Apprendi violation in Illinois

2024Id. ¶ 273 Because Polk did not object to the Apprendi violation in the trial court, we review the matter for plain error.

2024Id. ¶ 273 Because Polk did not object to the Apprendi violation in the trial court, we review the matter for plain error.

2024After identifying an Apprendi violation, the next step is to determine whether the defendant raised a timely objection Id. at 409- 10.

2024After identifying an Apprendi violation, the next step is to determine whether the defendant raised a timely objection Id. at 409- 10.

2025In People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347-48 (2001), the supreme court held that if the “defendant did not object at the time of trial,” “the proper inquiry” was “whether the Apprendi violation constituted ‘plain error,’ ”—more precisely, plain error that “was prejudicial.” The implication of that holding in Crespo is that, because of the lack of an Apprendi objection at trial, there was a procedural forfeiture that the defendant would have to undo through the plain-error doctrine. ¶ 169 The question might be raised, though, when the State called Moore to testify to how fast the crash data ret

2025In People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347-48 (2001), the supreme court held that if the “defendant did not object at the time of trial,” “the proper inquiry” was “whether the Apprendi violation constituted ‘plain error,’ ”—more precisely, plain error that “was prejudicial.” The implication of that holding in Crespo is that, because of the lack of an Apprendi objection at trial, there was a procedural forfeiture that the defendant would have to undo through the plain-error doctrine. ¶ 169 The question might be raised, though, when the State called Moore to testify to how fast the crash data ret

2025The petition was untimely, but petitioner sought to avoid this procedural bar by claiming that the enhancement for attempted murder, too, was void—not based on the now- overruled Morgan but because (as we mentioned above) the enhancement for attempted murder was not charged in the indictment or included in the jury instructions, as required under section 111-3(c-5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/111-3(c-5) (West 2022) (codifying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). ¶ 19 We acknowledged that it was error—a possibly harmless Apprendi error—to impose the firearm enhancemen

2025See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (Apprendi rule is grounded in “due process and associated jury protections”).

2023See People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256 , ¶ 23 n.1. ¶ 19 An Apprendi violation does not warrant resentencing “where there is overwhelming evidence that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty.” People v. Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d 288, 302 (2003).

2023See People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256 , ¶ 23 n.1. ¶ 19 An Apprendi violation does not warrant resentencing “where there is overwhelming evidence that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty.” People v. Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d 288, 302 (2003).

2024Thereafter, the supreme court entered supervisory orders instructing this court to vacate the judgment and reconsider the appeal in light of People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378 (2002) (Under Apprendi, facts enhancing a sentence for first degree murder above the sentencing range must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003) (finding an Apprendi violation subject to harmless error review); and People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001) (when a defendant does not raise an Apprendi objection at the time of trial, the court should apply a plain error test,

2024Thereafter, the supreme court entered supervisory orders instructing this court to vacate the judgment and reconsider the appeal in light of People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378 (2002) (Under Apprendi, facts enhancing a sentence for first degree murder above the sentencing range must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003) (finding an Apprendi violation subject to harmless error review); and People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001) (when a defendant does not raise an Apprendi objection at the time of trial, the court should apply a plain error test,

2004A defendant raising an Apprendi claim on appeal is simply complaining that he received a sentence in excess of the normal sentencing range, without the fact or facts necessary to permit such sentence having been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” De La Paz , 204 Ill. 2d at 436-37 , citing United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes , 282 F.3d 664, 671 (9th Cir. 2002).

2004A defendant raising an Apprendi claim on appeal is simply complaining that he received a sentence in excess of the normal sentencing range, without the fact or facts necessary to permit such sentence having been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d at 436-37 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 , citing United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 671 (9th Cir.2002).

2023App. 3d at 60 (2009) (“Because the instructions provided to the jury at defendant’s trial included the language ‘personally discharging firearm’ and properly articulated the facts that were required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to apply the 25-year extension to defendant’s sentence, the enhancement did not violate Apprendi”); People v. Hopkins, 201 Ill. 2d 26, 39-40 (2002) (finding no Apprendi violation where the defendant was sentenced to an extended term sentence due to the victim’s age, despite the fact that the jury did not receive a separate instruction on the issue). ¶

2014See also Hopkins, 201 Ill. 2d at 39-40 (holding that no Apprendi error occurred where the enhancement factor, the victim’s old age, was included “as an element of the offense,” making it “undisputed that the age of the victim was *** proved [to the jury] beyond a reasonable doubt”). ¶ 69 The case at bar is distinguishable from Rodriguez and Hopkins.

2013Our supreme court has noted that “[a]n Apprendi violation is not per se reversible error and may be subject to a harmless-error analysis.” People v. Jones, 219 Ill. 2d 1, 36 (2006).

2006Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d at 369 ; see also Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d at 302 (“[i]t is *** clear, after Thurow and Crespo, that an Apprendi violation of this kind will not warrant resentencing where there is overwhelming evidence that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty”); People v. Jones, 219 Ill. 2d 1, 36 (2006) (finding Apprendi violation to be harmless error where State presented uncontested and overwhelming evidence of fact found by judge).

2024The court cited Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 , for its application of the plain-error test due to the defendant’s failure to object to an Apprendi violation at trial, even though Apprendi had not been decided until after the defendant was convicted.

2024The court cited Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 , for its application of the plain-error test due to the defendant’s failure to object to an Apprendi violation at trial, even though Apprendi had not been decided until after the defendant was convicted.

2023People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 295 (2002). ¶ 29 Defendant acknowledges that under Jackson he waived his right to have the State prove the enhancing factors beyond a reasonable doubt, but he insists that this is not an Apprendi claim.

2023People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 295 (2002). ¶ 29 Defendant acknowledges that under Jackson he waived his right to have the State prove the enhancing factors beyond a reasonable doubt, but he insists that this is not an Apprendi claim.

2003App. 3d 719, 729 , 743 N.E.2d 1025 (2000) (defendant’s sentencing as a recidivist offender was not subject to Apprendi rule); People v. Ramos, 318 Ill.

2003App. 3d 719, 729 , 743 N.E.2d 1025 (2000) (defendant's sentencing as a recidivist offender was not subject to Apprendi rule); People v. Ramos , 318 Ill.

2003Regarding the first waiver argument, in People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269 (2001), our supreme court refused to find that an Apprendi claim was waived by the defendant’s failure to raise it in the trial court.

2003Regarding the first waiver argument, in People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269 (2001), our supreme court refused to find that an Apprendi claim was waived by the defendant’s failure to raise it in the trial court.

2018To determine if a constitutional error such as an Apprendi error was harmless, we must ask whether it is " 'clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.' " People v. Thurow , 203 Ill. 2d 352 , 368-69, 272 Ill.Dec. 185 , 786 N.E.2d 1019 (2003) (quoting Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) ).

2018To determine if a constitutional error such as an Apprendi error was harmless, we must ask whether it is " 'clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.' " People v. Thurow , 203 Ill. 2d 352 , 368-69, 272 Ill.Dec. 185 , 786 N.E.2d 1019 (2003) (quoting Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) ).

2023See id. § 5-5-3.2(b)(4)(ii) (victim 60 years of age or older permits extended term). 6 ¶ 18 The State concedes that “factors used to increase defendant’s sentences through the extended-term statute were not in the charging instrument, nor were they otherwise provided to defendant in writing.” However, the State argues we should nevertheless affirm the trial court’s imposition of an extended-term sentence because: (1) defendant forfeited his Apprendi claim, (2) defendant invited any error related to his Apprendi argument, (3) Apprendi cannot be applied retroactively, and (4) the trial court’s e

2023See id. § 5-5-3.2(b)(4)(ii) (victim 60 years of age or older permits extended term). 6 ¶ 18 The State concedes that “factors used to increase defendant’s sentences through the extended-term statute were not in the charging instrument, nor were they otherwise provided to defendant in writing.” However, the State argues we should nevertheless affirm the trial court’s imposition of an extended-term sentence because: (1) defendant forfeited his Apprendi claim, (2) defendant invited any error related to his Apprendi argument, (3) Apprendi cannot be applied retroactively, and (4) the trial court’s e

2024See In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 39 (reviewing respondent’s Apprendi claim which was first raised in the opening brief before the supreme court).

2014The court “agree[d] with the reasoning put forth by our appellate court,” finding that “[n]othing in the EJJ statute runs afoul of Apprendi.” M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 44 . ¶ 12 Additionally, the M.I. court found that even if Apprendi applied, there would be no violation because “for the purposes of Apprendi, the statutory maximum is not the juvenile sentence under the Juvenile Court Act, but rather the maximum sentence allowed by the offense committed.” M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 46 (citing Omar M., 2012 IL App (1st) 100866, ¶ 63 ). ¶ 13 Thus, since the supreme court’s analysis of the Apprendi iss

2012Moreover, the State’s subsequent motion to dismiss the Apprendi claim cited People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426 (2003), which held that Apprendi did not apply retroactively to criminal cases where direct appeals were exhausted before Apprendi was decided.

2012Moreover, the State’s subsequent motion to dismiss the Apprendi claim cited People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426 (2003), which held that Apprendi did not apply retroactively to criminal cases where direct appeals were exhausted before Apprendi was decided.

2003In my view, it is unfortunate that, in arriving at that decision, the court has found that Apprendi’s rule does not “require[ ] the observance of ‘those procedures that. . .are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” ’ [Citations.]” Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 , 103 L.

2003In my view, it is unfortunate that, in arriving at that decision, the court has found that Apprendi’s rule does not “require[ ] the observance of ‘those procedures that. . .are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” ’ [Citations.]” Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 , 103 L.

2002App. 3d 882 , 762 N.E.2d 18 (2001), appeal allowed, 198 Ill. 2d 625 (2002), concluded that an Apprendi claim could be raised by a defendant in an untimely, successive postconviction petition.

2002App. 3d 882 , 762 N.E.2d 18 (2001), appeal allowed, 198 Ill. 2d 625 (2002), concluded that an Apprendi claim could be raised by a defendant in an untimely, successive postconviction petition.

2011Because the State presented overwhelming evidence that the murder was brutal and heinous, "`there [was] no basis for concluding that the Apprendi violation "seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."' Crespo, 203 Ill.2d at 348 [ 273 Ill.Dec. 241 , 788 N.E.2d 1117 ]." Herron, 215 Ill.2d at 182-83 , 294 Ill.Dec. 55 , 830 N.E.2d 467 .

2011Because the State presented overwhelming evidence that the murder was brutal and heinous, "`there [was] no basis for concluding that the Apprendi violation "seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."' Crespo, 203 Ill.2d at 348 [ 273 Ill.Dec. 241 , 788 N.E.2d 1117 ]." Herron, 215 Ill.2d at 182-83 , 294 Ill.Dec. 55 , 830 N.E.2d 467 .

2003There, the Court held that an Apprendi violation was not plain error because there was "`no basis for concluding that the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." `" Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-34 , 122 S.Ct. at 1786 , 152 L.Ed.2d at 869 , quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 , 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1550 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718, 729 , (1997).

2003There, the Court held that an Apprendi violation was not plain error because there was "`no basis for concluding that the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." `" Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-34 , 122 S.Ct. at 1786 , 152 L.Ed.2d at 869 , quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 , 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1550 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718, 729 , (1997).

2004Therefore, we agree with the State that the Apprendi challenge made by the defendants is misplaced and inapplicable here ( Beltran , 327 Ill.

2004Therefore, we agree with the State that the Apprendi challenge made by the defendants is misplaced and inapplicable here (Beltran, 327 Ill.

2001The Beachem court also relied, in part, on United States v. Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1064 (D.Minn.2000), which held that the Apprendi rule satisfies the second Teague exception because it "compels a radical shift in criminal procedure." Less than one month after the court filed its opinion in Beachem , a first division panel of the First District Appellate Court decided that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review because the Apprendi rule did not "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to a fair trial." People v. Kizer, 318 I

2001The Beachem court also relied, in part, on United States v. Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1064 (D.Minn.2000), which held that the Apprendi rule satisfies the second Teague exception because it "compels a radical shift in criminal procedure." Less than one month after the court filed its opinion in Beachem , a first division panel of the First District Appellate Court decided that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review because the Apprendi rule did not "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to a fair trial." People v. Kizer, 318 I