equity rule in Minnesota

1939That was the construction put upon our own statute by this *149 court in Board v. Smith, 22 Minn. 97 .

1897That was the construction put upon our own statute by this court in Board v. Smith, 22 Minn. 97 .

1951The Christ- gau case confirms our previous holding in State v. Bishop Seabury Mission, 90 Minn. 92 , 95 N. W. 882 , which eliminates the old equity rule of 43 Eliz. c. 4, in situations where the constitution or a statute enumerates the subjects of tax exemption.

1951The Christ- gau case confirms our previous holding in State v. Bishop Seabury Mission, 90 Minn. 92 , 95 N. W. 882 , which eliminates the old equity rule of 43 Eliz. c. 4, in situations where the constitution or a statute enumerates the subjects of tax exemption.

1942We held in Wilson v. Eigenbrodt, 30 Minn. 4, 7 , 13 N. W. 907, 908 , that as between the parties to the mortgage the statute is but declaratory of the equity rule and “settles the order of the application of the proceeds of the sale.” In the cited case there were two notes.

1942We held in Wilson v. Eigenbrodt, 30 Minn. 4, 7 , 13 N. W. 907, 908 , that as between the parties to the mortgage the statute is but declaratory of the equity rule and “settles the order of the application of the proceeds of the sale.” In the cited case there were two notes.

1930Ellsworth v. Lockwood, 42 N. Y. 89 ; Cole v. Malcolm, 66 N. Y. 363 ; Slade An Van Vechten, 11 Paige, 21 ; Graham v. Dickinson, 3 Barb.

1930Ellsworth v. Lockwood, 42 N. Y. 89 ; Cole v. Malcolm, 66 N. Y. 363 ; Slade An Van Vechten, 11 Paige, 21 ; Graham v. Dickinson, 3 Barb.

1930Ellsworth v. Lockwood, 42 N. Y. 89 ; Cole v. Malcolm, 66 N. Y. 363 ; Slade An Van Vechten, 11 Paige, 21 ; Graham v. Dickinson, 3 Barb.

1930The case of Kimmel v. Bean, 68 Kan. 598 , 75 P. 1118 , 64 L.R.A. 785 , 104 A.S.R. 415 , goes no further than to apply the majority rule, as distinguished from the equity rule, to an indebtedness on an overdraft, in a state not following the equity rule. 3.

1930The case of Kimmel v. Bean, 68 Kan. 598 , 75 P. 1118 , 64 L.R.A. 785 , 104 A.S.R. 415 , goes no further than to apply the majority rule, as distinguished from the equity rule, to an indebtedness on an overdraft, in a state not following the equity rule. 3.

1930Ellsworth v. Lockwood, 42 N. Y. 89 ; Cole v. Malcolm, 66 N. Y. 363 ; Slade An Van Vechten, 11 Paige, 21 ; Graham v. Dickinson, 3 Barb.

1925I. v. Capehart, 63 Minn. 120 , 65 N. W. 258 , as the strict equity rule recognized by a majority of the court in the two cases cited.

1925I. v. Capehart, 63 Minn. 120 , 65 N. W. 258 , as the strict equity rule recognized by a majority of the court in the two cases cited.

1924Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218 , 43 N. W. 137 ; Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co. 66 Minn. 344 , 69 N. W. 1 .

1924Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218 , 43 N. W. 137 ; Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co. 66 Minn. 344 , 69 N. W. 1 .

1924Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218 , 43 N. W. 137 ; Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co. 66 Minn. 344 , 69 N. W. 1 .

1924Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218 , 43 N. W. 137 ; Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co. 66 Minn. 344 , 69 N. W. 1 .

1897This is not mere matter of discretion, but a settled principle of equity.” That the court using this language did not feel justified in abiding by it is obvious from the decision in Merritt v. Merritt, 99 N. Y. 643 , 1 N. E. 605 , where it was distinctly held that the fact that a plaintiff wife in a divorce action had some separate property did not bar her rights, or deprive the court of its discretionary powers upon her application for alimony pendente lite, when it appeared that such property did not come from her husband, and the income therefrom was not so great as to render all allowances

1897This is not mere matter of discretion, but a settled principle of equity.” That the court using this language did not feel justified in abiding by it is obvious from the decision in Merritt v. Merritt, 99 N. Y. 643 , 1 N. E. 605 , where it was distinctly held that the fact that a plaintiff wife in a divorce action had some separate property did not bar her rights, or deprive the court of its discretionary powers upon her application for alimony pendente lite, when it appeared that such property did not come from her husband, and the income therefrom was not so great as to render all allowances

1897S. 1894, § 4799, provides that— “In every action brought either for a divorce or separation the court may in its discretion require the husband to pay any sum necessary to enable the wife to carry on or defend the action, or for her support during its pendency.” This statute is broader than the old equity rule, which was probably in the mind of the New York court of appeals when, in Collins v. Collins, 80 N. Y. 1, 13 , it said: “The fact that a wife is destitute of means to carry on her suit, and to support herself during its pendency, is as essential as any other fact to authorize the court t

1897Direct reference was made to Collins v. Collins, supra. The statute above quoted must be construed with reference to the stricter equity rule which it was designed to supersede.

1896This statute, like the equity rule which it follows, applies only to express, technical, and continuing trusts, of the kind which were cognizable exclusively in a court of equity, and of which the cases of Smith v. Glover, 44 Minn. 260 , 46 N. W. 406 , and Donahue v. Quackenbush, 62 Minn. 132 , 64 N. W. 141 , relied on by the plaintiff, are examples.

1896This statute, like the equity rule which it follows, applies only to express, technical, and continuing trusts, of the kind which were cognizable exclusively in a court of equity, and of which the cases of Smith v. Glover, 44 Minn. 260 , 46 N. W. 406 , and Donahue v. Quackenbush, 62 Minn. 132 , 64 N. W. 141 , relied on by the plaintiff, are examples.

1896This statute, like the equity rule which it follows, applies only to express, technical, and continuing trusts, of the kind which were cognizable exclusively in a court of equity, and of which the cases of Smith v. Glover, 44 Minn. 260 , 46 N. W. 406 , and Donahue v. Quackenbush, 62 Minn. 132 , 64 N. W. 141 , relied on by the plaintiff, are examples.

1896This statute, like the equity rule which it follows, applies only to express, technical, and continuing trusts, of the kind which were cognizable exclusively in a court of equity, and of which the cases of Smith v. Glover, 44 Minn. 260 , 46 N. W. 406 , and Donahue v. Quackenbush, 62 Minn. 132 , 64 N. W. 141 , relied on by the plaintiff, are examples.

1895If the mortgages and notices to redeem are void, they are a cloud on the plaintiff’s title, and this action can be maintained to remove it, even under the strict equity rule recognized by a majority of the court in the case of Maloney v. Finnegan, 38 Minn. 70 , 35 N. W. 723 ; for upon their face they create an apparent outstanding right of redemption, and resort must be had to extraneous evidence to show their real character, purpose, and invalidity.

1895If the mortgages and notices to redeem are void, they are a cloud on the plaintiff’s title, and this action can be maintained to remove it, even under the strict equity rule recognized by a majority of the court in the case of Maloney v. Finnegan, 38 Minn. 70 , 35 N. W. 723 ; for upon their face they create an apparent outstanding right of redemption, and resort must be had to extraneous evidence to show their real character, purpose, and invalidity.