Mitchell test in Hawaii

2020Rather, the Mitchell test “contemplates a factual determination that the negligence of the defendant was more likely than not a substantial factor in bringing about the result complained of.” McKenna, 57 Haw. at 465 , 558 P.2d at 1022 (emphasis added).

2020Rather, the Mitchell test “contemplates a factual determination that the negligence of the defendant was more likely than not a substantial factor in bringing about the result complained of.” McKenna, 57 Haw. at 465 , 558 P.2d at 1022 (emphasis added).

2017In applying the first prong of the Mitchell test, the court elaborated that the defendant’s conduct “need not have been the whole cause or the only factor”—“[i]t was enough that his [or her] negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injuries.” Id. at 132 , 363 P.2d at 973 (citing First Restatement §§ 431, 433, 435); see also Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i at 74 , 979 P.2d at 1100 (same); Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 389-90 , 742 P.2d 377, 386 (1987) (observing that our law does not require that the event would not have occurred absent the conduct but instead cov

2017In applying the first prong of the Mitchell test, the court elaborated that the defendant’s conduct “need not have been the whole cause or the only factor”—“[i]t was enough that his [or her] negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injuries.” Id. at 132 , 363 P.2d at 973 (citing First Restatement §§ 431, 433, 435); see also Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i at 74 , 979 P.2d at 1100 (same); Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 389-90 , 742 P.2d 377, 386 (1987) (observing that our law does not require that the event would not have occurred absent the conduct but instead cov

2017In applying the first prong of the Mitchell test, the court elaborated that the defendant’s conduct “need not have been the whole cause or the only factor”—“[i]t was enough that his [or her] negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injuries.” Id. at 132 , 363 P.2d at 973 (citing First Restatement §§ 431, 433, 435); see also Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i at 74 , 979 P.2d at 1100 (same); Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 389-90 , 742 P.2d 377, 386 (1987) (observing that our law does not require that the event would not have occurred absent the conduct but instead cov

2017In applying the first prong of the Mitchell test, the court elaborated that the defendant’s conduct “need not have been the whole cause or the only factor”—“[i]t was enough that his [or her] negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injuries.” Id. at 132 , 363 P.2d at 973 (citing First Restatement §§ 431, 433, 435); see also Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i at 74 , 979 P.2d at 1100 (same); Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 389-90 , 742 P.2d 377, 386 (1987) (observing that our law does not require that the event would not have occurred absent the conduct but instead cov

2017In applying the first prong of the Mitchell test, the court elaborated that the defendant’s conduct “need not have been the whole cause or the only factor”—“[i]t was enough that his [or her] negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injuries.” Id. at 132 , 363 P.2d at 973 (citing First Restatement §§ 431, 433, 435); see also Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i at 74 , 979 P.2d at 1100 (same); Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 389-90 , 742 P.2d 377, 386 (1987) (observing that our law does not require that the event would not have occurred absent the conduct but instead cov

2017In applying the first prong of the Mitchell test, the court elaborated that the defendant’s conduct “need not have been the whole cause or the only factor”—“[i]t was enough that his [or her] negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injuries.” Id. at 132 , 363 P.2d at 973 (citing First Restatement §§ 431, 433, 435); see also Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i at 74 , 979 P.2d at 1100 (same); Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 389-90 , 742 P.2d 377, 386 (1987) (observing that our law does not require that the event would not have occurred absent the conduct but instead cov

2016Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Haw. 128, 132 , 363 P.2d 969, 973 (1961); see also Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Hawai'i 230, 236 , 891 P.2d 1022, 1028 (1995) (quoting the Mitchell test with approval).

2016Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Haw. 128, 132 , 363 P.2d 969, 973 (1961); see also Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Hawai'i 230, 236 , 891 P.2d 1022, 1028 (1995) (quoting the Mitchell test with approval).

2020State v. Phillips, 138 Hawaiʻi 321, 352, 382 P.3d 133, 164 (2016) 18 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** (ellipses omitted) (quoting Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 390 , 742 P.2d 377, 386 (1987)).

2020State v. Phillips, 138 Hawaiʻi 321, 352, 382 P.3d 133, 164 (2016) 18 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** (ellipses omitted) (quoting Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 390 , 742 P.2d 377, 386 (1987)).

2017(Haw.) Ltd., 73 Haw. 158, 169 , 829 P.2d 512, 518 (1992), the plaintiff will ordinarily satisfy his or her evi-dentiary burden with respect to legal causation by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

2017(Haw.) Ltd., 73 Haw. 158, 169 , 829 P.2d 512, 518 (1992), the plaintiff will ordinarily satisfy his or her evi-dentiary burden with respect to legal causation by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

2004See Freeman v. Freeman, 323 S.C. 95 , 473 S.E.2d 467 , 472-73 n. 4 (1996) (holding, under Mitchell, illegitimate child could not inherit because "[a]lthough [the father's] name is on the birth certificate, his signature is not").

2004See Freeman v. Freeman, 323 S.C. 95 , 473 S.E.2d 467 , 472-73 n. 4 (1996) (holding, under Mitchell, illegitimate child could not inherit because "[a]lthough [the father's] name is on the birth certificate, his signature is not").

2004As the Court said, "[t]he ... serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children ... than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally." Id. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also id. at 771 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Our previous decisions demonstrate a sensitivity to the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity...."); id. at 773 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Evidence of paternity may take a variety of forms, some creating more significant problems of inaccuracy and inefficiency

2004As the Court said, "[t]he ... serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children ... than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally." Id. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also id. at 771 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Our previous decisions demonstrate a sensitivity to the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity...."); id. at 773 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Evidence of paternity may take a variety of forms, some creating more significant problems of inaccuracy and inefficiency

2004The rule announced in Mitchell [16] is more exacting than the Williamson test, because all of the elements to the Mitchell rule must be satisfied, 374 S.E.2d at 683 ; whereas the Williamson rule may be satisfied by meeting any one of the elements, 345 S.E.2d at 322 .

2004The rule announced in Mitchell [16] is more exacting than the Williamson test, because all of the elements to the Mitchell rule must be satisfied, 374 S.E.2d at 683 ; whereas the Williamson rule may be satisfied by meeting any one of the elements, 345 S.E.2d at 322 .

2004Trimble's rationale is also reflected in the Mitchell rule's second element, which, with respect to proof of paternity, furthers the valid state interest in the "accurate and efficient disposition of property at death." Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 .

2004Trimble's rationale is also reflected in the Mitchell rule's second element, which, with respect to proof of paternity, furthers the valid state interest in the "accurate and efficient disposition of property at death." Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 .

2004Furthermore, its requirements provide "a more demanding standard," in the area of proof of paternity, as the Court advised in Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382 , 544 S.E.2d 620, 626 (2001) (discussing the development of the Mitchell standard, and explaining that its strict requirements "promote stability and prevent both fraudulent challenges to, and fraudulent assertions of, paternity").

2004Furthermore, its requirements provide "a more demanding standard," in the area of proof of paternity, as the Court advised in Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382 , 544 S.E.2d 620, 626 (2001) (discussing the development of the Mitchell standard, and explaining that its strict requirements "promote stability and prevent both fraudulent challenges to, and fraudulent assertions of, paternity").

2004The rule announced in Mitchell [16] is more exacting than the Williamson test, because all of the elements to the Mitchell rule must be satisfied, 374 S.E.2d at 683 ; whereas the Williamson rule may be satisfied by meeting any one of the elements, 345 S.E.2d at 322 .

2004The rule announced in Mitchell [16] is more exacting than the Williamson test, because all of the elements to the Mitchell rule must be satisfied, 374 S.E.2d at 683 ; whereas the Williamson rule may be satisfied by meeting any one of the elements, 345 S.E.2d at 322 .