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6 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Short Beach Cottage Owners Improvement Ass'n v. Town of Stratford
green
1 sentence2010This is inconsistent with a claim of title by adverse possession.” (Citation omitted.) Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Francis
green
1 sentence2007In fact, as the second habeas court noted in its memorandum of decision, “had [Gallucci] advocated *844 the petitioner’s actual innocence and simultaneously worked to lay the basis for a jury verdict of manslaughter, two strategies that are not exactly consistent and congruous, but nevertheless resulted in a conviction for manslaughter, it is not entirely impossible that the petitioner would be attacking this two-pronged strategy.” As is apparent from Pattis’ testimony, he believed that the lesser included offenses issue was a weak argument to pursue in the 1998 habeas appeal because, as Gallu | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Vivo v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2007In fact, as the second habeas court noted in its memorandum of decision, “had [Gallucci] advocated *844 the petitioner’s actual innocence and simultaneously worked to lay the basis for a jury verdict of manslaughter, two strategies that are not exactly consistent and congruous, but nevertheless resulted in a conviction for manslaughter, it is not entirely impossible that the petitioner would be attacking this two-pronged strategy.” As is apparent from Pattis’ testimony, he believed that the lesser included offenses issue was a weak argument to pursue in the 1998 habeas appeal because, as Gallu 2007In fact, as the second habeas court noted in its memorandum of decision, “had [Gallucci] advocated *844 the petitioner’s actual innocence and simultaneously worked to lay the basis for a jury verdict of manslaughter, two strategies that are not exactly consistent and congruous, but nevertheless resulted in a conviction for manslaughter, it is not entirely impossible that the petitioner would be attacking this two-pronged strategy.” As is apparent from Pattis’ testimony, he believed that the lesser included offenses issue was a weak argument to pursue in the 1998 habeas appeal because, as Gallu | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Weldy v. NORTHBROOK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.
green
1 sentence2007In fact, as the second habeas court noted in its memorandum of decision, “had [Gallucci] advocated *844 the petitioner’s actual innocence and simultaneously worked to lay the basis for a jury verdict of manslaughter, two strategies that are not exactly consistent and congruous, but nevertheless resulted in a conviction for manslaughter, it is not entirely impossible that the petitioner would be attacking this two-pronged strategy.” As is apparent from Pattis’ testimony, he believed that the lesser included offenses issue was a weak argument to pursue in the 1998 habeas appeal because, as Gallu | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Person
green
1 sentence1997Id., 344 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences1996With regard to the first issue, I am in agreement with the dissent of Justice Callahan that, to the extent that State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268 , 455 A.2d 342 (1983), must be read to require the trial court to give an instruction on an alternative inconsistent defense regardless of what the defendant has stated in relation to that defense in his testimony, essentially on the ground that the jury could find the defense established if it disbelieves the defendant’s own testimony relevant to that defense, Harris goes too far. 1996With regard to the first issue, I am in agreement with the dissent of Justice Callahan that, to the extent that State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268 , 455 A.2d 342 (1983), must be read to require the trial court to give an instruction on an alternative inconsistent defense regardless of what the defendant has stated in relation to that defense in his testimony, essentially on the ground that the jury could find the defense established if it disbelieves the defendant’s own testimony relevant to that defense, Harris goes too far. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
French v. Pearce
green
1 sentence1966French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 443 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Receivers Middlesex Banking Co. v. Realty Investment Co.
green
2 sentences1932Receivers Middlesex Banking Co. v. Realty Investment Co., 104 Conn. 206 , *624 214, 132 Atl. 390 . 1932Receivers Middlesex Banking Co. v. Realty Investment Co., 104 Conn. 206 , *624 214, 132 Atl. 390 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.