inconsistent defense in California

2000Applying Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 , we have stated that "`[i]n a capital case, a prospective juror may be excluded if the juror's views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair" the performance of the juror's duties.' [Citations.] `A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1114, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121 , 954 P.2d 384 .) In addition, "`[o]

2000Applying Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424 [ 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 ], we have stated that “ ‘[i]n a capital case, a prospective juror may be excluded if the juror’s views on capital punishment would “prevent or substantially impair” the performance of the juror’s duties.’ [Citations.] ‘A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1114.) In addition, “ ‘[o]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court’s rul

2000Specifically, he contends that the court erred in sustaining the prosecutor’s challenges to Prospective Jurors Wt., St., and Mn., 15 jurors whom defendant characterizes as “life-prone,” and in applying an inconsistent standard in overruling defense challenges to 13 other prospective jurors whom defendant characterizes as “death-prone.” Defendant contends the trial court was not evenhanded in applying the standards set out in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [ 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 ] for determining whether a prospective juror should be excused on the basis of views of capital pu

2000Specifically, he contends that the court erred in sustaining the prosecutor’s challenges to Prospective Jurors Wt., St., and Mn., 15 jurors whom defendant characterizes as “life-prone,” and in applying an inconsistent standard in overruling defense challenges to 13 other prospective jurors whom defendant characterizes as “death-prone.” Defendant contends the trial court was not evenhanded in applying the standards set out in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [ 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 ] for determining whether a prospective juror should be excused on the basis of views of capital pu

2023(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638 [“We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses”].) “If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (Id. at p. 639.) Defendant has not shown there is insufficient evidence that any rational juror could find that defendant used a semiautomatic firearm in the assault.

2008(Kinney v. Overton (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 482,497, fn. 7 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 136 ]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1); see also Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 459, 469, fn. 7 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 834 P.2d 1148 ].) *1182 On our own motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (f) and section 459, we take judicial notice of the prior cases between the parties and between respondents and Laycock, contained in the record.

2008(Kinney v. Overton (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 482,497, fn. 7 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 136 ]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1); see also Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 459, 469, fn. 7 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 834 P.2d 1148 ].) *1182 On our own motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (f) and section 459, we take judicial notice of the prior cases between the parties and between respondents and Laycock, contained in the record.

2008(Kinney v. Overton (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 482,497, fn. 7 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 136 ]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1); see also Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 459, 469, fn. 7 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 834 P.2d 1148 ].) *1182 On our own motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (f) and section 459, we take judicial notice of the prior cases between the parties and between respondents and Laycock, contained in the record.

2008(Kinney v. Overton (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 482,497, fn. 7 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 136 ]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1); see also Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 459, 469, fn. 7 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 834 P.2d 1148 ].) *1182 On our own motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (f) and section 459, we take judicial notice of the prior cases between the parties and between respondents and Laycock, contained in the record.

2003(See Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 603, 613 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 189 ]; South Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist. v. Johnson (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 388, 403 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; Lewis Avenue Parent Teachers’ Assn. v Hussey (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 232, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; 1 Schwing, Cal. Affirmative Defenses (2d ed. 1996) § 1.3, pp. 14-16.) Prudence dictated that she do so.

2003(See Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 603, 613 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 189 ]; South Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist. v. Johnson (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 388, 403 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; Lewis Avenue Parent Teachers’ Assn. v Hussey (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 232, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; 1 Schwing, Cal. Affirmative Defenses (2d ed. 1996) § 1.3, pp. 14-16.) Prudence dictated that she do so.

2003(See Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 603, 613 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 189 ]; South Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist. v. Johnson (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 388, 403 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; Lewis Avenue Parent Teachers’ Assn. v Hussey (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 232, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; 1 Schwing, Cal. Affirmative Defenses (2d ed. 1996) § 1.3, pp. 14-16.) Prudence dictated that she do so.

2003(See Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 603, 613 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 189 ]; South Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist. v. Johnson (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 388, 403 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; Lewis Avenue Parent Teachers’ Assn. v Hussey (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 232, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; 1 Schwing, Cal. Affirmative Defenses (2d ed. 1996) § 1.3, pp. 14-16.) Prudence dictated that she do so.

2003(See Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 603, 613 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 189 ]; South Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist. v. Johnson (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 388, 403 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; Lewis Avenue Parent Teachers’ Assn. v Hussey (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 232, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; 1 Schwing, Cal. Affirmative Defenses (2d ed. 1996) § 1.3, pp. 14-16.) Prudence dictated that she do so.

2003(See Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 603, 613 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 189 ]; South Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist. v. Johnson (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 388, 403 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 846 ]; Lewis Avenue Parent Teachers’ Assn. v Hussey (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 232, 236 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; 1 Schwing, Cal. Affirmative Defenses (2d ed. 1996) § 1.3, pp. 14-16.) Prudence dictated that she do so.

1998Finally, it concludes that the undisclosed test result was “material”; that is, the result “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” (Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 435 [ 115 S.Ct. at p. 1566 ], fn. omitted), and that therefore petitioner’s conviction and death sentence must be vacated.

1998Finally, it concludes that the undisclosed test result was “material”; that is, the result “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” (Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 435 [ 115 S.Ct. at p. 1566 ], fn. omitted), and that therefore petitioner’s conviction and death sentence must be vacated.

1981Inc. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 56, 70-71 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 473 ].) We note, though, in this regard that the grounds of contest statute, the aforementioned Elections Code, section 20021, specifies that the relevant time of eligibility to the involved office is “the time of the election” and that this specification with respect to eligibility prevails over the inconsistent requirement of Los Angeles City Charter section 307.

1981Inc. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 56, 70-71 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 473 ].) We note, though, in this regard that the grounds of contest statute, the aforementioned Elections Code, section 20021, specifies that the relevant time of eligibility to the involved office is “the time of the election” and that this specification with respect to eligibility prevails over the inconsistent requirement of Los Angeles City Charter section 307.

1981(See Powers v. Hitchcock (1900) 129 Cal. 325, 327 [ 61 P. 1076 ].) We suppose that in view of the intervening election the nonresidency cause of action in the first action must be so amended to conform to prevailing state law in this respect or be treated as if it were.

1981(See Powers v. Hitchcock (1900) 129 Cal. 325, 327 [ 61 P. 1076 ].) We suppose that in view of the intervening election the nonresidency cause of action in the first action must be so amended to conform to prevailing state law in this respect or be treated as if it were.

1977In such a case the special statutory enactment “ ‘will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.’ ” (People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal.3d 475, 479 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 462 P.2d 580 ]; In re Williamson, 43 Cal.2d 651, 654 [ 276 P.2d 593 ].) It is noted also that as first enacted (see Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, § 2, pp. 3384-3385) section 945.6 required that the action “must be commenced within six months after the date the claim is acted upon by the board, or is deemed to have been rejected by the board, ...” In 1970 it was amended to

1977In such a case the special statutory enactment “ ‘will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.’ ” (People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal.3d 475, 479 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 462 P.2d 580 ]; In re Williamson, 43 Cal.2d 651, 654 [ 276 P.2d 593 ].) It is noted also that as first enacted (see Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, § 2, pp. 3384-3385) section 945.6 required that the action “must be commenced within six months after the date the claim is acted upon by the board, or is deemed to have been rejected by the board, ...” In 1970 it was amended to

1977In such a case the special statutory enactment “ ‘will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.’ ” (People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal.3d 475, 479 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 462 P.2d 580 ]; In re Williamson, 43 Cal.2d 651, 654 [ 276 P.2d 593 ].) It is noted also that as first enacted (see Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, § 2, pp. 3384-3385) section 945.6 required that the action “must be commenced within six months after the date the claim is acted upon by the board, or is deemed to have been rejected by the board, ...” In 1970 it was amended to

1977In such a case the special statutory enactment “ ‘will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.’ ” (People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal.3d 475, 479 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 462 P.2d 580 ]; In re Williamson, 43 Cal.2d 651, 654 [ 276 P.2d 593 ].) It is noted also that as first enacted (see Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, § 2, pp. 3384-3385) section 945.6 required that the action “must be commenced within six months after the date the claim is acted upon by the board, or is deemed to have been rejected by the board, ...” In 1970 it was amended to

1962(People v. Lollis, *312 177 Cal.App.2d 665, 670 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 420 ].) As stated in People v. Braddock, 41 Cal.2d 794 [ 264 P.2d 521 ] (p. 803) : “Entrapment ‘is a positive defense imposing upon an accused the burden of showing that he was induced to commit the act for which he is on trial’ [citations].” Defendant offered no evidence whatever in support of this theory in the trial court.

1962(People v. Lollis, *312 177 Cal.App.2d 665, 670 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 420 ].) As stated in People v. Braddock, 41 Cal.2d 794 [ 264 P.2d 521 ] (p. 803) : “Entrapment ‘is a positive defense imposing upon an accused the burden of showing that he was induced to commit the act for which he is on trial’ [citations].” Defendant offered no evidence whatever in support of this theory in the trial court.