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121 California opinions name it 3 courts 2001–2026 34 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2025(Cf. People v. Allen (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 573 , 578.) The Apprendi Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490 ; Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834-835 [ 219 L.Ed.2d 451 ] [Apprendi rule rooted in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments].) In compliance with this precept, section 1170(b)(2) provides that courts may exceed the middle term “only when there are circumstances in agg 2025Those decisions broadly construed Apprendi’s exception to the jury trial right for “the fact of a prior conviction” (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490 ) to encompass “other related issues” (Black, at p. 819) concerning a “defendant’s criminal history” or “ ‘[r]ecidivism’ ” (id. at p. 818; accord, Towne, at pp. 75–81). | 7 | 29 |
People v. Sengpadychithgreen2 sentences2023(People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326 [applying Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24 standard to Apprendi error].) 7 DISPOSITION The judgment is vacated and the matter is remanded with directions for the trial court to reverse the strike finding and to conduct further sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2013(Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 320 .) “[W]here a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.” (Neder v. U.S. (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 17 .) Defendant argues that he did contest the amount of funds diverted by “presenting evidence that he had used all of the funds provided to pay for labor and materials,…” (Italics added.) But this evidence contested the non-omitted elements o | 7 | 11 |
Southern Union Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023The Apprendi rule has been applied to judicial factfinding that results in increased maximum or minimum prison sentences ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 468–469; Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 103, 108), criminal fines (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 (Southern Union)), the imposition of a “new mandatory minimum prison term” upon the revocation of conditional release (United States v. Haymond (2019) 588 U.S. ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 204 L.Ed.2d 897, 907 ] (Haymond) (plur. opn. of Gorsuch, J.)), and death sentences 12 ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 588–589). 2023The Apprendi rule has been applied to judicial factfinding that results in increased maximum or minimum prison sentences ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 468–469; Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 103, 108), criminal fines (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 (Southern Union)), the imposition of a “new mandatory minimum prison term” upon the revocation of conditional release (United States v. Haymond (2019) 588 U.S. ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 204 L.Ed.2d 897, 907 ] (Haymond) (plur. opn. of Gorsuch, J.)), and death sentences 12 ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 588–589). | 6 | 15 |
Blakely v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2021Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)), based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” citing Apprendi, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 ] (Blakely), and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [ 166 L.Ed.2d 856 ] (Cunningham).4 (In re Cabrera (July 10, 2019, S256165) review granted.) As directed by the Supreme Court, we vacated our order denying the petition and issued an order to show cause, returnable to the trial court. 4 In Apprendi, the court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 2021Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)), based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” citing Apprendi, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 ] (Blakely), and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [ 166 L.Ed.2d 856 ] (Cunningham).4 (In re Cabrera (July 10, 2019, S256165) review granted.) As directed by the Supreme Court, we vacated our order denying the petition and issued an order to show cause, returnable to the trial court. 4 In Apprendi, the court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the | 5 | 9 |
Oregon v. Icegreen2 sentences2025(Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 757.) Catarino observed that section 667.6, subdivision (d) “does not change what is a ‘full’ term or otherwise define the sentence for any particular offense,” but rather “requires that the term already authorized (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) be meted out as a full term,” and thus “does not define or alter the term for any particular offense in a manner that invades the historical province of the jury.” (Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 756.) In reaching this conclusion, Catarino relied on Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160 (Ice), where the Supreme Court held that 2025(Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 757.) Catarino observed that section 667.6, subdivision (d) “does not change what is a ‘full’ term or otherwise define the sentence for any particular offense,” but rather “requires that the term already authorized (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) be meted out as a full term,” and thus “does not define or alter the term for any particular offense in a manner that invades the historical province of the jury.” (Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 756.) In reaching this conclusion, Catarino relied on Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160 (Ice), where the Supreme Court held that | 4 | 17 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2023Apprendi error is subject to the harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . 2023(People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326 [applying Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24 standard to Apprendi error].) 7 DISPOSITION The judgment is vacated and the matter is remanded with directions for the trial court to reverse the strike finding and to conduct further sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. | 4 | 17 |
Almendarez-Torres v. United Statesred2 sentences2019For example, an Apprendi issue was avoided in Towne , supra , 44 Cal.4th 63 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 , 186 P.3d 10 because the defendant had no right to a jury trial on his record of prior convictions, rendering the defendant eligible for the upper term based on that aggravating circumstance alone. ( Id. at pp. 83, 86, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 , 186 P.3d 10 ; see generally Almendarez-Torres v. U.S. (1998) 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 .) It was in this context that the court could further consider evidence the jury had implicitly found not true through its acquittals on other counts. ( 2019For example, an Apprendi issue was avoided in Towne , supra , 44 Cal.4th 63 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 , 186 P.3d 10 because the defendant had no right to a jury trial on his record of prior convictions, rendering the defendant eligible for the upper term based on that aggravating circumstance alone. ( Id. at pp. 83, 86, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 , 186 P.3d 10 ; see generally Almendarez-Torres v. U.S. (1998) 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 .) It was in this context that the court could further consider evidence the jury had implicitly found not true through its acquittals on other counts. ( | 4 | 7 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Jones (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 866 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 780 ].) 14 Apprendi’s exception for prior convictions is based in part on the fact that “unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, ... a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair' notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” (Jones v. U.S. (1999) 526 U.S. 227, 249 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 311 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 ].) “[T]he certainty that procedural safeguards [are] attached to any ‘fact’ of [a] prior conviction . . . mitigatefs] the d 2016(People v. Jones (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 866 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 780 ].) 14 Apprendi’s exception for prior convictions is based in part on the fact that “unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, ... a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair' notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” (Jones v. U.S. (1999) 526 U.S. 227, 249 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 311 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 ].) “[T]he certainty that procedural safeguards [are] attached to any ‘fact’ of [a] prior conviction . . . mitigatefs] the d | 4 | 4 |
Ring v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2023The Apprendi rule has been applied to judicial factfinding that results in increased maximum or minimum prison sentences ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 468–469; Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 103, 108), criminal fines (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 (Southern Union)), the imposition of a “new mandatory minimum prison term” upon the revocation of conditional release (United States v. Haymond (2019) 588 U.S. ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 204 L.Ed.2d 897, 907 ] (Haymond) (plur. opn. of Gorsuch, J.)), and death sentences 12 ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 588–589). 2023The Apprendi rule has been applied to judicial factfinding that results in increased maximum or minimum prison sentences ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 468–469; Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 103, 108), criminal fines (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 (Southern Union)), the imposition of a “new mandatory minimum prison term” upon the revocation of conditional release (United States v. Haymond (2019) 588 U.S. ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 204 L.Ed.2d 897, 907 ] (Haymond) (plur. opn. of Gorsuch, J.)), and death sentences 12 ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 588–589). | 3 | 7 |
People v. Sandovalred2 sentences2023(People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 564 .) Thus, “if a reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true” the finding in question, “the Sixth Amendment error properly may be found harmless.” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 839 .) That standard is easily met here. 2016(People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 564 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 ].) Thus, “if a reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true” the finding in question, “the Sixth Amendment error properly may be found harmless.” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 839 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ].) That standard is met here. | 3 | 7 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024J., post, at pp. 32–34, fn. 8; see also conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 13, fn. 2 [similarly suggesting a reviewing court should consider whether the individual facts a trial court relies on to justify an upper term sentence were actually necessary to the trial court’s exercise of its discretion].) But when a defendant is deprived of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right, the high court has consistently looked to whether the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have made the required finding, and no further. ( Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 16–19; Recu 2022(Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , 221–222 [Apprendi error is not structural and does not require reversal if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) In assessing whether Apprendi error is harmless, the high court has instructed that the proper inquiry 6 PEOPLE v. PINEDA Liu, J., concurring is whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 (Neder).) In conducting this inquiry, “a court, in typical appellate-court fashion, asks whether the record contains evidence | 3 | 5 |
Washington v. Recuencogreen2 sentences2024J., post, at pp. 32–34, fn. 8; see also conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 13, fn. 2 [similarly suggesting a reviewing court should consider whether the individual facts a trial court relies on to justify an upper term sentence were actually necessary to the trial court’s exercise of its discretion].) But when a defendant is deprived of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right, the high court has consistently looked to whether the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have made the required finding, and no further. ( Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 16–19; Recu 2022(Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , 221–222 [Apprendi error is not structural and does not require reversal if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) In assessing whether Apprendi error is harmless, the high court has instructed that the proper inquiry 6 PEOPLE v. PINEDA Liu, J., concurring is whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 (Neder).) In conducting this inquiry, “a court, in typical appellate-court fashion, asks whether the record contains evidence | 2 | 11 |
Alleyne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023The Apprendi rule has been applied to judicial factfinding that results in increased maximum or minimum prison sentences ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 468–469; Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 103, 108), criminal fines (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 (Southern Union)), the imposition of a “new mandatory minimum prison term” upon the revocation of conditional release (United States v. Haymond (2019) 588 U.S. ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 204 L.Ed.2d 897, 907 ] (Haymond) (plur. opn. of Gorsuch, J.)), and death sentences 12 ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 588–589). 2023The Apprendi rule has been applied to judicial factfinding that results in increased maximum or minimum prison sentences ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 468–469; Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 103, 108), criminal fines (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 (Southern Union)), the imposition of a “new mandatory minimum prison term” upon the revocation of conditional release (United States v. Haymond (2019) 588 U.S. ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 204 L.Ed.2d 897, 907 ] (Haymond) (plur. opn. of Gorsuch, J.)), and death sentences 12 ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 588–589). | 2 | 9 |
Cunningham v. Californiagreen2 sentences2021Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)), based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” citing Apprendi, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 ] (Blakely), and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [ 166 L.Ed.2d 856 ] (Cunningham).4 (In re Cabrera (July 10, 2019, S256165) review granted.) As directed by the Supreme Court, we vacated our order denying the petition and issued an order to show cause, returnable to the trial court. 4 In Apprendi, the court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 2021Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)), based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” citing Apprendi, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 ] (Blakely), and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [ 166 L.Ed.2d 856 ] (Cunningham).4 (In re Cabrera (July 10, 2019, S256165) review granted.) As directed by the Supreme Court, we vacated our order denying the petition and issued an order to show cause, returnable to the trial court. 4 In Apprendi, the court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the | 2 | 7 |
United States v. Haymondgreen2 sentences2023The Apprendi rule has been applied to judicial factfinding that results in increased maximum or minimum prison sentences ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 468–469; Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 103, 108), criminal fines (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 (Southern Union)), the imposition of a “new mandatory minimum prison term” upon the revocation of conditional release (United States v. Haymond (2019) 588 U.S. ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 204 L.Ed.2d 897, 907 ] (Haymond) (plur. opn. of Gorsuch, J.)), and death sentences 12 ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 588–589). 2023The Apprendi rule has been applied to judicial factfinding that results in increased maximum or minimum prison sentences ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 468–469; Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 103, 108), criminal fines (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 (Southern Union)), the imposition of a “new mandatory minimum prison term” upon the revocation of conditional release (United States v. Haymond (2019) 588 U.S. ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 204 L.Ed.2d 897, 907 ] (Haymond) (plur. opn. of Gorsuch, J.)), and death sentences 12 ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 588–589). | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Cottongreen2 sentences2018(See *479 Taylor, supra , 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 28-30, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 .) Apprendi error is also subject to harmless error analysis. ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , 221-222, 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 ; United States v. Cotton (2002) 535 U.S. 625 , 627, 631-632, 122 S.Ct. 1781 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 ; French, supra , 43 Cal.4th at pp. 52-53, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ; People v. Taulton (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1218 , 1226, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 203 .) The cases finding Apprendi error subject to harmless error analysis typically address failures to submit alleged facts to t 2018(See *479 Taylor, supra , 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 28-30, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 .) Apprendi error is also subject to harmless error analysis. ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , 221-222, 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 ; United States v. Cotton (2002) 535 U.S. 625 , 627, 631-632, 122 S.Ct. 1781 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 ; French, supra , 43 Cal.4th at pp. 52-53, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ; People v. Taulton (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1218 , 1226, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 203 .) The cases finding Apprendi error subject to harmless error analysis typically address failures to submit alleged facts to t | 2 | 3 |
| People v. Millardgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Erlinger v. United Statesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Dillon v. United Statesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Solisgreen | 2 | 2 |
| In Re Varnellgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. DeHoyosgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Napolesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Higginsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Riskingreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Luckygreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Lindergreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Croxfordgreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Frenchgreen2 sentences2020(Saez, at p. 1198.) Saez’s “stipulation to the complaint as the factual basis of his plea” did not “constitute a waiver of Sixth Amendment rights or an admission as to those additional facts.” (Id. at p. 1206.) It “was not tantamount to a finding that the facts in the affidavit of probable cause were true beyond a reasonable doubt or to an admission that those facts were true.” (Id. at p. 1207, fn. 21.) Thus, Saez does not assist the People’s argument. 11 California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; see People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 , 52–53 [applying Chapman standard to Sixth Amendment violatio 2018(See *479 Taylor, supra , 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 28-30, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 .) Apprendi error is also subject to harmless error analysis. ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , 221-222, 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 ; United States v. Cotton (2002) 535 U.S. 625 , 627, 631-632, 122 S.Ct. 1781 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 ; French, supra , 43 Cal.4th at pp. 52-53, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ; People v. Taulton (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1218 , 1226, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 203 .) The cases finding Apprendi error subject to harmless error analysis typically address failures to submit alleged facts to t | 1 | 5 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2007I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion the error in imposing upper term sentences was not harmless. [12] As the majority explains, the trial court's error in making the factual findings upon which it based its decision to impose the upper term sentences, rather than submitting those issues to the jury, is subject to harmless error analysis. ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 [Apprendi/Blakely error not "structural error" requiring automatic reversal]; see People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 , 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 2007I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion the error in imposing upper term sentences was not harmless. [12] As the majority explains, the trial court's error in making the factual findings upon which it based its decision to impose the upper term sentences, rather than submitting those issues to the jury, is subject to harmless error analysis. ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 [Apprendi/Blakely error not "structural error" requiring automatic reversal]; see People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 , 109 Cal. Rptr.2d | 1 | 5 |
People v. Townegreen2 sentences2019For example, an Apprendi issue was avoided in Towne , supra , 44 Cal.4th 63 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 , 186 P.3d 10 because the defendant had no right to a jury trial on his record of prior convictions, rendering the defendant eligible for the upper term based on that aggravating circumstance alone. ( Id. at pp. 83, 86, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 , 186 P.3d 10 ; see generally Almendarez-Torres v. U.S. (1998) 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 .) It was in this context that the court could further consider evidence the jury had implicitly found not true through its acquittals on other counts. ( 2019For example, an Apprendi issue was avoided in Towne , supra , 44 Cal.4th 63 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 , 186 P.3d 10 because the defendant had no right to a jury trial on his record of prior convictions, rendering the defendant eligible for the upper term based on that aggravating circumstance alone. ( Id. at pp. 83, 86, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 , 186 P.3d 10 ; see generally Almendarez-Torres v. U.S. (1998) 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 .) It was in this context that the court could further consider evidence the jury had implicitly found not true through its acquittals on other counts. ( | 1 | 4 |
Harris v. United Statesred2 sentences2023Because the Apprendi rule did not then apply to findings that increased a mandatory minimum sentence ( Harris, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 558–560), we had no occasion in Groves to consider whether a finding that triggers section 667.6(d) has the effect of increasing a mandatory minimum sentence; such an effect would have had, at that time, no constitutional significance. 2023Because the Apprendi rule did not then apply to findings that increased a mandatory minimum sentence ( Harris, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 558–560), we had no occasion in Groves to consider whether a finding that triggers section 667.6(d) has the effect of increasing a mandatory minimum sentence; such an effect would have had, at that time, no constitutional significance. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Pangangreen2 sentences2017The court’s analysis was based on the Apprendi rule that “ ‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury . . . .” (Id. at p. 348, italics added.) As the Fourth Appellate District concluded in People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574 , “neither Southern Union [nor] Apprendi . . . have any application to direct victim restitution, because direct victim restitution is not a criminal penalty.” (Id. at p. 585.) Therefore, the court held, defendant had no right to a jury trial on his restitution issue. 2017The court’s analysis was based on the Apprendi rule that “ ‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury . . . .” (Id. at p. 348, italics added.) As the Fourth Appellate District concluded in People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574 , “neither Southern Union [nor] Apprendi . . . have any application to direct victim restitution, because direct victim restitution is not a criminal penalty.” (Id. at p. 585.) Therefore, the court held, defendant had no right to a jury trial on his restitution issue. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Clevelandgreen2 sentences2015(People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1229 [weight of California authority holds Apprendi rule is not applicable to decisions made under § 654]; People v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263 , 269–271 [§ 654 is sentencing reduction statute, so Apprendi’s rationale does not apply]; People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1022 [same].) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. ___________________________ PEÑA, J. 2007(See People v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263, 271 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 641 [finding any Apprendi error harmless because "[w]e have no doubt a jury would have reached the same conclusion under the reasonable doubt standard"].) The first aggravating circumstance identified by the court was that Diaz's repeated sexual assaults on his semi-conscious victim disclosed a high degree of cruelty, viciousness or callousness. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Scottgreen2 sentences2016(See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 ; People v. Wilson (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 500, 518 .) Apprendi error, like failure to instruct on an element of an offense, is subject to harmless-error analysis under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 . 2007(See ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 [ Apprendi/Blakely error not "structural error" requiring automatic reversal]; see People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 [ Apprendi error reviewable under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ].) Here, however, despite the severity of the assault with a firearm, which also involved an attempted robbery of the liquor store during which Velasquez went behind the counter and pointed a shotgun at one of the sto | 1 | 3 |
| People v. Andersongreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Osbandgreen | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Mark Phillipsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Hofsheierred | 1 | 2 |
| McKeiver v. Pennsylvaniagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Icegreen2 sentences2025(Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 757.) Catarino observed that section 667.6, subdivision (d) “does not change what is a ‘full’ term or otherwise define the sentence for any particular offense,” but rather “requires that the term already authorized (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) be meted out as a full term,” and thus “does not define or alter the term for any particular offense in a manner that invades the historical province of the jury.” (Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 756.) In reaching this conclusion, Catarino relied on Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160 (Ice), where the Supreme Court held that 2025(Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 757.) Catarino observed that section 667.6, subdivision (d) “does not change what is a ‘full’ term or otherwise define the sentence for any particular offense,” but rather “requires that the term already authorized (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) be meted out as a full term,” and thus “does not define or alter the term for any particular offense in a manner that invades the historical province of the jury.” (Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 756.) In reaching this conclusion, Catarino relied on Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160 (Ice), where the Supreme Court held that | 1 | 17 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. McGee
red
2 sentences2016There, the court drew a distinction between “sentence enhancements that require factfinding related to the circumstance of the current offense . . .—a task identified by Apprendi as one for the jury—and the examination of court records pertaining to a defendant’s prior conviction *509 to determine the nature or basis of the conviction—a task to which Apprendi did not speak and ‘the type of inquiry that judges traditionally perform as part of the sentencing function.’ ” (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 709 , original italics.) The court acknowledged “the possibility that the United States Suprem 2016There, the court drew a distinction between “sentence enhancements that require factfinding related to the circumstance of the current offense . . .—a task identified by Apprendi as one for the jury—and the examination of court records pertaining to a defendant’s prior conviction *509 to determine the nature or basis of the conviction—a task to which Apprendi did not speak and ‘the type of inquiry that judges traditionally perform as part of the sentencing function.’ ” (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 709 , original italics.) The court acknowledged “the possibility that the United States Suprem | 5 | 2007–2016 |
People v. Gallardo
green
2 sentences2022(Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 103 .) And in Gallardo, the California Supreme Court adopted the Apprendi rule to hold that any facts giving rise to a conviction that “lead to the imposition of additional punishment under a recidivist sentencing scheme” must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 123, 134.) 16 [citation].’ (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1092 .) Accordingly, we have explained that a grant of probation is an act of grace or clemency, and an offender has no right or privilege to be granted such release. 2022(Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 103 .) And in Gallardo, the California Supreme Court adopted the Apprendi rule to hold that any facts giving rise to a conviction that “lead to the imposition of additional punishment under a recidivist sentencing scheme” must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 123, 134.) 16 [citation].’ (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1092 .) Accordingly, we have explained that a grant of probation is an act of grace or clemency, and an offender has no right or privilege to be granted such release. | 4 | 2020–2026 |
People v. Kramis
green
2 sentences2017(See People v. Kramis (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 346 , 349-350, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 84 [upholding a $10,000 restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4 against a similar Apprendi challenge].) Nor does the high court's subsequent decision in Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 cast any doubt on the trial court's ruling. 2017(See People v. Kramis (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 346 , 349-350, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 84 [upholding a $10,000 restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4 against a similar Apprendi challenge].) Nor does the high court's subsequent decision in Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 cast any doubt on the trial court's ruling. | 4 | 2013–2017 |
United States v. Booker
green
2 sentences2023(See Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 274 ; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 588 ; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 298 (Blakely); Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 226 ; see also Chiesa, When an Offense Is Not an Offense: Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Reasonable Doubt Jurisprudence (2011) 44 Creighton L.Rev. 647, 691 & fn. 242.) Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not repudiated due process as a foundation, which is the jurisprudential source of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as distinct from the requirement of a jury determination. 2023(See Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 274 ; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 588 ; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 298 (Blakely); Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 226 ; see also Chiesa, When an Offense Is Not an Offense: Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Reasonable Doubt Jurisprudence (2011) 44 Creighton L.Rev. 647, 691 & fn. 242.) Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not repudiated due process as a foundation, which is the jurisprudential source of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as distinct from the requirement of a jury determination. | 3 | 2007–2023 |
People v. Black
green
2 sentences2021In People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 (Black), the California Supreme Court held “that as long as a single aggravating circumstance that renders a defendant eligible for the upper term sentence has been established in accordance with the requirements of Apprendi and its progeny, any additional factfinding engaged in by the trial court in selecting the appropriate sentence among the three available options does not violate the defendant’s right to jury trial.” (Id. at p. 812.) As discussed in Black and reiterated in cases such as People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363 , “[t]he Apprendi rule d 2015(F) Noneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for felony violations of Section 288." 34 Company v. U.S. (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2344, 2350 (Southern Union); People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 812 .) The Apprendi rule is designed to safeguard a defendant's right to have a jury decide all the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and it extends the jury factfinding requirement to sentencing factors that are viewed as akin to elements of the offense because they increase the punishment for the offense above what is otherwise statutorily prescribed. ( Alleyne, | 3 | 2015–2023 |
People v. Nguyen
green
2 sentences2021The defendant in Nguyen seized on Apprendi’s prior conviction exception to argue that “the Apprendi rule barred use of the prior juvenile 13 adjudication to enhance his maximum sentence in the current case because the prior juvenile proceeding, though it included most constitutional guarantees attendant upon adult criminal proceedings, did not afford him the right to a jury trial.” (Nguyen, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1011 .) Our Supreme Court disagreed, for two main reasons. 2021The defendant in Nguyen seized on Apprendi’s prior conviction exception to argue that “the Apprendi rule barred use of the prior juvenile 13 adjudication to enhance his maximum sentence in the current case because the prior juvenile proceeding, though it included most constitutional guarantees attendant upon adult criminal proceedings, did not afford him the right to a jury trial.” (Nguyen, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1011 .) Our Supreme Court disagreed, for two main reasons. | 3 | 2013–2021 |
| Descamps v. United States green | 3 | 2014–2016 |
The People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2016(See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 ; People v. Wilson (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 500, 518 .) Apprendi error, like failure to instruct on an element of an offense, is subject to harmless-error analysis under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 . 2016(People v. Wilson (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 500, 518-519 .) “ ‘Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.’ (Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 222 .) ‘Such an error does not require reversal if the reviewing court determines it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, applying the test set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .’ (People v. French [(2008)] 43 Cal.4th [36,] 52–53.) . . . ‘The failure to submit a sentencing factor to a jury may be found harmless if the evidence supporting that factor | 3 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Moran green | 2 | 2022–2023 |
| People v. Scott green | 2 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Taulton green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Taylor green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| In Re Daedler green | 2 | 2007–2009 |
| United States v. Shannon Wayne Tighe green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Villarreal green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Moore green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Perez green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Superior Court (Mendella) red | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Johnson green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Upsher green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Arnett green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Delgado green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Aranda green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Howard green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Anderson green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Bravo green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Walton v. Arizona red | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.