Apprendi rule in Tennessee

2005See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 769 (“[W]e expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”); Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627, 122 S.Ct. 1781 (applying plain error review to an alleged Apprendi error that had not been raised in the district court).

2005See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 769 (“[W]e expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”); Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627, 122 S.Ct. 1781 (applying plain error review to an alleged Apprendi error that had not been raised in the district court).

2005Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district court did not commit Apprendi error when it enhanced [the defendant's] sentence because he committed the second of his narcotics offenses while he was on release for the first.”); People v. Williamson, 747 N.E.2d 26, 34 (Ill.

2004Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district court did not commit Apprendi error when it enhanced [the defendant’s] sentence because he committed the second of his narcotics offenses while he was on release for the first.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1078 , 123 S. Ct. 680 (2002); People v. Williamson, 747 N.E.2d 26, 34 (Ill.

2004People v. George Carl Sample, No. C044445 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2004) (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523-24 (2004)).

2004People v. George Carl Sample, No. C044445 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2004) (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523-24 (2004)).

2005See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 769 (“[W]e expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”); Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627, 122 S.Ct. 1781 (applying plain error review to an alleged Apprendi error that had not been raised in the district court).

2005See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 769 (“[W]e expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”); Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627, 122 S.Ct. 1781 (applying plain error review to an alleged Apprendi error that had not been raised in the district court).

2003In Jones, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional guarantees of due process, notice and trial by jury require that, except for a prior conviction, any fact used to enhance sentence above the statutory maximum "must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 526 U.S. at 243, n.6 .

2003In Jones, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional guarantees of due process, notice and trial by jury require that, except for a prior conviction, any fact used to enhance sentence above the statutory maximum "must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 526 U.S. at 243, n.6 .

2012Justices Anderson and Birch read Blakely to hold that, under the Apprendi standard, "the base range or standard range” was the applicable statutory maximum for Sixth Amendment purposes, i.e., " ‘the maximum [the judge] may impose without any additional facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 ).

2012Justices Anderson and Birch read Blakely to hold that, under the Apprendi standard, "the base range or standard range” was the applicable statutory maximum for Sixth Amendment purposes, i.e., " ‘the maximum [the judge] may impose without any additional facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 ).

2026Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998). - 18 - Recently, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the scope of the Almendarez-Torres exception.

2026Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998). - 18 - Recently, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the scope of the Almendarez-Torres exception.

2008See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 845 N.E.2d 470, 491 (2006) (holding that “because the total punishment increases through consecutive sentences only after judicial findings beyond those determined by a jury or stipulated to by a defendant, [Ohio’s consecutive sentencing statute] violates principles announced in Blakely ”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 442 , 166 L.Ed.2d 314 (2006); Ice, 170 P.3d at 1059 (acknowledging the majority rule that Apprendi and Blakely are inapplicable to consecutive sentencing but “disagreeing] fundamentally with the proposition that the Apprendi rule is a

2008See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 845 N.E.2d 470, 491 (2006) (holding that “because the total punishment increases through consecutive sentences only after judicial findings beyond those determined by a jury or stipulated to by a defendant, [Ohio’s consecutive sentencing statute] violates principles announced in Blakely ”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 442 , 166 L.Ed.2d 314 (2006); Ice, 170 P.3d at 1059 (acknowledging the majority rule that Apprendi and Blakely are inapplicable to consecutive sentencing but “disagreeing] fundamentally with the proposition that the Apprendi rule is a

2008The Ice case, now before the United States Supreme Court, produced a 5-2 decision in the Oregon Supreme Court with the dissenting judges asserting that “[n]either the holding in Apprendi nor its reasoning supports extending that decision to the question of consecutive sentencing,” and opining that “the rule in Apprendi serves only to provide a nonsubjective means of determining when the legislature’s efforts to redefine the elements of a single offense will stay within constitutional bounds.” 170 P.3d at 1059, 1062 (Kistler, J., dissenting).

2008See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 845 N.E.2d 470, 491 (2006) (holding that “because the total punishment increases through consecutive sentences only after judicial findings beyond those determined by a jury or stipulated to by a defendant, [Ohio’s consecutive sentencing statute] violates principles announced in Blakely ”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 442 , 166 L.Ed.2d 314 (2006); Ice, 170 P.3d at 1059 (acknowledging the majority rule that Apprendi and Blakely are inapplicable to consecutive sentencing but “disagreeing] fundamentally with the proposition that the Apprendi rule is a

2008See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 845 N.E.2d 470, 491 (2006) (holding that “because the total punishment increases through consecutive sentences only after judicial findings beyond those determined by a jury or stipulated to by a defendant, [Ohio’s consecutive sentencing statute] violates principles announced in Blakely ”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 442 , 166 L.Ed.2d 314 (2006); Ice, 170 P.3d at 1059 (acknowledging the majority rule that Apprendi and Blakely are inapplicable to consecutive sentencing but “disagreeing] fundamentally with the proposition that the Apprendi rule is a

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005Contra State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534 , 65 P.3d 915, 939 (2003).

2005Contra State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534 , 65 P.3d 915, 939 (2003).

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2005See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 48-49 (Fla.2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.2003); State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Mo.2003); see also United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that a determination of whether a prior conviction is aggravated does not fall outside of the Apprendi exception); United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 706-07 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that Apprendi does not require that the nature of prior convictions used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the stat

2004See Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 160 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516 , 561 n. 45 (Tenn. 2000) (the Tennessee Supreme Court is not bound by any federal court decisions other than those of the United States Supreme Court.) The appellant in the case sub judice raised the Apprendi issue in a very timely manner after the Blakely decision was filed.