Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
15 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alleyne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015In Alleyne, the Supreme Court overruled Harris and for the first time concluded that mandatory minimum sentences were equally subject to the Apprendi rule, holding that “a fact increasing either end of the range produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient of the offense.” Alleyne , 570 US at_; 133 S Ct at 2160 (emphasis added). 2015In Alleyne, the Supreme Court overruled Harris and for the first time concluded that mandatory minimum sentences were equally subject to the Apprendi rule, holding that “a fact increasing either end of the range produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient of the offense.” Alleyne , 570 US at_; 133 S Ct at 2160 (emphasis added). | 2 | 5 |
Ring v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2016The Court recited its holding in Ring that “Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violated Apprendi’s rule because the State allowed a judge to find the facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death.” Id., citing Ring, 536 US at 591 . 2016The Court recited its holding in Ring that “Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violated Apprendi’s rule because the State allowed a judge to find the facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death.” Id., citing Ring, 536 US at 591 . | 1 | 2 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015Apprendi, 530 US at 490 , quoting Jones, 526 US at 252-253 (emphasis added). 2015Apprendi, 530 US at 490 , quoting Jones, 526 US at 252-253 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harpergreen2 sentences2007This requires a conclusion that, in order to determine a defendant's appropriate maximum sentence, a sentencing court should score only the PRVs. [ Post at 698, 739 N.W.2d 523 .] *574 This interpretation disregards the integral part of the Apprendi rule that only facts used to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum need be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 2007This requires a conclusion that, in order to determine a defendant's appropriate maximum sentence, a sentencing court should score only the PRVs. [ Post at 698, 739 N.W.2d 523 .] *574 This interpretation disregards the integral part of the Apprendi rule that only facts used to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum need be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. United Statesred2 sentences2015In Harris v United States, 536 US 545, 550 ; 122 S Ct 2406 ; 153 L Ed 2d 524 (2002), overruled by Alleyne , the Supreme Court was squarely presented with the question “whether McMillan stands after Apprendi.” A majority held that the Apprendi rule did not bar judicially found facts altering “mandatory minimum” sentences. 2015In Harris v United States, 536 US 545, 550 ; 122 S Ct 2406 ; 153 L Ed 2d 524 (2002), overruled by Alleyne , the Supreme Court was squarely presented with the question “whether McMillan stands after Apprendi.” A majority held that the Apprendi rule did not bar judicially found facts altering “mandatory minimum” sentences. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Booker
green
2 sentences2023But in United States v Booker, 543 US 220, 227 ; 125 S Ct 738 ; 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that this process ran afoul of the Apprendi rule. 2023But in United States v Booker, 543 US 220, 227 ; 125 S Ct 738 ; 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that this process ran afoul of the Apprendi rule. | 4 | 2013–2023 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2018So the statutory scheme falls within the Apprendi rule: "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 . 2018So the statutory scheme falls within the Apprendi rule: "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 . | 4 | 2007–2018 |
Oregon v. Ice
green
1 sentence2016In so concluding, the Court found that “twin considerations— historical practice and respect for state sovereignty— counsel against extending Apprendi's rule to the imposition of sentences for discrete crimes.” Id. at 168 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hurst v. Florida
green
2 sentences2016See Hurst v Florida, __ US __; 136 S Ct 616 ; 193 L Ed 2d 504 (2016); Ring, 536 US 584 . 2016See Hurst v Florida, __ US __; 136 S Ct 616 ; 193 L Ed 2d 504 (2016); Ring, 536 US 584 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Herron
green
2 sentences2015In Herron , the Court of Appeals found no constitutional flaw in our sentencing guidelines, reasoning in part that judicial fact-finding in our guidelines scheme is permissible because it is used only to “inform the trial court’s sentencing discretion within the maximum determined by statute and the jury’s verdict.” Herron, 303 Mich App at 403 . 14 We reject this analysis because it ignores two key aspects of the Apprendi rule as extended by Alleyne : (1) the fact-finding is used to constrain, not merely inform, the court’s sentencing discretion by increasing the mandatory minimum sentence and 2015In Herron , the Court of Appeals found no constitutional flaw in our sentencing guidelines, reasoning in part that judicial fact-finding in our guidelines scheme is permissible because it is used only to “inform the trial court’s sentencing discretion within the maximum determined by statute and the jury’s verdict.” Herron, 303 Mich App at 403 . 14 We reject this analysis because it ignores two key aspects of the Apprendi rule as extended by Alleyne : (1) the fact-finding is used to constrain, not merely inform, the court’s sentencing discretion by increasing the mandatory minimum sentence and | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 303 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Soto
green
2 sentences2015See, e.g., State v Soto, 299 Kan 102; 322 P3d 334 (2014) (rejecting as unconstitutional under Alleyne a statute that provided for a prison sentence of life with 50 years before the possibility of parole). 2015See, e.g., State v Soto, 299 Kan 102; 322 P3d 334 (2014) (rejecting as unconstitutional under Alleyne a statute that provided for a prison sentence of life with 50 years before the possibility of parole). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Joseph Lira
green
1 sentence2015RESPONSE TO THE MAJORITY The majority believes that Alleyne altered the Sixth Amendment landscape established by Apprendi by holding merely that the “Apprendi rule applied with equal force to minimum sentences.” Michigan’s sentencing guidelines thereby fail under Apprendi because the “guidelines used to set the minimum sentence require a court to increase a defendant’s minimum sentence beyond the minimum sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict alone.” As a result, “under Alleyne, the Legislature may not require judicial fact-finding that results in a mandatory increase in either the minimum | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wolff v. McDonnell
green
2 sentences2015Neither the dissent nor the Attorney General cites any other case for the novel proposition that application of the Apprendi rule hinges on whether a defendant is entitled to immediate release upon completion of the sentence at issue or whether the defendant is simply eligible for release or to be paroled. 23 23 The dissent briefly cites Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539 ; 94 S Ct 2963 ; 41 L Ed 2d 935 (1974), and Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471 ; 92 S Ct 2593 ; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972), but both of those cases involve a criminal defendant’s rights in parole proceedings. 2015Neither the dissent nor the Attorney General cites any other case for the novel proposition that application of the Apprendi rule hinges on whether a defendant is entitled to immediate release upon completion of the sentence at issue or whether the defendant is simply eligible for release or to be paroled. 23 23 The dissent briefly cites Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539 ; 94 S Ct 2963 ; 41 L Ed 2d 935 (1974), and Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471 ; 92 S Ct 2593 ; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972), but both of those cases involve a criminal defendant’s rights in parole proceedings. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2015Neither the dissent nor the Attorney General cites any other case for the novel proposition that application of the Apprendi rule hinges on whether a defendant is entitled to immediate release upon completion of the sentence at issue or whether the defendant is simply eligible for release or to be paroled. 23 23 The dissent briefly cites Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539 ; 94 S Ct 2963 ; 41 L Ed 2d 935 (1974), and Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471 ; 92 S Ct 2593 ; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972), but both of those cases involve a criminal defendant’s rights in parole proceedings. 2015Neither the dissent nor the Attorney General cites any other case for the novel proposition that application of the Apprendi rule hinges on whether a defendant is entitled to immediate release upon completion of the sentence at issue or whether the defendant is simply eligible for release or to be paroled. 23 23 The dissent briefly cites Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539 ; 94 S Ct 2963 ; 41 L Ed 2d 935 (1974), and Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471 ; 92 S Ct 2593 ; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972), but both of those cases involve a criminal defendant’s rights in parole proceedings. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Drohan
green
2 sentences2015Drohan, 475 Mich at 164 . 2015Drohan, 475 Mich at 164 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. DaQuann Hackett
green
1 sentence2015RESPONSE TO THE MAJORITY The majority believes that Alleyne altered the Sixth Amendment landscape established by Apprendi by holding merely that the “Apprendi rule applied with equal force to minimum sentences.” Michigan’s sentencing guidelines thereby fail under Apprendi because the “guidelines used to set the minimum sentence require a court to increase a defendant’s minimum sentence beyond the minimum sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict alone.” As a result, “under Alleyne, the Legislature may not require judicial fact-finding that results in a mandatory increase in either the minimum | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Williams v. New York
green
2 sentences2013“It is indisputable that a fact triggering a mandatory minimum alters the prescribed range of sentences to which a criminal defendant is exposed.” Id. at _; 133 S Ct at 2160 (emphasis added.) Thus, “the core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at_; 133 S Ct at 2161 (emphasis added.) But in applying the Apprendi rule to facts that establish the mandatory minimum of a sentencing range, the Alleyne Court distinguished judicial fact-finding “used to guide judicial discret 2013“It is indisputable that a fact triggering a mandatory minimum alters the prescribed range of sentences to which a criminal defendant is exposed.” Id. at _; 133 S Ct at 2160 (emphasis added.) Thus, “the core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at_; 133 S Ct at 2161 (emphasis added.) But in applying the Apprendi rule to facts that establish the mandatory minimum of a sentencing range, the Alleyne Court distinguished judicial fact-finding “used to guide judicial discret | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. McCuller
green
2 sentences2013People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 676 ; 739 NW2d 563 (2007). 2013People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 676 ; 739 NW2d 563 (2007). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.