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19 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2017Mara sought relief on the grounds that: (1) his extended terms of imprisonment were illegal under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); and (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert his Apprendi claim on direct appeal. 2017Mara sought relief on the grounds that: (1) his extended terms of imprisonment were illegal under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); and (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert his Apprendi claim on direct appeal. | 3 | 10 |
State v. Maugaotegagreen2 sentences2015The ICA noted that the prior conviction exception remained undisturbed in Alleyne and was “expressly recognized” by this court in Maugaotega, 115 Hawai'i at 446 -47 & n. 15, 168 P.3d at 576 -77 & n. 15 (“The United States Supreme Court has always exempted prior convictions from the Apprendi rule[.].... 2015The ICA noted that the prior conviction exception remained undisturbed in Alleyne and was “expressly recognized” by this court in Maugaotega, 115 Hawai'i at 446 -47 & n. 15, 168 P.3d at 576 -77 & n. 15 (“The United States Supreme Court has always exempted prior convictions from the Apprendi rule[.].... | 3 | 3 |
State v. Riveragreen2 sentences2008In turn, Cunningham concluded that a court "engaging in fact-finding that increased the defendant's sentence beyond that authorized by the jury verdict" was "offending the Apprendi rule." Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 453, 168 P.3d at 583 (Acoba, J., dissenting, joined by Duffy, J.) (explaining that "'Hawaii's extended term proceeding . . . would be a proceeding subject to the right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment'" and noting that any dispute on this issue "has been put to rest by the majority opinion in Cunningham " (quoting State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai`i, 146, 172, 102 P.3d 2008In turn, Cunningham concluded that a court "engaging in fact-finding that increased the defendant's sentence beyond that authorized by the jury verdict" was "offending the Apprendi rule." Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 453, 168 P.3d at 583 (Acoba, J., dissenting, joined by Duffy, J.) (explaining that "'Hawaii's extended term proceeding . . . would be a proceeding subject to the right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment'" and noting that any dispute on this issue "has been put to rest by the majority opinion in Cunningham " (quoting State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai`i, 146, 172, 102 P.3d | 2 | 4 |
Cunningham v. Californiagreen2 sentences2018On January 22, 2007, the Supreme Court held in Cunningham that California's determinate sentencing law (DSL) violated the Apprendi rule because it allowed a judge to find an aggravating factor that then permitted the judge to order an "upper term" determinate sentence. 549 U.S. at 277 , 127 S.Ct. 856 . 2018On January 22, 2007, the Supreme Court held in Cunningham that California's determinate sentencing law (DSL) violated the Apprendi rule because it allowed a judge to find an aggravating factor that then permitted the judge to order an "upper term" determinate sentence. 549 U.S. at 277 , 127 S.Ct. 856 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Kauagreen2 sentences2018Accordingly, we asserted that the "facts at issue in rendering an extended term sentencing determination under HRS § 706-662(1), (3), and (4) implicate considerations completely 'extrinsic' to the elements of the offense with which the defendant was charged.... [and thus] fell outside the Apprendi rule." Id. at 12-13 , 72 P.3d at 484 -85 . 2018Accordingly, we asserted that the "facts at issue in rendering an extended term sentencing determination under HRS § 706-662(1), (3), and (4) implicate considerations completely 'extrinsic' to the elements of the offense with which the defendant was charged.... [and thus] fell outside the Apprendi rule." Id. at 12-13 , 72 P.3d at 484 -85 . | 1 | 10 |
Kaua v. Frankgreen2 sentences2017In Kaua v. Frank, 350 F.Supp.2d 848 (D.Haw.2004) (Federal Kaua I), the federal district court granted Kaua’s habeas corpus petition, holding that Kaua’s extended term sentence clearly violated Apprendi and that the Hawai'i Supreme Court’s failure to overturn Kaua’s extended sentence based on Apprendi “was contrary to, and involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law[.]” Federal Kaua I, 350 F.Supp.2d at 850, 860 . 2017In Kaua v. Frank, 350 F.Supp.2d 848 (D.Haw.2004) (Federal Kaua I), the federal district court granted Kaua’s habeas corpus petition, holding that Kaua’s extended term sentence clearly violated Apprendi and that the Hawai'i Supreme Court’s failure to overturn Kaua’s extended sentence based on Apprendi “was contrary to, and involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law[.]” Federal Kaua I, 350 F.Supp.2d at 850, 860 . | 1 | 1 |
Alleyne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015The second consequence of overruling Loher and Gonsalves by extending the Apprendi rule to repeat offender sentencing is that we also hold that Jess’s rule requiring a charging instrument to include “all ‘allegations, which if proved, would result in the application of a statute enhancing the penalty of the crime committed,’ ” now requires the State to allege the piior convictions it seeks to use as a basis for sentencing a defendant as a repeat offender, because “[m]andatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime.” Jess, 117 Hawai'i at 398 , 184 P.3d at 150 ; Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2015The second consequence of overruling Loher and Gonsalves by extending the Apprendi rule to repeat offender sentencing is that we also hold that Jess’s rule requiring a charging instrument to include “all ‘allegations, which if proved, would result in the application of a statute enhancing the penalty of the crime committed,’ ” now requires the State to allege the piior convictions it seeks to use as a basis for sentencing a defendant as a repeat offender, because “[m]andatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime.” Jess, 117 Hawai'i at 398 , 184 P.3d at 150 ; Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gonsalvesgreen2 sentences2015Alleyne’s holding extending the Apprendi rule to mandatory minimum sentences calls into question two of our appellate decisions, Loher, 118 Hawai'i 522 , 193 P.3d 438 , and Gonsalves, 108 Hawai'i 289 , 119 P.3d 597 . 2015Alleyne’s holding extending the Apprendi rule to mandatory minimum sentences calls into question two of our appellate decisions, Loher, 118 Hawai'i 522 , 193 P.3d 438 , and Gonsalves, 108 Hawai'i 289 , 119 P.3d 597 . | 1 | 1 |
Oregon v. Icegreen2 sentences2010Last year, the United States Supreme Court reviewed this issue in Oregon v. Ice, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct. 711, 718 (2009), and held that it does not violate the Apprendi rule: In light of this history, legislative reforms regarding the imposition of multiple sentences do not implicate the core concerns that prompted our decision in Apprendi. 2010Last year, the United States Supreme Court reviewed this issue in Oregon v. Ice, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct. 711, 718 (2009), and held that it does not violate the Apprendi rule: In light of this history, legislative reforms regarding the imposition of multiple sentences do not implicate the core concerns that prompted our decision in Apprendi. | 1 | 1 |
Janra Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Honolulugreen2 sentences2008Based on this retroactivity analysis, the supreme court held that “the Apprendi rule, however it may be construed, is not controlling retroactively on collateral attack.” Id. at 314, 113 P.3d at 190. 2. 2008Based on this retroactivity analysis, the supreme court held that “the Apprendi rule, however it may be construed, is not controlling retroactively on collateral attack.” Id. at 314, 113 P.3d at 190. 2. | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. United Statesred2 sentences2008Indeed, in explicating the Apprendi rule, the six-member Cunningham majority quoted with approval the observation, expressed in Harris, 536 U.S. at 557 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 (plurality opinion), that "` Apprendi said that any fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict would have been considered an element of an aggravated crime and thus the domain of the jury by those who framed the Bill of Rights. '" [15] 549 U.S. at ___ , 127 S.Ct. at 864 (emphases added); see also Harris, 536 U.S. at 557-58 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 (plurality opinion) ("Congress may not 2008Indeed, in explicating the Apprendi rule, the six-member Cunningham majority quoted with approval the observation, expressed in Harris, 536 U.S. at 557 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 (plurality opinion), that "` Apprendi said that any fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict would have been considered an element of an aggravated crime and thus the domain of the jury by those who framed the Bill of Rights. '" [15] 549 U.S. at ___ , 127 S.Ct. at 864 (emphases added); see also Harris, 536 U.S. at 557-58 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 (plurality opinion) ("Congress may not | 1 | 1 |
| Maugaotega v. Hawaiigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chester McCoy v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sepulveda v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Medina-Garcia v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alfaro-Rojas v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Darius M. Mossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Sean Lamar Sanders, A/K/A Sean Lamont Sandersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2018The Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 , 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), illustrate that the Apprendi rule was still being discussed and debated after 2000, and federal and state appellate courts (not to mention Supreme Court justices) continued to disagree on its holding. 2018The Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 , 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), illustrate that the Apprendi rule was still being discussed and debated after 2000, and federal and state appellate courts (not to mention Supreme Court justices) continued to disagree on its holding. | 6 | 2004–2018 |
State v. Tafoya
green
2 sentences2006In State v. Kaua , the first case to address the effects of Apprendi on Hawaii's extended term sentencing scheme, we reaffirmed the "intrinsic-extrinsic" analysis first articulated by this court in State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i 517, 880 P.2d 192 (1994), and reaffirmed in State v. Tafoya, 91 Hawai`i 261, 982 P.2d 890 (1999), and rejected the defendant's argument that Apprendi mandated that a "multiple offender" determination, for purposes of HRS § 706-662(4)(a), [ see supra note 3,] must be made by the trier of fact, holding (1) that HRS § 706-662[, see supra note 3,] passed constitutional mus 2006In State v. Kaua , the first case to address the effects of Apprendi on Hawaii's extended term sentencing scheme, we reaffirmed the "intrinsic-extrinsic" analysis first articulated by this court in State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i 517, 880 P.2d 192 (1994), and reaffirmed in State v. Tafoya, 91 Hawai`i 261, 982 P.2d 890 (1999), and rejected the defendant's argument that Apprendi mandated that a "multiple offender" determination, for purposes of HRS § 706-662(4)(a), [ see supra note 3,] must be made by the trier of fact, holding (1) that HRS § 706-662[, see supra note 3,] passed constitutional mus | 4 | 2003–2006 |
State v. Schroeder
green
2 sentences2006In State v. Kaua , the first case to address the effects of Apprendi on Hawaii's extended term sentencing scheme, we reaffirmed the "intrinsic-extrinsic" analysis first articulated by this court in State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i 517, 880 P.2d 192 (1994), and reaffirmed in State v. Tafoya, 91 Hawai`i 261, 982 P.2d 890 (1999), and rejected the defendant's argument that Apprendi mandated that a "multiple offender" determination, for purposes of HRS § 706-662(4)(a), [ see supra note 3,] must be made by the trier of fact, holding (1) that HRS § 706-662[, see supra note 3,] passed constitutional mus 2006In State v. Kaua , the first case to address the effects of Apprendi on Hawaii's extended term sentencing scheme, we reaffirmed the "intrinsic-extrinsic" analysis first articulated by this court in State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i 517, 880 P.2d 192 (1994), and reaffirmed in State v. Tafoya, 91 Hawai`i 261, 982 P.2d 890 (1999), and rejected the defendant's argument that Apprendi mandated that a "multiple offender" determination, for purposes of HRS § 706-662(4)(a), [ see supra note 3,] must be made by the trier of fact, holding (1) that HRS § 706-662[, see supra note 3,] passed constitutional mus | 4 | 2003–2006 |
United States v. Booker
green
2 sentences2018The Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 , 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), illustrate that the Apprendi rule was still being discussed and debated after 2000, and federal and state appellate courts (not to mention Supreme Court justices) continued to disagree on its holding. 2018The Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 , 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), illustrate that the Apprendi rule was still being discussed and debated after 2000, and federal and state appellate courts (not to mention Supreme Court justices) continued to disagree on its holding. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Teague v. Lane
green
2 sentences2018Moreover, the subsequent decisions of numerous federal courts of appeals interpreting the Blakely and Booker rules as "new" rules of criminal procedure (and not "old" rules that merely applied precedent existing at the time, cf. Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288 , 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion) ) 5 provide further evidence that the original Apprendi rule was unclear at the time that Blakely and Booker were decided. 2018Moreover, the subsequent decisions of numerous federal courts of appeals interpreting the Blakely and Booker rules as "new" rules of criminal procedure (and not "old" rules that merely applied precedent existing at the time, cf. Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288 , 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion) ) 5 provide further evidence that the original Apprendi rule was unclear at the time that Blakely and Booker were decided. | 2 | 2005–2018 |
People v. Rosen
green
2 sentences2017For example, New York's persistent felony offender sentencing statute, which was very similar to Hawai'i’s "persistent offender” extended term sentencing provision, was upheld against Apprendi challenge by New York’s highest court in People v. Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d 329 , 728 N.Y.S.2d 407 , 752 N.E.2d 844 (2001). 2017For example, New York's persistent felony offender sentencing statute, which was very similar to Hawai'i’s "persistent offender” extended term sentencing provision, was upheld against Apprendi challenge by New York’s highest court in People v. Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d 329 , 728 N.Y.S.2d 407 , 752 N.E.2d 844 (2001). | 2 | 2002–2017 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences2008Hawaii Case Law Post-Apprendi Starting with State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1 , 72 P.3d 473 (2003), 14 until Maugaotega II, the Hawaii Supreme Court steadfastly opined that Hawaii’s extended sentencing scheme comported with Apprendi . 15 See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38 , 79 P.3d 131 (2003); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146 , 102 P.3d 1044 (2004); State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai'i 399 , 114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I); State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79 , 129 P.3d 1107 (2006); State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411 , 163 P.3d 1148 (2007). 2008Hawaii Case Law Post-Apprendi Starting with State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1 , 72 P.3d 473 (2003), 14 until Maugaotega II, the Hawaii Supreme Court steadfastly opined that Hawaii’s extended sentencing scheme comported with Apprendi . 15 See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38 , 79 P.3d 131 (2003); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146 , 102 P.3d 1044 (2004); State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai'i 399 , 114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I); State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79 , 129 P.3d 1107 (2006); State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411 , 163 P.3d 1148 (2007). | 2 | 2007–2008 |
State v. CALARRUDA
neutral
2 sentences2017No. SCWC-30402, 2012 WL 474022 (Hawai'i Feb. 13, 2012); Scrivner v. State, No. 30507, 126 Hawai'i 25 , 2011 WL 5997039 (Hawai'i App. Nov. 30, 2011), cert. denied, No. SCWC-30507, 2012 WL 1677430 (Hawai'i May 14, 2012). , Given the Hawaii Supreme Court's repeated rejection of Apprendi-based challenges to the constitutionality of Hawaii’s extended term sentencing scheme prior to Maugaotega II, we also conclude that Mara's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert an Apprendi claim on direct appeal of Mara’s Judgment, 2017No. SCWC-30402, 2012 WL 474022 (Hawai'i Feb. 13, 2012); Scrivner v. State, No. 30507, 126 Hawai'i 25 , 2011 WL 5997039 (Hawai'i App. Nov. 30, 2011), cert. denied, No. SCWC-30507, 2012 WL 1677430 (Hawai'i May 14, 2012). , Given the Hawaii Supreme Court's repeated rejection of Apprendi-based challenges to the constitutionality of Hawaii’s extended term sentencing scheme prior to Maugaotega II, we also conclude that Mara's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert an Apprendi claim on direct appeal of Mara’s Judgment, | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Kahapea
green
2 sentences2017Kahapea , 111 Hawai'i at 279 , 141 P.3d at 452 . 2017Kahapea , 111 Hawai'i at 279 , 141 P.3d at 452 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Frank Loher v. Todd Thomas
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 1121 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Jess
green
2 sentences2015The second consequence of overruling Loher and Gonsalves by extending the Apprendi rule to repeat offender sentencing is that we also hold that Jess’s rule requiring a charging instrument to include “all ‘allegations, which if proved, would result in the application of a statute enhancing the penalty of the crime committed,’ ” now requires the State to allege the piior convictions it seeks to use as a basis for sentencing a defendant as a repeat offender, because “[m]andatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime.” Jess, 117 Hawai'i at 398 , 184 P.3d at 150 ; Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2015The second consequence of overruling Loher and Gonsalves by extending the Apprendi rule to repeat offender sentencing is that we also hold that Jess’s rule requiring a charging instrument to include “all ‘allegations, which if proved, would result in the application of a statute enhancing the penalty of the crime committed,’ ” now requires the State to allege the piior convictions it seeks to use as a basis for sentencing a defendant as a repeat offender, because “[m]andatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime.” Jess, 117 Hawai'i at 398 , 184 P.3d at 150 ; Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Loher v. State
green
2 sentences2015Alleyne’s holding extending the Apprendi rule to mandatory minimum sentences calls into question two of our appellate decisions, Loher, 118 Hawai'i 522 , 193 P.3d 438 , and Gonsalves, 108 Hawai'i 289 , 119 P.3d 597 . 2015Alleyne’s holding extending the Apprendi rule to mandatory minimum sentences calls into question two of our appellate decisions, Loher, 118 Hawai'i 522 , 193 P.3d 438 , and Gonsalves, 108 Hawai'i 289 , 119 P.3d 597 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Hauge
green
2 sentences2008Hawaii Case Law Post-Apprendi Starting with State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1 , 72 P.3d 473 (2003), 14 until Maugaotega II, the Hawaii Supreme Court steadfastly opined that Hawaii’s extended sentencing scheme comported with Apprendi . 15 See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38 , 79 P.3d 131 (2003); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146 , 102 P.3d 1044 (2004); State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai'i 399 , 114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I); State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79 , 129 P.3d 1107 (2006); State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411 , 163 P.3d 1148 (2007). 2008Hawaii Case Law Post-Apprendi Starting with State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1 , 72 P.3d 473 (2003), 14 until Maugaotega II, the Hawaii Supreme Court steadfastly opined that Hawaii’s extended sentencing scheme comported with Apprendi . 15 See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38 , 79 P.3d 131 (2003); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146 , 102 P.3d 1044 (2004); State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai'i 399 , 114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I); State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79 , 129 P.3d 1107 (2006); State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411 , 163 P.3d 1148 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Schriro v. Summerlin
green
2 sentences2008Rules that allocate decision-making authority, such as the Apprendi requirement that a jury rather than a judge determine sentencing-enhancing facts, “are prototypical procedural rules.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004). 17 In Dobbert , the United States Supreme Court concluded that a statute which changed the roles played by the judge and jury in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed only effected a procedural change. 2008Rules that allocate decision-making authority, such as the Apprendi requirement that a jury rather than a judge determine sentencing-enhancing facts, “are prototypical procedural rules.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004). 17 In Dobbert , the United States Supreme Court concluded that a statute which changed the roles played by the judge and jury in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed only effected a procedural change. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Maugaotega
green
2 sentences2008Hawaii Case Law Post-Apprendi Starting with State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1 , 72 P.3d 473 (2003), 14 until Maugaotega II, the Hawaii Supreme Court steadfastly opined that Hawaii’s extended sentencing scheme comported with Apprendi . 15 See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38 , 79 P.3d 131 (2003); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146 , 102 P.3d 1044 (2004); State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai'i 399 , 114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I); State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79 , 129 P.3d 1107 (2006); State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411 , 163 P.3d 1148 (2007). 2008Hawaii Case Law Post-Apprendi Starting with State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1 , 72 P.3d 473 (2003), 14 until Maugaotega II, the Hawaii Supreme Court steadfastly opined that Hawaii’s extended sentencing scheme comported with Apprendi . 15 See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38 , 79 P.3d 131 (2003); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146 , 102 P.3d 1044 (2004); State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai'i 399 , 114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I); State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79 , 129 P.3d 1107 (2006); State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411 , 163 P.3d 1148 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Dobbert v. Florida
green
2 sentences2008Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292-94 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 . 2008Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292-94 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Patterson v. New York
green
2 sentences2008McMillan [v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986),] and Apprendi asked whether certain types of facts, though labeled sentencing factors by the legislature, were nevertheless `traditional elements' to which these constitutional safeguards were intended to apply." (Quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 211 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 2319 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977).) (Citations omitted.)); Harris, 536 U.S. at 567 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ("Read together, McMillan and Apprendi mean that those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are 2008McMillan [v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986),] and Apprendi asked whether certain types of facts, though labeled sentencing factors by the legislature, were nevertheless `traditional elements' to which these constitutional safeguards were intended to apply." (Quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 211 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 2319 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977).) (Citations omitted.)); Harris, 536 U.S. at 567 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ("Read together, McMillan and Apprendi mean that those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Kekuewa
green
2 sentences2008Hawaii Case Law Post-Apprendi Starting with State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1 , 72 P.3d 473 (2003), 14 until Maugaotega II, the Hawaii Supreme Court steadfastly opined that Hawaii’s extended sentencing scheme comported with Apprendi . 15 See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38 , 79 P.3d 131 (2003); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146 , 102 P.3d 1044 (2004); State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai'i 399 , 114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I); State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79 , 129 P.3d 1107 (2006); State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411 , 163 P.3d 1148 (2007). 2008Hawaii Case Law Post-Apprendi Starting with State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1 , 72 P.3d 473 (2003), 14 until Maugaotega II, the Hawaii Supreme Court steadfastly opined that Hawaii’s extended sentencing scheme comported with Apprendi . 15 See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38 , 79 P.3d 131 (2003); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146 , 102 P.3d 1044 (2004); State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai'i 399 , 114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I); State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79 , 129 P.3d 1107 (2006); State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411 , 163 P.3d 1148 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
McMillan v. Pennsylvania
red
2 sentences2008McMillan [v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986),] and Apprendi asked whether certain types of facts, though labeled sentencing factors by the legislature, were nevertheless `traditional elements' to which these constitutional safeguards were intended to apply." (Quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 211 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 2319 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977).) (Citations omitted.)); Harris, 536 U.S. at 567 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ("Read together, McMillan and Apprendi mean that those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are 2008McMillan [v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986),] and Apprendi asked whether certain types of facts, though labeled sentencing factors by the legislature, were nevertheless `traditional elements' to which these constitutional safeguards were intended to apply." (Quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 211 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 2319 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977).) (Citations omitted.)); Harris, 536 U.S. at 567 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ("Read together, McMillan and Apprendi mean that those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Philistin v. Pennsylvania green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Quoc Thai Minh Thuy v. United States green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Clark v. United States green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Redman v. United States green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Osterback v. Ingram green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Carvalho green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.