equity doctrine in Illinois

1995We rejected Equity’s claim that Norin and Schultz imply that a legally cognizable interference with property occurs with the mere filing of an injunction action in which no injunction is ultimately entered: ''[T]hat the [Schultz] court may suggest that the existence of special injury does not always depend upon the issuance of an injunction is unavailing to plaintiffs inasmuch as the court strongly implies that it was the peculiar effect of a preliminary injunction, as a provisional remedy, upon the plaintiff’s property which motivated its holding.” (Emphasis added.) Equity Associates, 171 Ill

1992Forum non conveniens is not a doctrine of constitutional law; rather, it is a doctrine of equity (Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 101, 105 , 554 N.E.2d 209, 211 ) that limits the application of a statute; that is to say, courts — irrespective of clear language within a statute — simply refuse to enforce that statute as it was written, but instead limit its scope, all in the name of “equity,” which broadly means in the spirit of fairness, justness and right.

1992Forum non conveniens is not a doctrine of constitutional law; rather, it is a doctrine of equity (Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 101, 105 , 554 N.E.2d 209, 211 ) that limits the application of a statute; that is to say, courts — irrespective of clear language within a statute — simply refuse to enforce that statute as it was written, but instead limit its scope, all in the name of “equity,” which broadly means in the spirit of fairness, justness and right.

1983App. 3d 690, 694 , 344 N.E.2d 635, 638 .) In the presence of this provision, any prejudice to Equity resulting from Patis’ delay in giving notice is immaterial and therefore will not warrant denial of Equity’s motion for summary judgment.

1935This is true of insurance companies, annuity companies, benevolent associations, manufacturing companies, railroad companies, etc., having surplus funds.” It was said in the Svithiod case, supra, that the doctrine of the foregoing text is sustained by numerous authorities, among which are Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Clowes, 3 N. Y. 470 ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Perry, 3 Sanford Ch.

1924In a court of equity the doctrine of estoppel finds its widest field, and when we take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of this case, the honest expenditure of the money, the benefits from it received by the city and the attitude of these appellants, there is, to our minds, presented an appropriate case for an application of the doctrine.” In Mosiman Plumbing Co. v. Village of Pocahontas, 199 Ill.

1911(City of Peoria v. Johnston, 56 Ill. 45 ; Rawson v. Fox, 65 id. 200; Pool v. Docker, 92 id. 501; County of Cook v. Davis, 143 id. 151.) In any view of the case the decree was not void and subject to collateral attack as a mere nullity.

1911In Davis v. Stambaugh, 163 Ill. 557 , it was held to be the settled doctrine of this court that equity does not, in the face of the statute, enforce verbal promises to convey real estate, and that the mere refusal of the trustee to execute an express trust, or the denial of the existence of a trust by a trustee, does not constitute such fraud as takes the case out of the statute, and that in order to take a case out of the statute and establish- a trust ex maleficio, the transaction by means of which the ownership of the property is obtained must be, in fact, a scheme of actual deceit which am

1911To the same effect is Ryder v. Ryder, 244 Ill. 297 .

1910Perry on Trusts, sec. 904, and cases in notes. ‘If trustees,’ says the same author, ‘render services to the trust estate in their professional characters as solicitors, factors, brokers, bankers, or in any other capacity, they can receive no compensation or commission for such services.’ Id. sec. 904.” Under these authorities we hold that the allowance to appellee bank of $200 solicitors’ fees was error.

1907(Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 Ill. 238 ; Dewey v. Eckert, 62 id. 218; Butler v. Butler, 164 id. 171.) In Williams v. Vanderbilt, supra, it is stated that the giving of a lien, such as is here contended for under the general doctrine of equity, even though the right can be secured in no other way, is carrying the doctrine of equitable liens further than the courts have generally gone.

1907(Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 Ill. 238 ; Dewey v. Eckert, 62 id. 218; Butler v. Butler, 164 id. 171.) In Williams v. Vanderbilt, supra, it is stated that the giving of a lien, such as is here contended for under the general doctrine of equity, even though the right can be secured in no other way, is carrying the doctrine of equitable liens further than the courts have generally gone.

1907(Smith v. Henline, 174 Ill. 184 .) While it may be true that some of these instructions, standing alone, might be subject to some of the criticisms made against them, yet taking them as a whole and considering them as one series, as we must, we think they fairly and reasonably presented to the jury the law with reference to mental capacity and undue influence, and the jury were in no way misled by them and all of the rights of appellant were subserved in that respect.

1907In equity the harsh remedy of forfeiture yields to compensation when fair dealing and good conscience seem to require it; (Ebert v. Arends, 190 Ill. 221 ;) but even in a court of equity the test whether a forfeiture will be relieved against is whether compensation can or cannot be adequately made for breaches of obligations. (1 Pomeroy’s Eq.

1895While courts of equity, not less than courts of law, recognize the right of parties to a contract to stipulate for penalties and forfeitures, and while, on a proper showing, courts of equity will relieve against forfeitures, it is a rule of universal application that they will never enforce either a penalty or a forfeiture. (2 Story’s Eq. 319; Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 Johns.

1885Longwith v. Butler, 3 Gilm. 32 ; Burr v. Borden, 61 Ill. 389 ; Rounsavell v. Crofoot, 4 Bradwell, 671.

1882Mr. Justice Lawrence in Iglehart et al. v. Crane et al. 42 Ill. 261 , in speaking of tills rule said: “The equity of this rule is apparent on the plain ground that a man’s own property should be first applied to the payment of his own debts, arid when a court of chancery requires a mortgagee first to exhaust that part of the mortgaged property still held by the mortgagor, it is only another application of the principle so long and so firmly settled by courts of equity, that where there are two creditors standing in equal equity, one of whom has security upon two funds and the other upon only o