inconsistent rule in Maryland

2016See, e.g., County Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Equitable Savings & Loan Ass’n, 261 Md. 246, 252-53 , 274 A.2d 363 (1971); Smith v. State, 5 Md.App. 633 , 634 n. 1, 248 A.2d 913 , cert. denied, 254 Md. 719 (1969) (statute forbidding guilty pleas in murder cases overridden by later court rule); 66 Opinions of the Attorney General 80, 84 (1981) ("as between an inconsistent rule of the Court of Appeals and a statute enacted by the General Assembly, the last enacted will prevail”). .

2016See, e.g., County Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Equitable Savings & Loan Ass’n, 261 Md. 246, 252-53 , 274 A.2d 363 (1971); Smith v. State, 5 Md.App. 633 , 634 n. 1, 248 A.2d 913 , cert. denied, 254 Md. 719 (1969) (statute forbidding guilty pleas in murder cases overridden by later court rule); 66 Opinions of the Attorney General 80, 84 (1981) ("as between an inconsistent rule of the Court of Appeals and a statute enacted by the General Assembly, the last enacted will prevail”). .

2016App. 633 , 634 n.1, 248 A.2d 913 , cert. denied, 254 Md. 719 (1969) (statute forbidding guilty pleas in murder cases overridden by later court rule); 66 Opinions of the Attorney General 80, 84 (1981) (Aas between an inconsistent rule of the Court of Appeals and a statute enacted by the General Assembly, the last enacted will prevail@). 14 See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 157 (2009); Gilchrist, supra, 340 Md. at 620 n.2. 15 See M.

2016App. 633 , 634 n.1, 248 A.2d 913 , cert. denied, 254 Md. 719 (1969) (statute forbidding guilty pleas in murder cases overridden by later court rule); 66 Opinions of the Attorney General 80, 84 (1981) (Aas between an inconsistent rule of the Court of Appeals and a statute enacted by the General Assembly, the last enacted will prevail@). 14 See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 157 (2009); Gilchrist, supra, 340 Md. at 620 n.2. 15 See M.

1970Bolton Mines Co. v. Stokes, 82 Md. 50 ; Kirchner v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 213 Md. 31 ; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide Construction Corporation, 244 Md. 401, 416 .

1969Bolton Mines Co. v. Stokes, 82 Md. 50 ; Kirchner v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 213 Md. 31 ; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide Construction Corporation, 244 Md. 401, 416 .

1970Bolton Mines Co. v. Stokes, 82 Md. 50 ; Kirchner v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 213 Md. 31 ; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide Construction Corporation, 244 Md. 401, 416 .

1969Bolton Mines Co. v. Stokes, 82 Md. 50 ; Kirchner v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 213 Md. 31 ; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide Construction Corporation, 244 Md. 401, 416 .

1970Bolton Mines Co. v. Stokes, 82 Md. 50 ; Kirchner v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 213 Md. 31 ; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide Construction Corporation, 244 Md. 401, 416 .

1969Bolton Mines Co. v. Stokes, 82 Md. 50 ; Kirchner v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 213 Md. 31 ; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide Construction Corporation, 244 Md. 401, 416 .

1989Noting that the Maryland Rules allowed inconsistent and alternative pleading, thus permitting a plaintiff “to join in one action either as independent or alternative claims as many claims as he may have against a defendant,” the Pemrock Court, and thus, by confirmance, the Landay Court as well, observed that: “The cases have said that if one claim or remedy is pursued to judgment an inconsistent claim is thereafter barred, [citations omitted.] The theory of the Maryland statements seems to have been that the plaintiff may not again vex the same defendant if he has already taken judgment agains

1989Noting that the Maryland Rules allowed inconsistent and alternative pleading, thus permitting a plaintiff “to join in one action either as independent or alternative claims as many claims as he may have against a defendant,” the Pemrock Court, and thus, by confirmance, the Landay Court as well, observed that: “The cases have said that if one claim or remedy is pursued to judgment an inconsistent claim is thereafter barred, [citations omitted.] The theory of the Maryland statements seems to have been that the plaintiff may not again vex the same defendant if he has already taken judgment agains

1989Noting that the Maryland Rules allowed inconsistent and alternative pleading, thus permitting a plaintiff “to join in one action either as independent or alternative claims as many claims as he may have against a defendant,” the Pemrock Court, and thus, by confirmance, the Landay Court as well, observed that: “The cases have said that if one claim or remedy is pursued to judgment an inconsistent claim is thereafter barred, [citations omitted.] The theory of the Maryland statements seems to have been that the plaintiff may not again vex the same defendant if he has already taken judgment agains

1989Noting that the Maryland Rules allowed inconsistent and alternative pleading, thus permitting a plaintiff “to join in one action either as independent or alternative claims as many claims as he may have against a defendant,” the Pemrock Court, and thus, by confirmance, the Landay Court as well, observed that: “The cases have said that if one claim or remedy is pursued to judgment an inconsistent claim is thereafter barred, [citations omitted.] The theory of the Maryland statements seems to have been that the plaintiff may not again vex the same defendant if he has already taken judgment agains

1983Cf. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 , 100 S. Ct. 1759 , 64 L.

1983Cf. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 , 100 S. Ct. 1759 , 64 L.

1969In Petillo v. Stein, 184 Md. 644, 652 , this Court said that the doctrine of election of remedies is a severe one “which it is now generally held should not be extended.” The cases have said that if one claim or remedy is pursued to judgment an inconsistent claim is thereafter barred.