Scott motion in Mississippi

2008Scott v. State, 8 So.3d 871 (Miss.Ct.App.

2005Scott v. State, No. 2005-KA-00915-COA, 2008 Miss.

2024“A change of venue is at ‘the discretion of the trial court, and its ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion or that the discretion has not been justly and properly exercised under the circumstances of the case.’” Davis v. State, 196 So. 3d 194, 198 (¶17) (Miss.

2023We flatly refuse to do so for the same reason the circuit court denied Scott’s motion to supplement the record with this information: “Motions for failure to prosecute are considered on a case-by-case basis.” Holder, 54 So. 3d at 197 (¶17).

2023The circuit court dismissed this case for failure to prosecute on July 25, 2022, finding that Scott’s motion to leave his case on the docket was not an “action of record” that would serve to prevent dismissal under Rule 41(d)(1), as it was not a pleading, discovery request, or deposition notice, citing Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Moore, 994 So. 2d 723, 728 (¶14) (Miss. 2008).

2023The circuit court dismissed this case for failure to prosecute on July 25, 2022, finding that Scott’s motion to leave his case on the docket was not an “action of record” that would serve to prevent dismissal under Rule 41(d)(1), as it was not a pleading, discovery request, or deposition notice, citing Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Moore, 994 So. 2d 723, 728 (¶14) (Miss. 2008).

2023In short, we find that Scott’s motion was really no more 11 than “a request to remain active on the court’s docket” that simply does not suffice as an “action of record.” Glass, 271 So. 3d at 605 (¶13) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶29.

2023We agree with the circuit court that Scott failed to demonstrate the requisite good 8 We also observe that even if Scott’s motion to leave his case on the docket were an “action of record” so as to prevent dismissal under Rule 41(d), see Cascio, 164 So. 3d at 459 (¶26), we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s dismissal based upon its own inherent power to do so.

2017Chase, 873 So.2d at 1029. ¶ 39.

2016Later, on August 19, 2014, the trial court, addressing Scott’s motion to dismiss, stat *1042 ed that “most of the delay falls on the shoulders of Mr. Rod Nixon, who was Mr. Scott’s attorney for a good while.” Accordingly, “[a] delay attributable to the defendant tolls the constitutional speedy trial clock.” DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512, 517 (¶ 19) (Miss.1998).

2008“Attorneys are allowed wide latitude in arguing their cases to the jury, but they are not allowed to employ tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury.” Shumpert v. State, 935 So.2d 962, 972 (¶ 38) (Miss.2006) (citing Sheppard v. State, 111 So.2d 659, 661(¶ 7) (Miss.2000)).

2008See Wimberly v. State, 760 So.2d 800, 802 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (stating that when a trial judge sits as the finder of fact in a suppression hearing, he has the “sole authority to determine the credibility of the witnesses”).

2008As to Scott’s claim that the trial court failed in not suppressing his confession in accordance with Agee , “ ‘[t]he standard of review regarding a trial judge’s ruling at a suppression hearing is whether substantial credible evidence was present to support the trial judge’s finding when evaluating the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Mayes v. State, 925 So.2d 130, 134 (¶8) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (quoting Greer v. State, 818 So.2d 352, 355 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App. 2002)).

2008“Since the trial judge sits as the finder of fact in determining the voluntariness of a confession, this Court will not disturb the trial judge’s decision unless it is manifestly wrong.” Id.

2008“Attorneys are allowed wide latitude in arguing their cases to the jury, but they are not allowed to employ tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury.” Shumpert v. State, 935 So.2d 962, 972 (¶ 38) (Miss.2006) (citing Sheppard v. State, 111 So.2d 659, 661(¶ 7) (Miss.2000)).

2008As to Scott’s claim that the trial court failed in not suppressing his confession in accordance with Agee , “ ‘[t]he standard of review regarding a trial judge’s ruling at a suppression hearing is whether substantial credible evidence was present to support the trial judge’s finding when evaluating the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Mayes v. State, 925 So.2d 130, 134 (¶8) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (quoting Greer v. State, 818 So.2d 352, 355 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App. 2002)).

1999Scott's challenge to the effectiveness of counsel he received at trial is dependant upon a successful completion of a two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and followed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 476 (Miss.1984).