Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
16 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Erlinger v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025Despite the Erlinger majority's explanation that it was relying on established constitutional principles, 602 U.S. at 838 -39, that holding "abrogate[d] New Jersey Supreme Court precedent that embraced a contrary interpretation of the Apprendi doctrine, State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006)." Carlton, 480 N.J. 2025Despite the Erlinger majority's explanation that it was relying on established constitutional principles, 602 U.S. at 838 -39, that holding "abrogate[d] New Jersey Supreme Court precedent that embraced a contrary interpretation of the Apprendi doctrine, State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006)." Carlton, 480 N.J. | 8 | 10 |
Descamps v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025We note in this regard the majority in Erlinger re-affirmed that under the Almendarez-Torres exemption from the strictures of the Apprendi rule, a judge may determine "the fact of a prior A-0532-22 42 conviction and the then-existing elements of that offense." Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 839 (emphasis added) (citing Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260 (2013)). 2024We note in this regard the majority in Erlinger re-affirmed that under the Almendarez-Torres exemption from the strictures of the Apprendi rule, a judge may determine "the fact of a prior conviction and the then-existing elements of that offense." Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 839 (emphasis added) (citing Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260 (2013)). | 7 | 7 |
Ring v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2006In Ring v. Arizona, the Court applied the Apprendi test in striking down provisions of Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to impose the death penalty based solely on a judicial finding of aggravating circumstances. 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 , 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2432 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556, 563-64 (2002). 2006In Ring v. Arizona, the Court applied the Apprendi test in striking down provisions of Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to impose the death penalty based solely on a judicial finding of aggravating circumstances. 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 , 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2432 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556, 563-64 (2002). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Piercegreen2 sentences2025Despite the Erlinger majority's explanation that it was relying on established constitutional principles, 602 U.S. at 838 -39, that holding "abrogate[d] New Jersey Supreme Court precedent that embraced a contrary interpretation of the Apprendi doctrine, State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006)." Carlton, 480 N.J. 2025Despite the Erlinger majority's explanation that it was relying on established constitutional principles, 602 U.S. at 838 -39, that holding "abrogate[d] New Jersey Supreme Court precedent that embraced a contrary interpretation of the Apprendi doctrine, State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006)." Carlton, 480 N.J. | 1 | 11 |
United States v. Davion Riversgreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Oct. 6, 2025); United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87, 94-95 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Nov. 10, 2025) (applying harmless error review to an Erlinger error relying on the United States Supreme Court’s “observation that an Erlinger error is merely a type of Apprendi error”; “Recuenco established that Apprendi errors of the type found in Erlinger are subject to harmless-error review”; and “[n]othing in Erlinger purported to change or undermine that holding”); United States v. Val | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rico Browngreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Oct. 6, 2025); United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87, 94-95 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Nov. 10, 2025) (applying harmless error review to an Erlinger error relying on the United States Supreme Court’s “observation that an Erlinger error is merely a type of Apprendi error”; “Recuenco established that Apprendi errors of the type found in Erlinger are subject to harmless-error review”; and “[n]othing in Erlinger purported to change or undermine that holding”); United States v. Val | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rufus Bowlinggreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Oct. 6, 2025); United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87, 94-95 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Nov. 10, 2025) (applying harmless error review to an Erlinger error relying on the United States Supreme Court’s “observation that an Erlinger error is merely a type of Apprendi error”; “Recuenco established that Apprendi errors of the type found in Erlinger are subject to harmless-error review”; and “[n]othing in Erlinger purported to change or undermine that holding”); United States v. Val | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cameron Johnsongreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Oct. 6, 2025); United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87, 94-95 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Nov. 10, 2025) (applying harmless error review to an Erlinger error relying on the United States Supreme Court’s “observation that an Erlinger error is merely a type of Apprendi error”; “Recuenco established that Apprendi errors of the type found in Erlinger are subject to harmless-error review”; and “[n]othing in Erlinger purported to change or undermine that holding”); United States v. Val | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Valenciagreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Oct. 6, 2025); United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87, 94-95 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Nov. 10, 2025) (applying harmless error review to an Erlinger error relying on the United States Supreme Court’s “observation that an Erlinger error is merely a type of Apprendi error”; “Recuenco established that Apprendi errors of the type found in Erlinger are subject to harmless-error review”; and “[n]othing in Erlinger purported to change or undermine that holding”); United States v. Val | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gerald Lynn Campbellgreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Oct. 6, 2025); United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87, 94-95 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (Nov. 10, 2025) (applying harmless error review to an Erlinger error relying on the United States Supreme Court’s “observation that an Erlinger error is merely a type of Apprendi error”; “Recuenco established that Apprendi errors of the type found in Erlinger are subject to harmless-error review”; and “[n]othing in Erlinger purported to change or undermine that holding”); United States v. Val | 1 | 1 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2020In Apprendi,3 the United States Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490 ; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) ("[I]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized 3 The Court addressed a New Jersey hate-crime statute that prescribed a range of sentences greater than the range that ordinarily applies to the degree of crime for which the defendant was convicted, known as an 2020In Apprendi,3 the United States Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490 ; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) ("[I]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized 3 The Court addressed a New Jersey hate-crime statute that prescribed a range of sentences greater than the range that ordinarily applies to the degree of crime for which the defendant was convicted, known as an | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Haymondgreen2 sentences2020A-4526-17T1 21 [ 588 U.S. __ , 139 S. Ct. at 2384 (plurality opinion) (emphases added).] Notably, in this pointed discussion of the potential breadth of Apprendi's reach, the plurality referred to the combination of two periods of incarceration, not to the combination of a period of incarceration and a period of supervised release when describing a composite sentence that might conceivably exceed the "statutory maximum." The point simply is that even as the plurality and dissenting Justices argued vociferously about the prospects for expanding the Apprendi doctrine, no one raised the possibili 2020A-4526-17T1 21 [ 588 U.S. __ , 139 S. Ct. at 2384 (plurality opinion) (emphases added).] Notably, in this pointed discussion of the potential breadth of Apprendi's reach, the plurality referred to the combination of two periods of incarceration, not to the combination of a period of incarceration and a period of supervised release when describing a composite sentence that might conceivably exceed the "statutory maximum." The point simply is that even as the plurality and dissenting Justices argued vociferously about the prospects for expanding the Apprendi doctrine, no one raised the possibili | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Almendarez-Torres v. United States
red
2 sentences2025In Almendarez- Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Court focused on an exception contemplated in the initial formulation of the basic Apprendi rule. 2025In Almendarez- Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Court focused on an exception contemplated in the initial formulation of the basic Apprendi rule. | 7 | 2024–2025 |
Mathis v. United States
green
2 sentences2025The majority added, "[u]nder that exception, a judge may "do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of." Ibid. (emphasis added) (citing Mathis, 579 U.S. at 511-12 ). 2024The majority added, "[u]nder that exception, a judge may 'do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.'" Ibid. (emphasis added) (citing Mathis, 579 U.S. at 511-12 ). | 7 | 2024–2025 |
Alleyne v. United States
green
2 sentences2018In Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99 , 103, 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), the Supreme Court extended the Apprendi principle to mandatory-minimum sentences. 2018In Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99 , 103, 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), the Supreme Court extended the Apprendi principle to mandatory-minimum sentences. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Gordon v. Conley, Warden
green
2 sentences2004In State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75 , 820 A. 2d 637 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 259 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 187 (2003), the Court held that the determination of whether a defendant had been intoxicated, as a basis for imposing a statutorily mandated parole ineligibility term for vehicular manslaughter, may be made by the trial judge rather than by the jury. 176 N.J. at 102 , 820 A. 2d 637 . 2004In State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75 , 820 A. 2d 637 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 259 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 187 (2003), the Court held that the determination of whether a defendant had been intoxicated, as a basis for imposing a statutorily mandated parole ineligibility term for vehicular manslaughter, may be made by the trial judge rather than by the jury. 176 N.J. at 102 , 820 A. 2d 637 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Smith v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
green
2 sentences2004In State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75 , 820 A. 2d 637 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 259 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 187 (2003), the Court held that the determination of whether a defendant had been intoxicated, as a basis for imposing a statutorily mandated parole ineligibility term for vehicular manslaughter, may be made by the trial judge rather than by the jury. 176 N.J. at 102 , 820 A. 2d 637 . 2004In State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75 , 820 A. 2d 637 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 259 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 187 (2003), the Court held that the determination of whether a defendant had been intoxicated, as a basis for imposing a statutorily mandated parole ineligibility term for vehicular manslaughter, may be made by the trial judge rather than by the jury. 176 N.J. at 102 , 820 A. 2d 637 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Harris v. United States
red
2 sentences2004The judge may impose the minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence within the range without seeking further authorization from those juriesand without contradicting Apprendi. [ Harris, supra, 536 U.S. at 565 , 122 S.Ct. at 2418 , 153 L.Ed. 2d at 543 .] [5] *872 Following Harris , our Supreme Court recently revisited the Apprendi doctrine. 2004The judge may impose the minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence within the range without seeking further authorization from those juriesand without contradicting Apprendi. [ Harris, supra, 536 U.S. at 565 , 122 S.Ct. at 2418 , 153 L.Ed. 2d at 543 .] [5] *872 Following Harris , our Supreme Court recently revisited the Apprendi doctrine. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Stanton
green
2 sentences2004In State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75 , 820 A. 2d 637 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 259 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 187 (2003), the Court held that the determination of whether a defendant had been intoxicated, as a basis for imposing a statutorily mandated parole ineligibility term for vehicular manslaughter, may be made by the trial judge rather than by the jury. 176 N.J. at 102 , 820 A. 2d 637 . 2004In State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75 , 820 A. 2d 637 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 259 , 157 L.Ed. 2d 187 (2003), the Court held that the determination of whether a defendant had been intoxicated, as a basis for imposing a statutorily mandated parole ineligibility term for vehicular manslaughter, may be made by the trial judge rather than by the jury. 176 N.J. at 102 , 820 A. 2d 637 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.