearing to determine whether all the prerequisites to certification have been met.

2000The Bernal opinion “reject[s] this approach of certify now and worry later,” Bernal, at 435, 2000 Tex. LEXIS 50 at *23 , and requires a rigorous analysis now be made at the initial certification hearing to determine whether all the prerequisites to certification have been met.

1998Brister, 722 S.W.2d at 772 .

1994Co. of the Southwest v. Brister , 722 S.W.2d 764, 770 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1986, no writ); RSR Corp. v. Hayes , 673 S.W.2d 928, 931-32 (Tex. App.Dallas 1984, writ dism'd). 5. 5 See , e.g. , Petty , 778 S.W.2d at 159 ; Franklin , 774 S.W.2d at 310 . 6. 6 In addition, Focus claims that if consideration of materials is acceptable at the certification hearing, there was either "no evidence" or "insufficient evidence" to support the certification order.

2002In Microsoft v. Manning, the defendant voiced an identical challenge to the production of expert testimony at the certification hearing. 914 S.W.2d at 615 .

2002In Microsoft v. Manning, the defendant voiced an identical challenge to the production of expert testimony at the certification hearing. 914 S.W.2d at 615 .

2002Weatherly, 905 S.W.2d at 652 ; see Manning, 914 S.W.2d at 614-15 (finding that the failure of the class representatives to attend the certification hearing did not preclude a finding of adequate representation).

2001Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche, 905 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d w.o.j.).