equity doctrine in Alabama

2008In speaking of the doctrine, Chief Justice Taney said in the case of McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 161, 168 , 11 L.Ed. 86 (1843): “ ‘We do not found our judgment upon the presumption of payment; for it is not merely on presumption of payment or in analogy to the statute of limitations that a court of chancery refuses to lend its aid to stale demands.

2008In speaking of the doctrine, Chief Justice Taney said in the case of McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 161, 168 , 11 L.Ed. 86 (1843): “ ‘We do not found our judgment upon the presumption of payment; for it is not merely on presumption of payment or in analogy to the statute of limitations that a court of chancery refuses to lend its aid to stale demands.

2016The equity of such principle is said to be that the insured has only one claim and is entitled to one payment only, and that the loss should ultimately fall on the third party who caused it.’ ” (quoting City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 154 , 101 So.2d 250, 252 (1958))).

1979The equity of such principle is said to be that the insured has only one claim and is entitled to one payment only, and that the loss should ultimately fall on the third party who caused it. 267 Ala. at 154 -155 , 101 So.2d at 253.

1985We think it helpful to add the following statement of the rule as set out in Rives v. Morris, 108 Ala. 527 , 18 So. 743 (1895), citing numerous authorities: In adopting this view we go upon the well-established doctrine of equity that “where, from delay, any conclusion the court may arrive at must at best be conjectural, and the original transactions have become so obscured by lapse of time, loss of evidence, and death of parties, as to render it difficult, if not impossible, to do justice, the plaintiff will, by his laches, be precluded from relief; and it is not even necessary that the court

1985The application of this equitable doctrine is for the sound discretion of the equitable forum, and does not require the conviction of the court against the original justice of the claim or of any other specific ground of defense but its belief that under the circumstances of the case it is too late to ascertain the merits of the controversy. 108 Ala. at 530-31 , 18 So. at 744-45 (citations omitted).

1980As the court said in Root v. Johnson [ 99 Ala. 90 , 10 So. 293 ], `Forfeitures are not favorites in equity, and unless the penalty is fairly proportionate to the damage suffered by the breach, relief will be granted when the court can give by way of compensation all that could be reasonably expected.' In Southern Inv.

1980As the court said in Root v. Johnson [ 99 Ala. 90 , 10 So. 293 ], `Forfeitures are not favorites in equity, and unless the penalty is fairly proportionate to the damage suffered by the breach, relief will be granted when the court can give by way of compensation all that could be reasonably expected.' In Southern Inv.

1975The most common statement is, “The test' of the finality of a decree sufficient to support an appeal is that it ascertains and declares the rights of the parties and settles the equities, and is not controlled by the fact that the cause remains in fieri in respect to other matters.” McCulloch v. Roberts, 290 Ala. 303 , 276 So.2d 425 (1973); Moorer v. Chastang, 247 Ala. 676 , 26 So.2d 75 (1946); Carter v. Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287 , 142 So. 514 (1932).

1975The most common statement is, “The test' of the finality of a decree sufficient to support an appeal is that it ascertains and declares the rights of the parties and settles the equities, and is not controlled by the fact that the cause remains in fieri in respect to other matters.” McCulloch v. Roberts, 290 Ala. 303 , 276 So.2d 425 (1973); Moorer v. Chastang, 247 Ala. 676 , 26 So.2d 75 (1946); Carter v. Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287 , 142 So. 514 (1932).

1975The most common statement is, “The test' of the finality of a decree sufficient to support an appeal is that it ascertains and declares the rights of the parties and settles the equities, and is not controlled by the fact that the cause remains in fieri in respect to other matters.” McCulloch v. Roberts, 290 Ala. 303 , 276 So.2d 425 (1973); Moorer v. Chastang, 247 Ala. 676 , 26 So.2d 75 (1946); Carter v. Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287 , 142 So. 514 (1932).

1975The most common statement is, “The test' of the finality of a decree sufficient to support an appeal is that it ascertains and declares the rights of the parties and settles the equities, and is not controlled by the fact that the cause remains in fieri in respect to other matters.” McCulloch v. Roberts, 290 Ala. 303 , 276 So.2d 425 (1973); Moorer v. Chastang, 247 Ala. 676 , 26 So.2d 75 (1946); Carter v. Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287 , 142 So. 514 (1932).

1975The most common statement is, “The test' of the finality of a decree sufficient to support an appeal is that it ascertains and declares the rights of the parties and settles the equities, and is not controlled by the fact that the cause remains in fieri in respect to other matters.” McCulloch v. Roberts, 290 Ala. 303 , 276 So.2d 425 (1973); Moorer v. Chastang, 247 Ala. 676 , 26 So.2d 75 (1946); Carter v. Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287 , 142 So. 514 (1932).

1975The most common statement is, “The test' of the finality of a decree sufficient to support an appeal is that it ascertains and declares the rights of the parties and settles the equities, and is not controlled by the fact that the cause remains in fieri in respect to other matters.” McCulloch v. Roberts, 290 Ala. 303 , 276 So.2d 425 (1973); Moorer v. Chastang, 247 Ala. 676 , 26 So.2d 75 (1946); Carter v. Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287 , 142 So. 514 (1932).

1948Without going into the question of waiver and the extent it might affect this equity rule (Cf. Ex parte O’ Barr, supra, 247 Ala. page 138, 22 So.2d 912 ; Durr v. Hanover Nat.

1942Butts v. Cooper, 152 Ala. 375 (5), 44 So. 616 .

1942Butts v. Cooper, 152 Ala. 375 (5), 44 So. 616 .

1935In the case of Keeble v. Jones, 187 Ala. 207 , 65 So. 384, 386 , it was observed: “While the law of pledges falls under the head of bailment at common law rather than under any general doctrine of equity, courts of equity have been accustomed to take cognizance of cases arising out of the collateral assignment of securities upon acknowledged grounds of equitable jurisdiction.

1935In the case of Keeble v. Jones, 187 Ala. 207 , 65 So. 384, 386 , it was observed: “While the law of pledges falls under the head of bailment at common law rather than under any general doctrine of equity, courts of equity have been accustomed to take cognizance of cases arising out of the collateral assignment of securities upon acknowledged grounds of equitable jurisdiction.

1914In that jurisdiction, for just reasons arising out of the contract 'and the status of possession created by the acts of the parties, the pledgee is considered to hold as a trustee for the joint account of himself and the pledgor.—Joliet Iron & Steel Co. v. Scioto Fire Brick Co., 82 Ill. 548 , 25 Am.

1897Beside, an adverse possession is not in a court of equity a bar to a suit for partition of personal property, for the reason that a co-tenant has no remedy at law which he can pursue against the wrong-doer. — Freeman on Co-tenancy & Partition, § 426 ; Smith v. Dunn, 27 Ala. 315 ; Marshall v. Crow, 29 Ala. 278 .

1897Beside, an adverse possession is not in a court of equity a bar to a suit for partition of personal property, for the reason that a co-tenant has no remedy at law which he can pursue against the wrong-doer. — Freeman on Co-tenancy & Partition, § 426 ; Smith v. Dunn, 27 Ala. 315 ; Marshall v. Crow, 29 Ala. 278 .

1883J. — It is a familiar doctrine of a court of equity, that au instrument in writing, intended as a conveyance of lands, wanting in some essential, element to pass the legal estate, — as the attestation of a subscribing witness, or an acknowledgment of execution before an officer having authority to take and certify it, or a defective acknowledgment, — will be regarded as an agreement to convey, and performance of it will be enforced.^-Goodlett v. Hansell, 66 Ala. 151 ; Jenkins v. Harrison, Ib. 345.