equity rule in Nebraska

2014Under the common-law doctrine of lis pendens (literally “[a] pending lawsuit”14), the mere pendency of a suit affecting title to real property was constructive notice to the world of the disputed claim.15 Before 1887, Nebraska’s lis pendens statute “was a legislative adoption of the equity rule of lis pendens that had existed from time immemorial.”16 Under the rule then in effect that a suit was not commenced until the service of summons, the traditional application of the doctrine proved problematic.17 Persons aware of the filing of a complaint but not yet served with a summons could freely a

2014Under the common-law doctrine of lis pendens (literally “[a] pending lawsuit”14), the mere pendency of a suit affecting title to real property was constructive notice to the world of the disputed claim.15 Before 1887, Nebraska’s lis pendens statute “was a legislative adoption of the equity rule of lis pendens that had existed from time immemorial.”16 Under the rule then in effect that a suit was not commenced until the service of summons, the traditional application of the doctrine proved problematic.17 Persons aware of the filing of a complaint but not yet served with a summons could freely a

2024LEGACY OUTDOOR ADVERTISING Cite as 318 Neb. 1 “[T]he recording acts have not abolished the equity rule as to actual and constructive notice.” Under this rule, we consider whether there are circumstances which, in the exercise of common reason and prudence, ought to put a [person] upon particular inquiry.

2017To be considered by an appellate court, an error must be both specifically assigned and spe- cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.13 Because he did neither, we do not address it. 8 Id. 9 In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493 , 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). 10 Caruso v. Parkos, supra note 7 ; Craig v. Kile, 213 Neb. 340 , 329 N.W.2d 340 (1983); McDonald v. McDonald, 207 Neb. 217 , 298 N.W.2d 136 (1980); Zych v. Zych, 183 Neb. 708 , 163 N.W.2d 882 (1969). 11 Goff v. Weeks, supra note 3 . 12 See, Hartley v. Metropolitan Util.

2017If so, then the purchaser will be charged with notice of every fact which an inquiry, if made, would have given him or her”); Egan v. Catholic Bishop, supra note 11 . - 312 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports WALTERS v. COLFORD Cite as 297 Neb. 302 servitude;15 and (6) injustice can be avoided only by imply- ing the servitude.16 [8-10] While the doctrine of implied reciprocal negative servitudes has a long pedigree and is well established,17 courts tend to use it only with great trepidation.

2017To be considered by an appellate court, an error must be both specifically assigned and spe- cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.13 Because he did neither, we do not address it. 8 Id. 9 In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493 , 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). 10 Caruso v. Parkos, supra note 7 ; Craig v. Kile, 213 Neb. 340 , 329 N.W.2d 340 (1983); McDonald v. McDonald, 207 Neb. 217 , 298 N.W.2d 136 (1980); Zych v. Zych, 183 Neb. 708 , 163 N.W.2d 882 (1969). 11 Goff v. Weeks, supra note 3 . 12 See, Hartley v. Metropolitan Util.

2017To be considered by an appellate court, an error must be both specifically assigned and spe- cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.13 Because he did neither, we do not address it. 8 Id. 9 In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493 , 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). 10 Caruso v. Parkos, supra note 7 ; Craig v. Kile, 213 Neb. 340 , 329 N.W.2d 340 (1983); McDonald v. McDonald, 207 Neb. 217 , 298 N.W.2d 136 (1980); Zych v. Zych, 183 Neb. 708 , 163 N.W.2d 882 (1969). 11 Goff v. Weeks, supra note 3 . 12 See, Hartley v. Metropolitan Util.

2017To be considered by an appellate court, an error must be both specifically assigned and spe- cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.13 Because he did neither, we do not address it. 8 Id. 9 In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493 , 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). 10 Caruso v. Parkos, supra note 7 ; Craig v. Kile, 213 Neb. 340 , 329 N.W.2d 340 (1983); McDonald v. McDonald, 207 Neb. 217 , 298 N.W.2d 136 (1980); Zych v. Zych, 183 Neb. 708 , 163 N.W.2d 882 (1969). 11 Goff v. Weeks, supra note 3 . 12 See, Hartley v. Metropolitan Util.

2017To be considered by an appellate court, an error must be both specifically assigned and spe- cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.13 Because he did neither, we do not address it. 8 Id. 9 In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493 , 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). 10 Caruso v. Parkos, supra note 7 ; Craig v. Kile, 213 Neb. 340 , 329 N.W.2d 340 (1983); McDonald v. McDonald, 207 Neb. 217 , 298 N.W.2d 136 (1980); Zych v. Zych, 183 Neb. 708 , 163 N.W.2d 882 (1969). 11 Goff v. Weeks, supra note 3 . 12 See, Hartley v. Metropolitan Util.

2017To be considered by an appellate court, an error must be both specifically assigned and spe- cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.13 Because he did neither, we do not address it. 8 Id. 9 In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493 , 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). 10 Caruso v. Parkos, supra note 7 ; Craig v. Kile, 213 Neb. 340 , 329 N.W.2d 340 (1983); McDonald v. McDonald, 207 Neb. 217 , 298 N.W.2d 136 (1980); Zych v. Zych, 183 Neb. 708 , 163 N.W.2d 882 (1969). 11 Goff v. Weeks, supra note 3 . 12 See, Hartley v. Metropolitan Util.

2017To be considered by an appellate court, an error must be both specifically assigned and spe- cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.13 Because he did neither, we do not address it. 8 Id. 9 In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493 , 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). 10 Caruso v. Parkos, supra note 7 ; Craig v. Kile, 213 Neb. 340 , 329 N.W.2d 340 (1983); McDonald v. McDonald, 207 Neb. 217 , 298 N.W.2d 136 (1980); Zych v. Zych, 183 Neb. 708 , 163 N.W.2d 882 (1969). 11 Goff v. Weeks, supra note 3 . 12 See, Hartley v. Metropolitan Util.

2017To be considered by an appellate court, an error must be both specifically assigned and spe- cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.13 Because he did neither, we do not address it. 8 Id. 9 In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493 , 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). 10 Caruso v. Parkos, supra note 7 ; Craig v. Kile, 213 Neb. 340 , 329 N.W.2d 340 (1983); McDonald v. McDonald, 207 Neb. 217 , 298 N.W.2d 136 (1980); Zych v. Zych, 183 Neb. 708 , 163 N.W.2d 882 (1969). 11 Goff v. Weeks, supra note 3 . 12 See, Hartley v. Metropolitan Util.

2017To be considered by an appellate court, an error must be both specifically assigned and spe- cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.13 Because he did neither, we do not address it. 8 Id. 9 In re Estate of Mecello, 262 Neb. 493 , 633 N.W.2d 892 (2001). 10 Caruso v. Parkos, supra note 7 ; Craig v. Kile, 213 Neb. 340 , 329 N.W.2d 340 (1983); McDonald v. McDonald, 207 Neb. 217 , 298 N.W.2d 136 (1980); Zych v. Zych, 183 Neb. 708 , 163 N.W.2d 882 (1969). 11 Goff v. Weeks, supra note 3 . 12 See, Hartley v. Metropolitan Util.

2014Under the common-law doctrine of lis pendens (literally “[a] pending lawsuit”14), the mere pendency of a suit affecting title to real property was constructive notice to the world of the disputed claim.15 Before 1887, Nebraska’s lis pendens statute “was a legislative adoption of the equity rule of lis pendens that had existed from time immemorial.”16 Under the rule then in effect that a suit was not commenced until the service of summons, the traditional application of the doctrine proved problematic.17 Persons aware of the filing of a complaint but not yet served with a summons could freely a

1959Pomeroy deals with those situations separate and apart from the equity rule as such which he states and which is cited in Reynolds v. Warner, supra. Pomeroy is quoted at length in Varnes v. Schwartz, 50 N.D. 511 , 197 N.W. 129 , to which I shall refer presently.

1959Pomeroy deals with those situations separate and apart from the equity rule as such which he states and which is cited in Reynolds v. Warner, supra. Pomeroy is quoted at length in Varnes v. Schwartz, 50 N.D. 511 , 197 N.W. 129 , to which I shall refer presently.

1959It cited 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.), §§ 237, 238; and Stockhausen v. Oehler, 186 Wis. 277 , 201 N. W. 823 .

1959It cited 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.), §§ 237, 238; and Stockhausen v. Oehler, 186 Wis. 277 , 201 N. W. 823 .

1958(Unoff.) 235, 95 N. W. 486 , that: “This statute is declaratory of the principles of the common law and everyone must subscribe to the equity of the rule which declares that no one shall be a judge in his own case or where he is interested * * Therein we went on to say, by quoting from Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547 , that: “ ‘The first idea in the administration of justice is that a judge must necessarily be free from all bias and partiality.’ ” Then we said: “Courts of all grades ought to regard with the most scrupulous care this pro *12 vision of our statute and a justice of the peace,' o

1958(Unoff.) 235, 95 N. W. 486 , that: “This statute is declaratory of the principles of the common law and everyone must subscribe to the equity of the rule which declares that no one shall be a judge in his own case or where he is interested * * Therein we went on to say, by quoting from Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547 , that: “ ‘The first idea in the administration of justice is that a judge must necessarily be free from all bias and partiality.’ ” Then we said: “Courts of all grades ought to regard with the most scrupulous care this pro *12 vision of our statute and a justice of the peace,' o

1958(Unoff.) 235, 95 N. W. 486 , that: “This statute is declaratory of the principles of the common law and everyone must subscribe to the equity of the rule which declares that no one shall be a judge in his own case or where he is interested * * Therein we went on to say, by quoting from Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547 , that: “ ‘The first idea in the administration of justice is that a judge must necessarily be free from all bias and partiality.’ ” Then we said: “Courts of all grades ought to regard with the most scrupulous care this pro *12 vision of our statute and a justice of the peace,' o

1957We have reviewed the evidence subject to the equity rule that “when the evidence on material questions of fact is in irreconcilable conflict this court will, in determining the weight of the evidence, consider the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and must have accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite.” Rettinger v. Pierpont, 145 Neb. 161 , 15 N. W. 2d 393 .

1957We have reviewed the evidence subject to the equity rule that “when the evidence on material questions of fact is in irreconcilable conflict this court will, in determining the weight of the evidence, consider the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and must have accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite.” Rettinger v. Pierpont, 145 Neb. 161 , 15 N. W. 2d 393 .

1957Plaintiff relies on the rule that:- “Any unjustifiable conduct on the part of a husband or wife which destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony may constitute extreme cruelty.” Spencer v. Spencer, 158 Neb. 629 , 64 N. W. 2d 348 .

1957Plaintiff relies on the rule that:- “Any unjustifiable conduct on the part of a husband or wife which destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony may constitute extreme cruelty.” Spencer v. Spencer, 158 Neb. 629 , 64 N. W. 2d 348 .

1957In regard to defendants’ first contention, we are mindful of the controlling rule that: “In a case tried to the court in equity the presumption obtains that the trial court, in arriving at decision, considered such evidence only as was competent and relevant, and this court will not reverse a case so tried because other evidence was admitted, if there is sufficient competent and relevant evidence in the record to sustain the judgment.” Rohn v. Kelley, 156 Neb. 463 , 56 N. W. 2d 711 .

1957In regard to defendants’ first contention, we are mindful of the controlling rule that: “In a case tried to the court in equity the presumption obtains that the trial court, in arriving at decision, considered such evidence only as was competent and relevant, and this court will not reverse a case so tried because other evidence was admitted, if there is sufficient competent and relevant evidence in the record to sustain the judgment.” Rohn v. Kelley, 156 Neb. 463 , 56 N. W. 2d 711 .

1952Ed. 1250 , said on this subject: “From the beginning there has existed alongside the term rule a rule of equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term of their entry. * * * This equity rule, which was firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our Republic, the courts have developed and fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized need for correcting injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adhe

1952Ed. 1250 , said on this subject: “From the beginning there has existed alongside the term rule a rule of equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term of their entry. * * * This equity rule, which was firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our Republic, the courts have developed and fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized need for correcting injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adhe

1952Ed. 1250 , said on this subject: “From the beginning there has existed alongside the term rule a rule of equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term of their entry. * * * This equity rule, which was firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our Republic, the courts have developed and fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized need for correcting injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adhe

1952Ed. 1250 , said on this subject: “From the beginning there has existed alongside the term rule a rule of equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term of their entry. * * * This equity rule, which was firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our Republic, the courts have developed and fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized need for correcting injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adhe

1952Ed. 1250 , said on this subject: “From the beginning there has existed alongside the term rule a rule of equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term of their entry. * * * This equity rule, which was firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our Republic, the courts have developed and fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized need for correcting injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adhe

1908Secord v. Powers, 61 Neb. 615 ; Barr v. Post, 59 Neb. 361 .

1908Secord v. Powers, 61 Neb. 615 ; Barr v. Post, 59 Neb. 361 .

1898In Laithe v. McDonald, 12 Kan. 340 , Laithe brought an action against McDonald for a failure to deliver goods which he charged were received by McDonald as a common carrier and lost through his negligence.

1888Comstock v. Johnson, 46 N. Y., 615 .