equity doctrine in New York

1897In a former equity case (Vermilyea v. Palmer, 52 N. Y. 471 ) the same learned judge recognized as follows the distinction which he disclaims in Foote v. Beecher, viz.: “ It is quite clear that the court by which the trial is had is not bound to regard exceptions which ought not to affect the merits, and, if so, it is equally clear that this court, reviewing the questions of law upon the trial, must adopt the same rule (p. 477); and pointed out that that was the rule in chancery.

1896In a former equity case (Vermilyea v. Palmer, 52 N. Y. 471 ) the same learned judge recognized as follows the distinction which he.disclaims in Foote v. Beecher, viz.: “ It is quite clear that the court by which the trial is had is not bound to regard exceptions which ought not to affect the merits, and if so it is equally clear that this court, reviewing the questions of law upon the trial, must adopt the same rule” (p. 477); and pointed out that that Was the rule in chancery.

1962Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1930Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none *167 at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1962Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1930Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none *167 at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1962Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1930Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none *167 at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1962Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1930Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none *167 at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1962Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1930Relief is not withheld because the money damage is unsubstantial or even none *167 at all (Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 453 ; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 316 ; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 103 ; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 31 ; Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652 ; Lord Manners v. Johnson, L.

1898It is personalty , only (Trimm v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599 ).

1898It is personalty , only (Trimm v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599 ).

2021While this evidentiary deficiency prevents the plaintiff from affirmatively obtaining summary judgment in its favor ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Negrin , 186 AD3d 1754, 1755 ), it does not eviscerate the question of fact requiring the denial of that branch of Equity's motion which was to dismiss, based upon both the 30-day contractual cure period required by Paragraph 22(b) of the mortgage and the separate averments in Aber's seventh affirmative defense served in the first action.

2021In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), the court must accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d 220, 224 ; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 ; Ford v Phillips , 121 AD3d 1232, 1234 ).

2021We agree with the portions of the majority's holding that the notice period of RPAPL 1304 does not operate as a toll of the statute of limitations in favor of the plaintiff ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Derissaint , 193 AD3d 790 ), and that paragraph 19 of the mortgage does not prohibit an acceleration of the note's debt until the entry of a judgment of foreclosure and sale ( see Bank of N.Y.

2021Parties who make sworn written statements are to be held to a strict accountability for the truth and accuracy of their contents ( see Matter of Portnow , 253 App Div 395, 398 ).

2021In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), the court must accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d 220, 224 ; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 ; Ford v Phillips , 121 AD3d 1232, 1234 ).

2021In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), the court must accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d 220, 224 ; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 ; Ford v Phillips , 121 AD3d 1232, 1234 ).

2018Notably, "the equity doctrine is designed to prevent a party from inducing full or partial performance from another and then claiming the sanctuary of the statute of frauds" ( Eujoy Realty Corp. v Van Wagner Communications, LLC , 22 NY3d 413, 426 [2013], citing Messner Vetere Berger McNamee Schmetterer Euro RSCG v Aegis Group , 93 NY2d 229 [1999]).

2005R.R., 305 AD2d 631 [2003]).

2000Leave to amend an answer is freely permitted where, as here, it would not create prejudice (see, Caceras v Zorbas, 74 NY2d 884 ; Speroni v Mid-Island Hosp., 222 AD2d 497 ; Cameli v Pace Univ., 131 AD2d 419 ).

2000Leave to amend an answer is freely permitted where, as here, it would not create prejudice (see, Caceras v Zorbas, 74 NY2d 884 ; Speroni v Mid-Island Hosp., 222 AD2d 497 ; Cameli v Pace Univ., 131 AD2d 419 ).

2000Leave to amend an answer is freely permitted where, as here, it would not create prejudice (see, Caceras v Zorbas, 74 NY2d 884 ; Speroni v Mid-Island Hosp., 222 AD2d 497 ; Cameli v Pace Univ., 131 AD2d 419 ).

1982The doctrine of equitable estoppel is grounded upon the principle that “a wrongdoer should not be able to take refuge behind the shield of his own wrong” (see General Stencils v Chiappa, 18 NY2d 125, 127 ).

1969S. 2d 121, 123; Holiber v. Holiber, 207 Misc. 716 .) This traditional equity doctrine would not seem to have been abrogated by anything set forth in provisions of the new divorce law and it is this court’s view that a determination should not be made in advance of trial, as a matter of law, that the doctrine may not be invoked by the defendant.

1967I, § 11; cf. People v. Friedman, 302 N. Y. 75, 81 ); (b) on the equity principle that a plaintiff must come into court with clean hands; and (c) on a principle analogous to the one applied in the Fair Trade Act area, that enforcement of a Fair Trade agreement is barred by a showing that it was abandoned by the manufacturer, or that the manufacturer “is using it inequitably, to favor some retailers against others ” (cf. National Distillers & Chem.

1967Corp. v. Macy & Co., 23 AD 2d 51 ).

1964Since the ‘ ‘ ‘ parties had the right to determine for themselves in what way and for what purpose their lands should be occupied irrespective of pecuniary gain or loss ’ ” (Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, 254 N. Y. 161, 167 , supra), and since the defendants “ insist upon adherence to a covenant which is now as valid and binding as at the hour of its making ” (ibid., p. 168), even though some of the “ neighbors are willing to modify the restriction and forego a portion of their rights ” {ibid., p. 168), and since the defendants believe “ that the comfort of [their] dwelling will be imp

1963The section overrode Watson v. Consolidated Laundries Corp. ( 235 App. Div. 234 [1932]), which had held that a supplemental complaint could not give validity to an insufficient original complaint.

1959The case of Scheuer v. Scheuer ( 308 N. Y. 447 ), cited in the affidavit of defendant’s attorney submitted in opposition to the motion, gives no support to his contention ‘1 that the motion of the plaintiff is premature since the granting of said motion would penalize the defendant and foreclose her from asserting the valid defenses of Statute of Frauds if plaintiff endeavors to establish the doctrine of estoppel. ’ ’ The Scheuer case stands for the proposition that the settled doctrine of equity, to wit, that the Statute of Frauds may not be raised as a bar to the imposition of a constructive

1958I. 339.) The New York courts have taken a contrary view from the time of Cutting v. Cutting (supra) where it is apparent that the court reached for the result there obtained by holding that the equity rule lacked a rational ground and that a statutory provision (Real Property Law, § 149), applicable to a quite distinct legal relationship, permitted a departure from the equity principle which theretofore had been accepted generally.

1956The meaning of the doctrine of cy pres is that when a definite function or duty is to be performed, and it cannot be done in exact conformity with the scheme of the person or persons who have provided for it, it must be performed with as close approximation to that scheme as reasonably practicable; and so, of course, it must be enforced, and the reason or basis for the doctrine is to permit the main purpose of the donor of a charitable trust to be carried out as nearly as possible where it cannot be done to the letter.” In Lutheran Hosp. v. Goldstein ( 182 Misc. 913, 917 ) the court said: “It

1947(Trade Accessories, Inc., v. Bellet, 184 Misc. 962, 967 .) Thus it is not enough for these three tenants to show rights of ownership under which they ordinarily would be entitled to possession but they must also establish affirmatively that they are the “ person ” intended by the statute and further that the equity they claim to have is the equity required by it.

1942Laws, ch. 50.) “ The right to redeem is an essential part of a mortgage, read in by the law if not inserted by the parties.” (Mooney v. Byrne, 163 N. Y. 86, 92 .) Further, it is a well-established doctrine of equity, also applied at law, that the parties to a deed may show by parol, as here, that it was intended to be a mortgage.