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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1918–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Saturday v. Saturdaygreen2 sentences2021See Gruner v. Thacker, 320 Ga. App. 146, 148 (1) ( 739 SE2d 440 ) (2013) (explaining that, when addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 6 See generally Saturday v. Saturday, 224 Ga. 236, 239 ( 161 SE2d 509 ) (1968) (“A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding generally estops a party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding, to the prejudice of the adverse party.”). 9 5-6-48 (c), a trial court errs by not engaging in the proper analysis and/or not making the requisite findings of fact). 2021See Gruner v. Thacker, 320 Ga. App. 146, 148 (1) ( 739 SE2d 440 ) (2013) (explaining that, when addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 6 See generally Saturday v. Saturday, 224 Ga. 236, 239 ( 161 SE2d 509 ) (1968) (“A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding generally estops a party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding, to the prejudice of the adverse party.”). 9 5-6-48 (c), a trial court errs by not engaging in the proper analysis and/or not making the requisite findings of fact). | 2 | 2 |
McDonald v. Dabneygreen2 sentences2011The evidence Riggins now cites does not meet this notice standard; the evidence was that Walker’s possession was, in fact, not exclusive, but that she merely lived in the house owned by Eugene. 6 The correct rule is that when the occupation by one is not exclusive, but in connection with another, with respect to whom there exists a relationship sufficient to account for the situation, and the circumstances do not suggest an inconsistent claim, then such a possession will not give notice of a right by an unrecorded grant. [Cit.] McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 726 (2) ( 132 SE 547 ) (1926), ov 2011The evidence Riggins now cites does not meet this notice standard; the evidence was that Walker’s possession was, in fact, not exclusive, but that she merely lived in the house owned by Eugene. 6 The correct rule is that when the occupation by one is not exclusive, but in connection with another, with respect to whom there exists a relationship sufficient to account for the situation, and the circumstances do not suggest an inconsistent claim, then such a possession will not give notice of a right by an unrecorded grant. [Cit.] McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 726 (2) ( 132 SE 547 ) (1926), ov | 2 | 2 |
Ellis v. Ellisgreen2 sentences1968“A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding generally estops a party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding, to the prejudice of the adverse party.” Ellis v. Ellis, 161 Ga. 360 (2) ( 130 SE 681 ). 1968“A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding generally estops a party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding, to the prejudice of the adverse party.” Ellis v. Ellis, 161 Ga. 360 (2) ( 130 SE 681 ). | 1 | 2 |
Gruner v. Thackergreen2 sentences2021See Gruner v. Thacker, 320 Ga. App. 146, 148 (1) ( 739 SE2d 440 ) (2013) (explaining that, when addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 6 See generally Saturday v. Saturday, 224 Ga. 236, 239 ( 161 SE2d 509 ) (1968) (“A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding generally estops a party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding, to the prejudice of the adverse party.”). 9 5-6-48 (c), a trial court errs by not engaging in the proper analysis and/or not making the requisite findings of fact). 2021See Gruner v. Thacker, 320 Ga. App. 146, 148 (1) ( 739 SE2d 440 ) (2013) (explaining that, when addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 6 See generally Saturday v. Saturday, 224 Ga. 236, 239 ( 161 SE2d 509 ) (1968) (“A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding generally estops a party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding, to the prejudice of the adverse party.”). 9 5-6-48 (c), a trial court errs by not engaging in the proper analysis and/or not making the requisite findings of fact). | 1 | 1 |
Cole v. Thrashergreen2 sentences2011The evidence Riggins now cites does not meet this notice standard; the evidence was that Walker’s possession was, in fact, not exclusive, but that she merely lived in the house owned by Eugene. 6 The correct rule is that when the occupation by one is not exclusive, but in connection with another, with respect to whom there exists a relationship sufficient to account for the situation, and the circumstances do not suggest an inconsistent claim, then such a possession will not give notice of a right by an unrecorded grant. [Cit.] McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 726 (2) ( 132 SE 547 ) (1926), ov 2011The evidence Riggins now cites does not meet this notice standard; the evidence was that Walker’s possession was, in fact, not exclusive, but that she merely lived in the house owned by Eugene. 6 The correct rule is that when the occupation by one is not exclusive, but in connection with another, with respect to whom there exists a relationship sufficient to account for the situation, and the circumstances do not suggest an inconsistent claim, then such a possession will not give notice of a right by an unrecorded grant. [Cit.] McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 726 (2) ( 132 SE 547 ) (1926), ov | 1 | 1 |
McKibben v. Stategreen2 sentences1973See McKibben v. State, 115 Ga. App. 598, 600 ( 155 SE2d 449 ). 1973See McKibben v. State, 115 Ga. App. 598, 600 ( 155 SE2d 449 ). | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Hagansgreen1 sentence1918Civil Code (1910), § 4268 (6); Augusta Factory v. Mente, 132 Ga. 503, 508 ( 64 S. E. 553 ); Surles v. Milikin, 97 Ga. 485 ( 25 S. E. 322 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goodwynne v. Bellerby
green
2 sentences1975If, of two occupants, one has the record title, a purchaser has the right to assume that the other has no title. [Cits.]" McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 725 ( 132 SE 547 ). *325 (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, Manning v. Manning, 135 Ga. 597 (3) ( 69 SE 1126 ); Goodwynne v. Bellerby, 116 Ga. 901 (5) ( 43 SE 275 ). 1975If, of two occupants, one has the record title, a purchaser has the right to assume that the other has no title. [Cits.]" McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 725 ( 132 SE 547 ). *325 (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, Manning v. Manning, 135 Ga. 597 (3) ( 69 SE 1126 ); Goodwynne v. Bellerby, 116 Ga. 901 (5) ( 43 SE 275 ). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Manning v. Manning
green
2 sentences1975If, of two occupants, one has the record title, a purchaser has the right to assume that the other has no title. [Cits.]" McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 725 ( 132 SE 547 ). *325 (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, Manning v. Manning, 135 Ga. 597 (3) ( 69 SE 1126 ); Goodwynne v. Bellerby, 116 Ga. 901 (5) ( 43 SE 275 ). 1975If, of two occupants, one has the record title, a purchaser has the right to assume that the other has no title. [Cits.]" McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 725 ( 132 SE 547 ). *325 (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, Manning v. Manning, 135 Ga. 597 (3) ( 69 SE 1126 ); Goodwynne v. Bellerby, 116 Ga. 901 (5) ( 43 SE 275 ). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences1973One reason given for disclosure in Roviaro, supra, p. 64 — that the testimony might have disclosed an entrapment — does not require disclosure here, where the defendant in his unsworn statement relied exclusively on the defense of alibi and the inconsistent defense of entrapment was raised neither by the pleadings nor the evidence. 1973One reason given for disclosure in Roviaro, supra, p. 64 — that the testimony might have disclosed an entrapment — does not require disclosure here, where the defendant in his unsworn statement relied exclusively on the defense of alibi and the inconsistent defense of entrapment was raised neither by the pleadings nor the evidence. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Brady v. Lewless
green
2 sentences1973The General Assembly in 1895 impliedly recognized that infants could commit torts of negligence when it enacted present Code § 105-204, which provides: "Due care in a child of tender years is such care as its capacity, mental and physical, fits it for exercising in the actual circumstances of the occasion and situation under investigation.” The inconsistent rule by which this provision has been applied only in cases of an infant’s contributory negligence has been treated at length by Mr. Justice Jordan in his dissenting opinion in Brady v. Lewless, 124 Ga. App. 858, 860 , supra, and need not b 1973The General Assembly in 1895 impliedly recognized that infants could commit torts of negligence when it enacted present Code § 105-204, which provides: "Due care in a child of tender years is such care as its capacity, mental and physical, fits it for exercising in the actual circumstances of the occasion and situation under investigation." The inconsistent rule by which this provision has been applied only in cases of an infant's contributory negligence has been treated at length by Mr. Justice Jordan in his dissenting opinion in Brady v. Lewless, 124 Ga. App. 858, 860 , supra, and need not b | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Crusselle v. Reinhardt
neutral
1 sentence1925Crusselle v. Reinhardt, 68 Ga. 619 ; Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 689 (15 Sup. Ct. 555, 39 L. ed. 578); Luther v. Clay, 100 Ga. 236 ( 28 S. E. 46 , 39 L. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Luther v. Clay
green
2 sentences1925Crusselle v. Reinhardt, 68 Ga. 619 ; Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 689 (15 Sup. Ct. 555, 39 L. ed. 578); Luther v. Clay, 100 Ga. 236 ( 28 S. E. 46 , 39 L. 1925Crusselle v. Reinhardt, 68 Ga. 619 ; Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 689 (15 Sup. Ct. 555, 39 L. ed. 578); Luther v. Clay, 100 Ga. 236 ( 28 S. E. 46 , 39 L. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Surles v. Milikin
green
2 sentences1918Civil Code (1910), § 4268 (6); Augusta Factory v. Mente, 132 Ga. 503, 508 ( 64 S. E. 553 ); Surles v. Milikin, 97 Ga. 485 ( 25 S. E. 322 ). 1918Civil Code (1910), § 4268 (6); Augusta Factory v. Mente, 132 Ga. 503, 508 ( 64 S. E. 553 ); Surles v. Milikin, 97 Ga. 485 ( 25 S. E. 322 ). | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Augusta Factory v. Mente & Co.
green
1 sentence1918Civil Code (1910), § 4268 (6); Augusta Factory v. Mente, 132 Ga. 503, 508 ( 64 S. E. 553 ); Surles v. Milikin, 97 Ga. 485 ( 25 S. E. 322 ). | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.