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9 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chase & Co. v. Littlegreen2 sentences2007In Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 790 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 2001), the supreme court discussed the doctrine of judicial estoppel, quoting from Chase & Co. v. Little, 116 Fla. 667 , 156 So. 609, 610 (1934): A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding will, in general, estop the party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding to the prejudice of the adverse party. 2007In Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 790 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 2001), the supreme court discussed the doctrine of judicial estoppel, quoting from Chase & Co. v. Little, 116 Fla. 667 , 156 So. 609, 610 (1934): A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding will, in general, estop the party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding to the prejudice of the adverse party. | 4 | 4 |
Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.green2 sentences2007In Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 790 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 2001), the supreme court discussed the doctrine of judicial estoppel, quoting from Chase & Co. v. Little, 116 Fla. 667 , 156 So. 609, 610 (1934): A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding will, in general, estop the party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding to the prejudice of the adverse party. 2003Co., 790 So.2d 1061, 1066 (Fla.2001) said: A claim made or position taken in a former action or judicial proceeding will, in general, estop the party to make an inconsistent claim or to take a conflicting position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding to the prejudice of the adverse party. | 1 | 2 |
Benyard v. Wainwrightgreen1 sentence2021See Beynard v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1975) (noting that a statute controls over an inconsistent rule of procedure); see also Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Ala., 202 So. 3d 391, 395-96 (Fla. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Susanne L. Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Company of Alabama, LLC.green1 sentence2021See Beynard v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1975) (noting that a statute controls over an inconsistent rule of procedure); see also Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Ala., 202 So. 3d 391, 395-96 (Fla. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Times Publishing Co. v. Huffstetlergreen1 sentence1996Such a question is academic given our holding that a request for attorney's fees incurred when asserting the defense of personal jurisdiction does not waive that defense. [5] See Shurden v. Thomas, 134 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961) ("motion reveals an inconsistent claim by [defendant in one suit] in that she has submitted herself to the Court's jurisdiction by her own actions by filing [another] suit [on the same subject] as plaintiff, while at the same time ... questioning the jurisdiction of the Court [to entertain the first suit]"); see also Hubbard v. Cazares, 413 So.2d 1192, 1193 (Fl | 1 | 1 |
Shurden v. Thomasgreen1 sentence1996Such a question is academic given our holding that a request for attorney's fees incurred when asserting the defense of personal jurisdiction does not waive that defense. [5] See Shurden v. Thomas, 134 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961) ("motion reveals an inconsistent claim by [defendant in one suit] in that she has submitted herself to the Court's jurisdiction by her own actions by filing [another] suit [on the same subject] as plaintiff, while at the same time ... questioning the jurisdiction of the Court [to entertain the first suit]"); see also Hubbard v. Cazares, 413 So.2d 1192, 1193 (Fl | 1 | 1 |
Hubbard v. Cazaresgreen1 sentence1996Such a question is academic given our holding that a request for attorney's fees incurred when asserting the defense of personal jurisdiction does not waive that defense. [5] See Shurden v. Thomas, 134 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961) ("motion reveals an inconsistent claim by [defendant in one suit] in that she has submitted herself to the Court's jurisdiction by her own actions by filing [another] suit [on the same subject] as plaintiff, while at the same time ... questioning the jurisdiction of the Court [to entertain the first suit]"); see also Hubbard v. Cazares, 413 So.2d 1192, 1193 (Fl | 1 | 1 |
Scarso v. Scarsogreen1 sentence1996But see Logan v. Mora, 555 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Scarso v. Scarso, 488 So.2d 549, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) ("Once asserted, the objection based upon lack of jurisdiction over the person is preserved for all purposes and is not waived because affirmative relief is sought.") [6] Without timely objection, the rule is clear, a general appearance waives a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Logan v. Moragreen1 sentence1996But see Logan v. Mora, 555 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Scarso v. Scarso, 488 So.2d 549, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) ("Once asserted, the objection based upon lack of jurisdiction over the person is preserved for all purposes and is not waived because affirmative relief is sought.") [6] Without timely objection, the rule is clear, a general appearance waives a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Glass
green
1 sentence2002“The rule recognizes that prompt rulings promote public confidence in the impartiality of the trial judge while delayed rulings not only slow the litigation process but call into question the trial judge’s motives.” Anderson, 727 So.2d at 1147 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
McNulty v. Cusack
green
1 sentence1968In many cases the Courts of Florida, apparently beginning with McNulty v. Cusack, Fla.App. 1958, 104 So.2d 785 , have recognized and applied the rule that in rear end collisions a rebuttable presumption arises that the driver of the following car was negligent. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.