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16 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New Century Financial Services Inc. v. Oughlagreen1 sentence2024Hartford claims New Century Financial Services, Inc. v. Oughla, 437 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
James L. McCoy Administrator of the Electrical Workers Trust Funds, Etc. v. Massachusetts Institute of Technologygreen1 sentence2018If lower courts felt free to limit Supreme Court opinions precisely to the facts of each case, then our system of jurisprudence would be in shambles, with litigants, lawyers, and legislatures left to grope aimlessly for some semblance of reliable guidance. [Rose, 206 N.J. at 183 (quoting McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)).] The Court's analysis of the purpose of the certification requirement in Sroczynski is binding and controls the outcome of this case. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fuchsgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., State v. Fuchs, 60 N.J. 564 , 292 A. 2d 10 (1972). [3] We do not read this passage to be inconsistent with the observation of Craig & Pomeroy, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law (Gann 2002) § 15:4-1 that "[o]ne significant impact of the certification requirement may well be to reduce, in significant measure, the summary judgment motion practice as established under Oswin v. Shaw ." 2002See, e.g., State v. Fuchs, 60 N.J. 564 , 292 A. 2d 10 (1972). [3] We do not read this passage to be inconsistent with the observation of Craig & Pomeroy, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law (Gann 2002) § 15:4-1 that "[o]ne significant impact of the certification requirement may well be to reduce, in significant measure, the summary judgment motion practice as established under Oswin v. Shaw ." | 1 | 1 |
Town of Secaucus v. City of Jersey Citygreen1 sentence2002In addition, I held that the certification requirement was not applicable to the years under appeal in the TPI matter, 1998 and 1999, because my interpretation of the requirement constituted a “ ‘clarifying decision in a murky or uncertain area of the law,’ ” id. at 542, which should be applied prospectively. | 1 | 1 |
United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences1991"As is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation, ... courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure." Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. at 412-13, 103 S.Ct. at 704-05, 74 L.Ed. 2d at 581 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 , 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1517-1518 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 92, 110 (1977)). 1991"As is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation, ... courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure." Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. at 412-13, 103 S.Ct. at 704-05, 74 L.Ed. 2d at 581 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 , 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1517-1518 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 92, 110 (1977)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Watts v. Camaligan
green
2 sentences2004AICRA only states “that a plaintiff ‘shall’ provide the required certification ‘[i]n order to satisfy the tort option provisions’ of the subsection, which describes the types of injury required to qualify for non-economic damages under the limitation on lawsuit option.” Id. at 462-63 , 782 A.2d 479 (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a). 2004AICRA only states “that a plaintiff ‘shall’ provide the required certification ‘[i]n order to satisfy the tort option provisions’ of the subsection, which describes the types of injury required to qualify for non-economic damages under the limitation on lawsuit option.” Id. at 462-63 , 782 A.2d 479 (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a). | 2 | 2002–2004 |
US Bank, N.A. v. Hough
green
1 sentence2020Ibid. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Lee v. Carter-Reed Co.
green
1 sentence2020A-5545-18T3 11 In support, plaintiffs rely on Lee, 203 N.J. at 525-26 , where the Supreme Court reversed because the trial court failed to accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true at the certification stage and for assuming that defendant would prevail on some of its scientific defenses. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sroczynski v. Milek
green
1 sentence2018The motion judge found "there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding [Praetorian's] compliance with the statutory requirements regarding the cancellation of the policy." The judge distinguished Sroczynski on the basis that the insurer in that case, NJM, "failed to provide any certification at all." The court rejected the Sroczynski Court's analysis that the purpose of the certification requirement "was to place personal responsibility on an employee of the insurer to assure that proper notice of cancellation was given and to require that employee to certify to that fact, recognizing | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Rose
green
1 sentence2018If lower courts felt free to limit Supreme Court opinions precisely to the facts of each case, then our system of jurisprudence would be in shambles, with litigants, lawyers, and legislatures left to grope aimlessly for some semblance of reliable guidance. [Rose, 206 N.J. at 183 (quoting McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)).] The Court's analysis of the purpose of the certification requirement in Sroczynski is binding and controls the outcome of this case. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lamarque v. Fairbanks Capital Corp.
green
2 sentences2008Lamarque, supra, 927 A.2d at 754—56, 767 n. 26. 2008Lamarque, supra, 927 A.2d at 754—56, 767 n. 26. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Konopka v. Foster
green
2 sentences2003However, a transformation of the dismissal to one without prejudice offers plaintiff no particular benefit in this case because any reinstitution of suit is barred by the statute of limitations. [ Konopka, supra, 356 N.J.Super. at 228 , 812 A. 2d 363 .] In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of substantial compliance should have been invoked to avoid the statute-of-limitations bar, since she had submitted, within one month of the filing of the defendant's answer, "a report by her treating chiropractor that established permanency[,]" ibid., the Konopka court stated, in pertin 2003However, a transformation of the dismissal to one without prejudice offers plaintiff no particular benefit in this case because any reinstitution of suit is barred by the statute of limitations. [ Konopka, supra, 356 N.J.Super. at 228 , 812 A. 2d 363 .] In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of substantial compliance should have been invoked to avoid the statute-of-limitations bar, since she had submitted, within one month of the filing of the defendant's answer, "a report by her treating chiropractor that established permanency[,]" ibid., the Konopka court stated, in pertin | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2000In determining whether “fundamental fairness,” Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Construction Co., supra, 161 N.J. at 192 , 735 A.2d 1142 , warrants excluding this matter and the twelve companion matters from the prospectivity ruling, I must consider Secaucus’s effort and expense, and also must consider any unfairness or injustice resulting from depriving all thirteen projects of them tax exemption by applying my interpretation of the certification requirement retroactively. 2000In determining whether “fundamental fairness,” Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Construction Co., supra, 161 N.J. at 192 , 735 A.2d 1142 , warrants excluding this matter and the twelve companion matters from the prospectivity ruling, I must consider Secaucus’s effort and expense, and also must consider any unfairness or injustice resulting from depriving all thirteen projects of them tax exemption by applying my interpretation of the certification requirement retroactively. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Town of Secaucus v. City of Jersey City
green
1 sentence2000As I have previously explained, Town of Secaucus v. City of Jersey City, supra 19 N.J. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster
green
2 sentences1991"The police power is the public right to reasonable regulation for the common good and welfare." Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 123 , 118 A. 2d 824 (1955). 1991"The police power is the public right to reasonable regulation for the common good and welfare." Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 123 , 118 A. 2d 824 (1955). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Accountemps Division of Robert Half of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Birch Tree Group, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1991In Accountemps Div. of Robert Half of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Birch Tree Group, Ltd., 115 N.J. 614 , 560 A. 2d 663 (1989), the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld, over a commerce clause challenge, a state statute requiring the registration of out-of-state employment agencies doing business within New Jersey. 1991In Accountemps Div. of Robert Half of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Birch Tree Group, Ltd., 115 N.J. 614 , 560 A. 2d 663 (1989), the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld, over a commerce clause challenge, a state statute requiring the registration of out-of-state employment agencies doing business within New Jersey. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Angelo's Motor Sales
green
1 sentence1988As the Appellate Division said in Parmigiani : “Certification is only another way of swearing or affirming.” 125 N.J.Super. at 206-207 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Orange Taxpayers Council, Inc. v. City of Orange
green
1 sentence1980Orange Taxpayers Council, Inc. v. City of Orange, 169 N.J.Super. 288 (App.Div.1979). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. CIB International
green
1 sentence1980Id. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Modular Concepts, Inc. v. So. Brunswick Twp.
green
1 sentence1979The trial judge concluded that (1) these provisions of the ordinance are not reasonably related to the purposes of rent control, (2) they have "a draconian consequence of an added penalty for violation of the code" and (3) "the landlord seeking an increase to cure violations by a capital improvement or hardship increase cannot even file the petition *303 because such a landlord could not get the certification." Relying on the case of Modular Concepts v. South Brunswick Tp., supra , he held the certification requirement invalid. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.