10 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2006Compare State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 246 (2005) (holding "the Sixth Amendment requires that when [a juvenile] adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing waiver"), and State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1289 (La.2004) (holding that a juvenile "adjudication should not be counted as a `prior conviction' for Apprendi purposes"), with Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 2005) (holding that juvenile adj | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cottongreen2 sentences2006United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 628, 631 , 122 S.Ct. 1781 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). 2006United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 628, 631 , 122 S.Ct. 1781 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2006Compare State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 246 (2005) (holding "the Sixth Amendment requires that when [a juvenile] adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing waiver"), and State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1289 (La.2004) (holding that a juvenile "adjudication should not be counted as a `prior conviction' for Apprendi purposes"), with Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 2005) (holding that juvenile adj 2006Compare State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 246 (2005) (holding "the Sixth Amendment requires that when [a juvenile] adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing waiver"), and State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1289 (La.2004) (holding that a juvenile "adjudication should not be counted as a `prior conviction' for Apprendi purposes"), with Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 2005) (holding that juvenile adj | 1 | 1 |
Ryle v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Compare State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 246 (2005) (holding "the Sixth Amendment requires that when [a juvenile] adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing waiver"), and State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1289 (La.2004) (holding that a juvenile "adjudication should not be counted as a `prior conviction' for Apprendi purposes"), with Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 2005) (holding that juvenile adj | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hittgreen2 sentences2006Compare State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 246 (2005) (holding "the Sixth Amendment requires that when [a juvenile] adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing waiver"), and State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1289 (La.2004) (holding that a juvenile "adjudication should not be counted as a `prior conviction' for Apprendi purposes"), with Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 2005) (holding that juvenile adj 2006Compare State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 246 (2005) (holding "the Sixth Amendment requires that when [a juvenile] adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing waiver"), and State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1289 (La.2004) (holding that a juvenile "adjudication should not be counted as a `prior conviction' for Apprendi purposes"), with Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 2005) (holding that juvenile adj | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCoygreen2 sentences2004Because our decision in State v. McCoy, 631 N.W.2d 446, 450-51 (Minn.App.2001), limited the Apprendi holding to sentences that literally exceed the “statutory maximum,” we are satisfied that appellant did not deliberate *559 ly and inexcusably fail to raise the Apprendi claim on his direct appeal. 2004Because our decision in State v. McCoy, 631 N.W.2d 446, 450-51 (Minn.App.2001), limited the Apprendi holding to sentences that literally exceed the “statutory maximum,” we are satisfied that appellant did not deliberate *559 ly and inexcusably fail to raise the Apprendi claim on his direct appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Hummel v. Stategreen2 sentences2003ANALYSIS “A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a conviction that carries a presumption of regularity.” Hummel v. State, 617 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn.2000) (citing State ex rel. 2003ANALYSIS “A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a conviction that carries a presumption of regularity.” Hummel v. State, 617 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn.2000) (citing State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2019Next, the constitutional argument advanced by Evans lacks merit for a similar reason. 2 The Blakely / Apprendi rule provides: " 'Other than the fact of a prior *244 conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Blakely , 542 U.S. at 301 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). 2019Next, the constitutional argument advanced by Evans lacks merit for a similar reason. 2 The Blakely / Apprendi rule provides: " 'Other than the fact of a prior *244 conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Blakely , 542 U.S. at 301 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). | 3 | 2006–2019 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2019Next, the constitutional argument advanced by Evans lacks merit for a similar reason. 2 The Blakely / Apprendi rule provides: " 'Other than the fact of a prior *244 conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Blakely , 542 U.S. at 301 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). 2019Next, the constitutional argument advanced by Evans lacks merit for a similar reason. 2 The Blakely / Apprendi rule provides: " 'Other than the fact of a prior *244 conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Blakely , 542 U.S. at 301 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). | 3 | 2004–2019 |
Meemken v. State
green
2 sentences2004However, the rule does not increase the reliability of the determination of guilt; it only limits the sentencing exposure of those who have already been validly convicted.” Id. (citing Moss, 252 F.3d at 997 ). 2004However, the rule does not increase the reliability of the determination of guilt; it only limits the sentencing exposure of those who have already been validly convicted.” Id. (citing Moss, 252 F.3d at 997 ). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Darius M. Moss
green
2 sentences2004However, the rule does not increase the reliability of the determination of guilt; it only limits the sentencing exposure of those who have already been validly convicted.” Id. (citing Moss, 252 F.3d at 997 ). 2004However, the rule does not increase the reliability of the determination of guilt; it only limits the sentencing exposure of those who have already been validly convicted.” Id. (citing Moss, 252 F.3d at 997 ). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Allen
green
1 sentence2014In Allen , the supreme court noted that the primary reason the Apprendi rule excludes prior convictions is that the convictions themselves are established by procedures that satisfy a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 706 N.W.2d at 47 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Almendarez-Torres v. United States
red
2 sentences2006The prior conviction exception to the Apprendi rule arose out of the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). 2006The prior conviction exception to the Apprendi rule arose out of the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Foster
green
2 sentences2006Id. (citations omitted). 2006Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.