Mitchell motion in Arkansas

2023If these factors weigh in favor of denial, there is no “[e]rroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice[]” that “qualifies as ‘structural error.’” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 (1993)) As noted above, the circuit court (over the course of multiple hearings) considered many of the relevant factors articulated in Arroyo when denying Mitchell’s motion to substitute counsel.

2023The majority’s opinion is patently flawed for three reasons. 11 First, the majority asserts that “[t]he circuit court (over the course of multiple hearings) considered many of the relevant factors articulated in Arroyo when denying Mitchell’s motion to substitute counsel.” (Emphasis added.) However, this court has long held that deprivation of the right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is complete “when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he received.” Arroyo v. State, 2013 Ark. 244, at 5

2023Unlike this court’s recent opinion in Stanton 7 v. State, the denial of Mitchell motion to substitute counsel came at the end of the pre-trial preparation, not the beginning. 2023 Ark. 81 , at 6–7, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___.

2023Unlike this court’s recent opinion in Stanton 7 v. State, the denial of Mitchell motion to substitute counsel came at the end of the pre-trial preparation, not the beginning. 2023 Ark. 81 , at 6–7, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___.

2023Blueford, 2011 Ark. 8 , at 9–11, 370 S.W.3d at 502 .

2023Blueford, 2011 Ark. 8 , at 9–11, 370 S.W.3d at 502 .

2020In Burchette v. Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment Committee, 374 Ark. 467 , 288 S.W.3d 614 (2008), the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to Mitchell’s claim that he had not had an adequate opportunity to make his case to the SOAC.

2020In Burchette v. Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment Committee, 374 Ark. 467 , 288 S.W.3d 614 (2008), the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to Mitchell’s claim that he had not had an adequate opportunity to make his case to the SOAC.

2019Instead, the correct inquiry under the statute is not whether the substances are natural or unnatural; rather, it is whether the material or substance on the public highway at issue is a 16 “substance likely to injure,” is “destructive or injurious material,” or an “injurious substance.” Finally, Sullivan and the Mitchell defendants’ reliance on Bowie, 262 Ark. 793 , 561 S.W.2d 314 , as support for the position that section 27-51-1405 applies only to unnatural substances is misplaced.

2019Instead, the correct inquiry under the statute is not whether the substances are natural or unnatural; rather, it is whether the material or substance on the public highway at issue is a 16 “substance likely to injure,” is “destructive or injurious material,” or an “injurious substance.” Finally, Sullivan and the Mitchell defendants’ reliance on Bowie, 262 Ark. 793 , 561 S.W.2d 314 , as support for the position that section 27-51-1405 applies only to unnatural substances is misplaced.

2006This court has recognized the “near universal rule that a corporation and its stockholders are separate and distinct entities, even though a stockholder may own the majority of the stock.” First Commercial Bank, N.A. v. Walker, 333 Ark. 100, 110 , 969 S.W.2d 146, 151 (1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 965 (1998).

1952“Courts having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of any litigation necessarily have inherent power to determine when the parties thereto have been properly brought into court.” Pruitt v. International Order of Twelve, Knights & Daughters of Tabor, 158 Ark. 437 , 250 S. W. 331 .

1952“Courts having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of any litigation necessarily have inherent power to determine when the parties thereto have been properly brought into court.” Pruitt v. International Order of Twelve, Knights & Daughters of Tabor, 158 Ark. 437 , 250 S. W. 331 .