11 Kansas opinions name it 1 courts 1893–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gannon v. Stategreen2 sentences2017It also concluded the State had violated the equity requirement by eliminating capital outlay state aid and prorating supplemental general state aid payments to which 10 some less-wealthy school districts were otherwise entitled by statute. 298 Kan. at 1181, 1188 . 2016As noted above, we instructed the panel to apply our test to determine whether any remedial action taken by the legislature complied with the equity requirement of Article 6 “through structure and implementation.” See 298 Kan. at 1198 . | 2 | 3 |
Gannon v. Stategreen2 sentences2017This test does not require that wealth-based disparities between districts be measured under a zero-tolerance test or other mathematically precise standard because "equity [is] not necessarily the equivalent of 51 equality." Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 710 ; see Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1180, 1188 . 2017Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 713-28 . | 1 | 2 |
Unruh v. PURINA MILLS, LLCgreen2 sentences2016See Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1179 (citing Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1195-96 , 221 P.3d 1130 (2009) (appellate court accepts as true the evidence and all the reasonable inferences drawn from it which support the district courts findings). 2016See Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1179 (citing Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1195-96 , 221 P.3d 1130 (2009) (appellate court accepts as true the evidence and all the reasonable inferences drawn from it which support the district courts findings). | 1 | 1 |
Montoy v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Montoy v. State, 278 Kan. 769, 774-75 , 120 P.3d 306 (2005) (Montoy II); U.S.D. 2014See Montoy v. State, 278 Kan. 769, 774-75 , 120 P.3d 306 (2005) (Montoy II); U.S.D. | 1 | 1 |
Montoy v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 279 Kan. 817, 840 , 112 P.3d 923 (2005) (Montoy III) (“extraordinary declining enrollment provisions cannot be allowed to exacerbate inequities”); Montoy II, 278 Kan. at 775 (“equity with which the funds are distributed . . . [is] critical factor[] for legislature to consider in achieving a suitable formula for financing education”); U.S.D. 2014See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 279 Kan. 817, 840 , 112 P.3d 923 (2005) (Montoy III) (“extraordinary declining enrollment provisions cannot be allowed to exacerbate inequities”); Montoy II, 278 Kan. at 775 (“equity with which the funds are distributed . . . [is] critical factor[] for legislature to consider in achieving a suitable formula for financing education”); U.S.D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hecht v. First National Bank & Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1996Limitations are created by statute and are legislative, not judicial acts. (53 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, § 2, p. 905.) “The legislature has specifically stated that the statute of limitations begins to run on an action such as is now before us when the cause of action accrues.” In Hecht, 208 Kan. at 93-94 , this court stated: . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Kansas State Bank v. First State Bank
green
2 sentences1940Thus in Bank v. Bank, 62 Kan. 788, 795 , 64 Pac. 634 , it was said: “Equity follows a trust fund through any number of changes and allows an owner to reclaim it when and wherever it can be identified. 1940Thus in Bank v. Bank, 62 Kan. 788, 795 , 64 Pac. 634 , it was said: “Equity follows a trust fund through any number of changes and allows an owner to reclaim it when and wherever it can be identified. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Blodgett v. Hitt
neutral
1 sentence1912In Sheldon on Subrogation, 2d ed., p. 58, it is said (citing Weimer v. Porter, 42 Mich. 569 , 4 N. W. 306 , and Blodgett and another v. Hitt, 29 Wis. 169 , 182 et seq.) respecting the right of the person claiming to be reimbursed: “It is merely necessary that his payment should have been made in good faith for the protection of an interest which he believed himself to have in the estate, and in discharge of a burden actually resting upon the property, so that his payment has increased the value of -the estate for the benefit of those who turn out subsequently to. be entitled to the title.” Wha | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Weimer v. Porter
neutral
2 sentences1912In Sheldon on Subrogation, 2d ed., p. 58, it is said (citing Weimer v. Porter, 42 Mich. 569 , 4 N. W. 306 , and Blodgett and another v. Hitt, 29 Wis. 169 , 182 et seq.) respecting the right of the person claiming to be reimbursed: “It is merely necessary that his payment should have been made in good faith for the protection of an interest which he believed himself to have in the estate, and in discharge of a burden actually resting upon the property, so that his payment has increased the value of -the estate for the benefit of those who turn out subsequently to. be entitled to the title.” Wha 1912In Sheldon on Subrogation, 2d ed., p. 58, it is said (citing Weimer v. Porter, 42 Mich. 569 , 4 N. W. 306 , and Blodgett and another v. Hitt, 29 Wis. 169 , 182 et seq.) respecting the right of the person claiming to be reimbursed: “It is merely necessary that his payment should have been made in good faith for the protection of an interest which he believed himself to have in the estate, and in discharge of a burden actually resting upon the property, so that his payment has increased the value of -the estate for the benefit of those who turn out subsequently to. be entitled to the title.” Wha | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Walker v. Mauro
neutral
1 sentence1902This rule is clearly stated by Mr. Pomeroy in his work on Code Remedies (3d ed.), section 249 : , “The fundamental principle may be stated as follows : The plaintiff who institutes an equitable action must bring before the court all those persons who have such relations to the subject-matter of the controversy that, in order to prevent further litigation by them, they must be included in and bound by the present decree ; in other words, all those persons who are so related to the controversy and its subject-matter that, unless thus concluded by the decree, they might set up some future claim, | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Painter v. Industrial Life Ass'n
green
2 sentences1901The court said: “A forfeiture is not favored either at law or in equity, and a provision for it in a contract will be strictly construed, and courts will find a waiver upon slight evidence, when the equity of the claim made, as in this case, is, under the contract, in favor of the insured.” (See, also, Painter v. The Industrial Life Association, 131 Ind. 68 , 30 N. E. 876 .) From the facts developed at the trial, we are of the opinion that the insurance company is liable. i. Departure in pleading. 1901The court said: “A forfeiture is not favored either at law or in equity, and a provision for it in a contract will be strictly construed, and courts will find a waiver upon slight evidence, when the equity of the claim made, as in this case, is, under the contract, in favor of the insured.” (See, also, Painter v. The Industrial Life Association, 131 Ind. 68 , 30 N. E. 876 .) From the facts developed at the trial, we are of the opinion that the insurance company is liable. i. Departure in pleading. | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Peak v. Ellicott
neutral
1 sentence1893This principle was fully recognized, and the question in the present case was substantially decided, in Peak v. Ellicott, 30 Kas. 156 . | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.