equity challenge in Oklahoma

2000Matter of J.L., 1978 OK 37 , 578 P.2d 349 , 352, ("We have examined the record and weighed the evidence and find trial court's judgment is against the clear weight of the evidence insofar as it terminated appellant's parental rights;") and Matter of James H., 1978 OK CIV APP 28 , 593 P.2d 1095, 1098 , ("... the supreme court has applied the rule [in a termination proceeding] that the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence or contrary to law.") applied the equity standard of review on appeal, it appears that Matter of T.R.W. has

2000Matter of J.L., 1978 OK 37 , 578 P.2d 349 , 352, ("We have examined the record and weighed the evidence and find trial court's judgment is against the clear weight of the evidence insofar as it terminated appellant's parental rights;") and Matter of James H., 1978 OK CIV APP 28 , 593 P.2d 1095, 1098 , ("... the supreme court has applied the rule [in a termination proceeding] that the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence or contrary to law.") applied the equity standard of review on appeal, it appears that Matter of T.R.W. has

2000Matter of J.L., 1978 OK 37 , 578 P.2d 349 , 352, ("We have examined the record and weighed the evidence and find trial court's judgment is against the clear weight of the evidence insofar as it terminated appellant's parental rights;") and Matter of James H., 1978 OK CIV APP 28 , 593 P.2d 1095, 1098 , ("... the supreme court has applied the rule [in a termination proceeding] that the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence or contrary to law.") applied the equity standard of review on appeal, it appears that Matter of T.R.W. has

2000Matter of J.L., 1978 OK 37 , 578 P.2d 349 , 352, ("We have examined the record and weighed the evidence and find trial court's judgment is against the clear weight of the evidence insofar as it terminated appellant's parental rights;") and Matter of James H., 1978 OK CIV APP 28 , 593 P.2d 1095, 1098 , ("... the supreme court has applied the rule [in a termination proceeding] that the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence or contrary to law.") applied the equity standard of review on appeal, it appears that Matter of T.R.W. has

2000Matter of J.L., 1978 OK 37 , 578 P.2d 349 , 352, ("We have examined the record and weighed the evidence and find trial court's judgment is against the clear weight of the evidence insofar as it terminated appellant's parental rights;") and Matter of James H., 1978 OK CIV APP 28 , 593 P.2d 1095, 1098 , ("... the supreme court has applied the rule [in a termination proceeding] that the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence or contrary to law.") applied the equity standard of review on appeal, it appears that Matter of T.R.W. has

2000Matter of J.L., 1978 OK 37 , 578 P.2d 349 , 352, ("We have examined the record and weighed the evidence and find trial court's judgment is against the clear weight of the evidence insofar as it terminated appellant's parental rights;") and Matter of James H., 1978 OK CIV APP 28 , 593 P.2d 1095, 1098 , ("... the supreme court has applied the rule [in a termination proceeding] that the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence or contrary to law.") applied the equity standard of review on appeal, it appears that Matter of T.R.W. has

2021Servs. , 2002 OK 71 , ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1072, 1078 (taxpayers have right to seek equitable relief in a court of equity to challenge illegal taxation or illegal expenditure of public funds). ¶13 In Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa , 2011 OK 57 , 270 P.3d 113 , the taxpayers sought intervention via combined theories.

2021Servs. , 2002 OK 71 , ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1072, 1078 (taxpayers have right to seek equitable relief in a court of equity to challenge illegal taxation or illegal expenditure of public funds). ¶13 In Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa , 2011 OK 57 , 270 P.3d 113 , the taxpayers sought intervention via combined theories.

2014Wheeler, Inc. v. Seott, 1991 OK 95, ¶ 12 , 818 P.2d 475, 480 ). ¶ 24 As the factfinder, the trial court "may have insights not conveyed by the record." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 , 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2546 , 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), Even when the evidence is "sharply in conflict," the appellate court, in applying the equity standard of review as directed by Peoplelink, LLC v. Bear, 2014 OK 65 , (10, - P.3d -, will not disturb the trial court's findings "simply because there in a conflict in the testimony, or for the reason that it is possible to draw another conclusion from the evidence

2014Wheeler, Inc. v. Seott, 1991 OK 95, ¶ 12 , 818 P.2d 475, 480 ). ¶ 24 As the factfinder, the trial court "may have insights not conveyed by the record." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 , 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2546 , 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), Even when the evidence is "sharply in conflict," the appellate court, in applying the equity standard of review as directed by Peoplelink, LLC v. Bear, 2014 OK 65 , (10, - P.3d -, will not disturb the trial court's findings "simply because there in a conflict in the testimony, or for the reason that it is possible to draw another conclusion from the evidence

2014Wheeler, Inc. v. Seott, 1991 OK 95, ¶ 12 , 818 P.2d 475, 480 ). ¶ 24 As the factfinder, the trial court "may have insights not conveyed by the record." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 , 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2546 , 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), Even when the evidence is "sharply in conflict," the appellate court, in applying the equity standard of review as directed by Peoplelink, LLC v. Bear, 2014 OK 65 , (10, - P.3d -, will not disturb the trial court's findings "simply because there in a conflict in the testimony, or for the reason that it is possible to draw another conclusion from the evidence

2014Wheeler, Inc. v. Seott, 1991 OK 95, ¶ 12 , 818 P.2d 475, 480 ). ¶ 24 As the factfinder, the trial court "may have insights not conveyed by the record." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 , 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2546 , 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), Even when the evidence is "sharply in conflict," the appellate court, in applying the equity standard of review as directed by Peoplelink, LLC v. Bear, 2014 OK 65 , (10, - P.3d -, will not disturb the trial court's findings "simply because there in a conflict in the testimony, or for the reason that it is possible to draw another conclusion from the evidence

2014Wheeler, Inc. v. Seott, 1991 OK 95, ¶ 12 , 818 P.2d 475, 480 ). ¶ 24 As the factfinder, the trial court "may have insights not conveyed by the record." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 , 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2546 , 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), Even when the evidence is "sharply in conflict," the appellate court, in applying the equity standard of review as directed by Peoplelink, LLC v. Bear, 2014 OK 65 , (10, - P.3d -, will not disturb the trial court's findings "simply because there in a conflict in the testimony, or for the reason that it is possible to draw another conclusion from the evidence

2008Id. (citation omitted).

1967Worley v. Carter, supra; Moore v. Beverlin, supra; Rives v. Mincks Hotel Co., 167 Okl. 500 , 30 P.2d 911 ; 36 Am.Jur., *39 Mortgages, § 184, p. 785.

1967Worley v. Carter, supra; Moore v. Beverlin, supra; Rives v. Mincks Hotel Co., 167 Okl. 500 , 30 P.2d 911 ; 36 Am.Jur., *39 Mortgages, § 184, p. 785.

1939Groves v. Stouder (1916) 58 Okla. 744 , 161 P. 239 ; McAllister v. Clark (1923) 91 Okla. 205 , 217 P. 178 ; Cox v. Fowler (1934) 169 Okla. 355 , 37 P.2d 291 ; G.

1939Groves v. Stouder (1916) 58 Okla. 744 , 161 P. 239 ; McAllister v. Clark (1923) 91 Okla. 205 , 217 P. 178 ; Cox v. Fowler (1934) 169 Okla. 355 , 37 P.2d 291 ; G.

1939Groves v. Stouder (1916) 58 Okla. 744 , 161 P. 239 ; McAllister v. Clark (1923) 91 Okla. 205 , 217 P. 178 ; Cox v. Fowler (1934) 169 Okla. 355 , 37 P.2d 291 ; G.

1939Groves v. Stouder (1916) 58 Okla. 744 , 161 P. 239 ; McAllister v. Clark (1923) 91 Okla. 205 , 217 P. 178 ; Cox v. Fowler (1934) 169 Okla. 355 , 37 P.2d 291 ; G.

1939Groves v. Stouder (1916) 58 Okla. 744 , 161 P. 239 ; McAllister v. Clark (1923) 91 Okla. 205 , 217 P. 178 ; Cox v. Fowler (1934) 169 Okla. 355 , 37 P.2d 291 ; G.

1939Groves v. Stouder (1916) 58 Okla. 744 , 161 P. 239 ; McAllister v. Clark (1923) 91 Okla. 205 , 217 P. 178 ; Cox v. Fowler (1934) 169 Okla. 355 , 37 P.2d 291 ; G.

1937S. 1931, gives the court power to abate the nuisance, and under the well-known equity doctrine, reiterated in Yeargain v. Shull, Bank Com’r (1931) 149 Okla. 221 , 300 P. 303 , that a court of equity once obtaining jurisdiction on any ground will retain it for the purpose of administering complete relief, the method of abatement and taxing of expenses prescribed in the decree was within the power of the court.

1937S. 1931, gives the court power to abate the nuisance, and under the well-known equity doctrine, reiterated in Yeargain v. Shull, Bank Com’r (1931) 149 Okla. 221 , 300 P. 303 , that a court of equity once obtaining jurisdiction on any ground will retain it for the purpose of administering complete relief, the method of abatement and taxing of expenses prescribed in the decree was within the power of the court.

1927Thus, in the recent ease of State Bank v. Weaber, 125 Okla. 186 , 256 Pac. 50 , opinion written by Oommissioner Jones, the equity rule announced in Caldwell v. Stevens, supra, was erroneously applied to matters pleaded as a set-off where no hardship, such as insolvency, nonresidence, etc., was shown.

1927Thus, in the recent ease of State Bank v. Weaber, 125 Okla. 186 , 256 Pac. 50 , opinion written by Oommissioner Jones, the equity rule announced in Caldwell v. Stevens, supra, was erroneously applied to matters pleaded as a set-off where no hardship, such as insolvency, nonresidence, etc., was shown.

1926No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, as it includes all surprise, trick, eun-hing, dissembling, and unfair ways, by which another is cheated, and while fraud must be proved at law, in equity it suffices to show facts and circumstances irom which it may be presumed.” And following the doctrine announced by this court in case No. 16149, Toone v. Walker et al., 115 Okla. 289 , 243 Pac. 147 , decided Jan. 12, 1926, we are clearly of the opinion that' sufficient facts and circumstances were shown in this case to show a legal fraud.

1926No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, as it includes all surprise, trick, eun-hing, dissembling, and unfair ways, by which another is cheated, and while fraud must be proved at law, in equity it suffices to show facts and circumstances irom which it may be presumed.” And following the doctrine announced by this court in case No. 16149, Toone v. Walker et al., 115 Okla. 289 , 243 Pac. 147 , decided Jan. 12, 1926, we are clearly of the opinion that' sufficient facts and circumstances were shown in this case to show a legal fraud.

1926This court has announced the equity rule as to fraud in the case of Armstrong v. Wasson, 93 Okla. 262 , 220 Pac. 643 , as follows: “Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another.

1926This court has announced the equity rule as to fraud in the case of Armstrong v. Wasson, 93 Okla. 262 , 220 Pac. 643 , as follows: “Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another.

1924Johnson v. Johnson, 82 Okla. 259 , 200 Pac. 204 .

1924Johnson v. Johnson, 82 Okla. 259 , 200 Pac. 204 .

1923In Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U. S. 621 , the court said: “Where, however, partnership affairs are being- wound up in due course, without antagonism between the parties, or cause for ‘ judicial interference; where assets are being realized upon and liabilities extinguished, and no settlement has been made, the cause of action has not accrued, and the statute has not begun to run. * * * When the right of action accrued so as to set the statute of limitation in motion, depends, as we have said, upon circumstances, and cannot be held as matter of law to arise at the date of the dissolntio i, or to

1923In Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U. S. 621 , the court said: “Where, however, partnership affairs are being- wound up in due course, without antagonism between the parties, or cause for ‘ judicial interference; where assets are being realized upon and liabilities extinguished, and no settlement has been made, the cause of action has not accrued, and the statute has not begun to run. * * * When the right of action accrued so as to set the statute of limitation in motion, depends, as we have said, upon circumstances, and cannot be held as matter of law to arise at the date of the dissolntio i, or to

1923In Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U. S. 621 , the court said: “Where, however, partnership affairs are being- wound up in due course, without antagonism between the parties, or cause for ‘ judicial interference; where assets are being realized upon and liabilities extinguished, and no settlement has been made, the cause of action has not accrued, and the statute has not begun to run. * * * When the right of action accrued so as to set the statute of limitation in motion, depends, as we have said, upon circumstances, and cannot be held as matter of law to arise at the date of the dissolntio i, or to

1923In Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U. S. 621 , the court said: “Where, however, partnership affairs are being- wound up in due course, without antagonism between the parties, or cause for ‘ judicial interference; where assets are being realized upon and liabilities extinguished, and no settlement has been made, the cause of action has not accrued, and the statute has not begun to run. * * * When the right of action accrued so as to set the statute of limitation in motion, depends, as we have said, upon circumstances, and cannot be held as matter of law to arise at the date of the dissolntio i, or to

1914In United States v. California, etc., Land Company, 148 U. S. 31 , 13 Sup. Ct. 458, 37 L.

1914In United States v. California, etc., Land Company, 148 U. S. 31 , 13 Sup. Ct. 458, 37 L.

1914It is, indeed, an elementary doctrine of equity that, where a grantor has been induced by fraud to part with the legal title to his property, he cannot reclaim it from subsequent innocent purchasers for value.” This doctrine is well established in Oklahoma, this court having held in Paulter v. Manuel, 25 Okla. 59 , 108 Pac. 749 , that, although a deed was obtained from an incompetent person by the grossest kind of fraud, a subsequent purchaser for value and without notice took title to the land.

1914It is, indeed, an elementary doctrine of equity that, where a grantor has been induced by fraud to part with the legal title to his property, he cannot reclaim it from subsequent innocent purchasers for value.” This doctrine is well established in Oklahoma, this court having held in Paulter v. Manuel, 25 Okla. 59 , 108 Pac. 749 , that, although a deed was obtained from an incompetent person by the grossest kind of fraud, a subsequent purchaser for value and without notice took title to the land.

1913While in Secord v. Powers, 61 Neb. 615 , 85 N. W. 846 , 87 Am.

1913While in Secord v. Powers, 61 Neb. 615 , 85 N. W. 846 , 87 Am.