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17 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Parker v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Cf. Parker v. State, 20 So. 3d 966, 969-70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Whitten v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Whitten v. State, 841 So.2d 578, 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer where the record did not refute the defendant’s claims). | 1 | 1 |
Stennes v. Stategreen1 sentence2007"On appeal of a motion to suppress evidence, this court defers to the trial court's factual findings but reviews legal conclusions de novo." Stennes v. State, 939 So.2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Lochner v. Monaco, Cardillo & Keithgreen1 sentence2004We affirm without comment the other issues that were raised, including Mr. Mitchell's challenge to the amount of attorney's fees and costs that the trial court found was owed to Ms. Coleman. *641 "A charging lien is an attorney's equitable right to have costs and fees owed for legal services secured by the judgment or recovery in the lawsuit." Newton v. Kiefer, 547 So.2d 727, 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); see also Lochner v. Monaco, Cardillo & Keith, P.A., 551 So.2d 581, 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Newton v. Kiefergreen1 sentence2004We affirm without comment the other issues that were raised, including Mr. Mitchell's challenge to the amount of attorney's fees and costs that the trial court found was owed to Ms. Coleman. *641 "A charging lien is an attorney's equitable right to have costs and fees owed for legal services secured by the judgment or recovery in the lawsuit." Newton v. Kiefer, 547 So.2d 727, 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); see also Lochner v. Monaco, Cardillo & Keith, P.A., 551 So.2d 581, 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Correa v. Christensengreen1 sentence2004"It is not enough to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only to the tangible fruits of the services." Correa v. Christensen, 780 So.2d 220, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Robson v. Hainesgreen1 sentence2001See Robson v. Haines, 634 So.2d 831 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Hierro v. Stategreen1 sentence1997Furthermore, where, as here, the critical issue was the veracity of Mitchell’s statement that he did not know a gun was under his seat, we cannot conclude the trial court’s refusal to admit Mitchell’s plea history, was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Hierro v. State, 608 So.2d 912, 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hillgreen1 sentence1996The appellant correctly states the law that "a trial court is without authority to enhance sentences from multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode by both sentencing a defendant as a habitual offender and ordering that the sentences be served consecutively." State v. Hill, 660 So.2d 1384, 1386 (Fla.1995) (emphasis added); Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 278 , 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
McLin v. Trimblegreen1 sentence1992See, e.g., McLin v. Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035 (Okl. 1990) (determining Mitchell was mandate to state courts, but stating the Supremacy Clause did not create state appellate court jurisdiction absent another jurisdictional basis, with result that exercise of original jurisdiction was proper); Henke v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 96 , 775 P.2d 1160 (Ct.App. 1989) (although denial of motion to dismiss was non-appealable interlocutory order, jurisdictional relief was granted under the "unusual step" of a special-action petition); Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1986) (finding Mitchel | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Woodson v. Stategreen1 sentence2004We certify that this decision conflicts with the Fifth District's decision in Woodson, 864 So.2d 512 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smiley v. State
green
1 sentence2007Weekly S303 , ___ So.2d ___, 2007 WL 1628111 (Fla. June 7, 2007). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Moore v. State
green
2 sentences2004The postconviction court cited Moore v. State, 768 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), in support of the principle that issues that were or could have been raised on direct appeal are "not cognizable on collateral attack." The Moore court specifically acknowledged, however, that "a claim that the sentence is illegal can be asserted at any time in a proceeding under rule 3.800(a) even if it could have been raised earlier." 768 So.2d at 1143 . 2004The postconviction court cited Moore v. State, 768 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), in support of the principle that issues that were or could have been raised on direct appeal are "not cognizable on collateral attack." The Moore court specifically acknowledged, however, that "a claim that the sentence is illegal can be asserted at any time in a proceeding under rule 3.800(a) even if it could have been raised earlier." 768 So.2d at 1143 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Mitchell v. Moore
green
2 sentences2004The first question we must resolve in attempting to apply the two-step Mitchell test is what, precisely, the court meant when it said that the right of access must be "significantly obstructed." 786 So.2d at 527 . 2004The first question we must resolve in attempting to apply the two-step Mitchell test is what, precisely, the court meant when it said that the right of access must be "significantly obstructed." 786 So.2d at 527 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Hale v. State
green
1 sentence1996The appellant correctly states the law that "a trial court is without authority to enhance sentences from multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode by both sentencing a defendant as a habitual offender and ordering that the sentences be served consecutively." State v. Hill, 660 So.2d 1384, 1386 (Fla.1995) (emphasis added); Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 278 , 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hale v. Florida
green
1 sentence1996The appellant correctly states the law that "a trial court is without authority to enhance sentences from multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode by both sentencing a defendant as a habitual offender and ordering that the sentences be served consecutively." State v. Hill, 660 So.2d 1384, 1386 (Fla.1995) (emphasis added); Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 278 , 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Loren v. State
green
1 sentence1995Mitchell argues that, pursuant to Loren v. State, 601 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable on direct appeal because such ineffectiveness is demonstrated on the face of the record. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Henke v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1992See, e.g., McLin v. Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035 (Okl. 1990) (determining Mitchell was mandate to state courts, but stating the Supremacy Clause did not create state appellate court jurisdiction absent another jurisdictional basis, with result that exercise of original jurisdiction was proper); Henke v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 96 , 775 P.2d 1160 (Ct.App. 1989) (although denial of motion to dismiss was non-appealable interlocutory order, jurisdictional relief was granted under the "unusual step" of a special-action petition); Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1986) (finding Mitchel 1992See, e.g., McLin v. Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035 (Okl. 1990) (determining Mitchell was mandate to state courts, but stating the Supremacy Clause did not create state appellate court jurisdiction absent another jurisdictional basis, with result that exercise of original jurisdiction was proper); Henke v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 96 , 775 P.2d 1160 (Ct.App. 1989) (although denial of motion to dismiss was non-appealable interlocutory order, jurisdictional relief was granted under the "unusual step" of a special-action petition); Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1986) (finding Mitchel | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Anderson v. City of Hopkins
green
1 sentence1992See, e.g., McLin v. Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035 (Okl. 1990) (determining Mitchell was mandate to state courts, but stating the Supremacy Clause did not create state appellate court jurisdiction absent another jurisdictional basis, with result that exercise of original jurisdiction was proper); Henke v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 96 , 775 P.2d 1160 (Ct.App. 1989) (although denial of motion to dismiss was non-appealable interlocutory order, jurisdictional relief was granted under the "unusual step" of a special-action petition); Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1986) (finding Mitchel | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Reyes v. State
green
1 sentence1986We believe the evidence regarding his very recent experience with his prior facility in Iowa was relevant to show that the defendant had special reason to have had his attention drawn to the day-to-day management and care of the residents at the Heritage and that he was therefore, contrary to his assertions, knowledgeable of the conditions at the Heritage. [3] "FEATURE OF TRIAL" Having concluded that the above categories of evidence were relevant and properly admitted, we turn to appellant's argument that the Williams Rule evidence was so pervasive that it became a prohibited "feature of the t | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fletcher v. State
green
1 sentence1986In Fletcher v. State, 472 So.2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), the court stated that it was not fatal to the prosecution that a weapon was not introduced into evidence inasmuch as the police never found one. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Williams v. State
green
1 sentence1986We believe the evidence regarding his very recent experience with his prior facility in Iowa was relevant to show that the defendant had special reason to have had his attention drawn to the day-to-day management and care of the residents at the Heritage and that he was therefore, contrary to his assertions, knowledgeable of the conditions at the Heritage. [3] "FEATURE OF TRIAL" Having concluded that the above categories of evidence were relevant and properly admitted, we turn to appellant's argument that the Williams Rule evidence was so pervasive that it became a prohibited "feature of the t | 1 | 1986–1986 |
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.
green
1 sentence1977North Georgia Finishing, supra, 419 U.S. at *572 606-607, 95 S.Ct. 719 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1969The trial Court denied Mitchell's motion to suppress the blood-taking evidence upon the authority of Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 . 1969The trial Court denied Mitchell's motion to suppress the blood-taking evidence upon the authority of Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.