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53 California opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2026 20 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2025(See People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 [“It is only if the trial court fails to give the parties any meaningful opportunity to object that the Scott rule becomes inapplicable”].) On the other hand, a defendant’s failure to object at sentencing does not forfeit a claim that the trial court’s reliance on an unproven aggravating factor violated the defendant’s constitutional right to jury trial. 2025(See People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 [“It is only if the trial court fails to give the parties any meaningful opportunity to object that the Scott rule becomes inapplicable”].) On the other hand, a defendant’s failure to object at sentencing does not forfeit a claim that the trial court’s reliance on an unproven aggravating factor violated the defendant’s constitutional right to jury trial. | 7 | 14 |
People v. Scottgreen2 sentences2025(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351 , 353–354, 356; People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300 , 302–303.) “[T]he Scott rule applies when the trial court ‘clearly apprise[s]’ the parties ‘of the sentence the court intends to impose and the reasons that support any discretionary choices’ (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 ), and gives the parties a chance to seek ‘clarification or change’ (id. at p. 351) by objecting to errors in the sentence. 2025(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351 , 353–354, 356; People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300 , 302–303.) “[T]he Scott rule applies when the trial court ‘clearly apprise[s]’ the parties ‘of the sentence the court intends to impose and the reasons that support any discretionary choices’ (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 ), and gives the parties a chance to seek ‘clarification or change’ (id. at p. 351) by objecting to errors in the sentence. | 5 | 16 |
People v. Boycegreen2 sentences2022(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ; see also People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 731 (Boyce) [defendant forfeited claim that trial court had given no reasons for imposing consecutive sentences because court “adjourned after asking counsel if there was anything else to discuss,” and “[a]t no time did defense counsel lodge his objections to the imposition of consecutive sentences”]; cf. Sperling, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1101-1102 [for purposes of forfeiture rule, defense counsel had meaningful opportunity to object, as counsel remained silent when trial court invited comment on sent 2022(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ; see also People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 731 (Boyce) [defendant forfeited claim that trial court had given no reasons for imposing consecutive sentences because court “adjourned after asking counsel if there was anything else to discuss,” and “[a]t no time did defense counsel lodge his objections to the imposition of consecutive sentences”]; cf. Sperling, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1101-1102 [for purposes of forfeiture rule, defense counsel had meaningful opportunity to object, as counsel remained silent when trial court invited comment on sent | 2 | 2 |
People v. Castellanogreen2 sentences2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap 2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap | 2 | 2 |
People v. Torresgreen2 sentences2003Scott nowhere limited itself to punishment and instead referred broadly to "sentencing decisions" ( Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 348 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), "sentencing choice[s]" ( id. at p. 352, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), and just plain old "sentences." ( Id. at p. 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) Moreover, the Scott rule has regularly been applied to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal other nonpunitive sentencing decisions, such as a trial court's failure to commit a defendant to the California Rehabilitation Center (e.g., Peo 2003Scott nowhere limited itself to punishment and instead referred broadly to "sentencing decisions" ( Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 348 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), "sentencing choice[s]" ( id. at p. 352, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), and just plain old "sentences." ( Id. at p. 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) Moreover, the Scott rule has regularly been applied to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal other nonpunitive sentencing decisions, such as a trial court's failure to commit a defendant to the California Rehabilitation Center (e.g., Peo | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lizarragagreen2 sentences2003Scott nowhere limited itself to punishment and instead referred broadly to "sentencing decisions" ( Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 348 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), "sentencing choice[s]" ( id. at p. 352, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), and just plain old "sentences." ( Id. at p. 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) Moreover, the Scott rule has regularly been applied to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal other nonpunitive sentencing decisions, such as a trial court's failure to commit a defendant to the California Rehabilitation Center (e.g., Peo 2003Scott nowhere limited itself to punishment and instead referred broadly to "sentencing decisions" ( Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 348 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), "sentencing choice[s]" ( id. at p. 352, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), and just plain old "sentences." ( Id. at p. 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) Moreover, the Scott rule has regularly been applied to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal other nonpunitive sentencing decisions, such as a trial court's failure to commit a defendant to the California Rehabilitation Center (e.g., Peo | 1 | 2 |
People v. Marchandgreen2 sentences2003Indeed, People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060-1061 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 687 — which is cited by the majority — applied Scott to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal a requirement that he register as a sex offender. 2003Indeed, People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060-1061 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 687 — which is cited by the majority — applied Scott to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal a requirement that he register as a sex offender. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Josue S.green2 sentences2003Scott nowhere limited itself to punishment and instead referred broadly to "sentencing decisions" ( Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 348 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), "sentencing choice[s]" ( id. at p. 352, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), and just plain old "sentences." ( Id. at p. 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) Moreover, the Scott rule has regularly been applied to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal other nonpunitive sentencing decisions, such as a trial court's failure to commit a defendant to the California Rehabilitation Center (e.g., Peo 2003Scott nowhere limited itself to punishment and instead referred broadly to "sentencing decisions" ( Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 348 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), "sentencing choice[s]" ( id. at p. 352, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), and just plain old "sentences." ( Id. at p. 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) Moreover, the Scott rule has regularly been applied to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal other nonpunitive sentencing decisions, such as a trial court's failure to commit a defendant to the California Rehabilitation Center (e.g., Peo | 1 | 2 |
People v. Planavskygreen2 sentences2003Scott nowhere limited itself to punishment and instead referred broadly to "sentencing decisions" ( Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 348 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), "sentencing choice[s]" ( id. at p. 352, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), and just plain old "sentences." ( Id. at p. 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) Moreover, the Scott rule has regularly been applied to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal other nonpunitive sentencing decisions, such as a trial court's failure to commit a defendant to the California Rehabilitation Center (e.g., Peo 2003Scott nowhere limited itself to punishment and instead referred broadly to "sentencing decisions" ( Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 348 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), "sentencing choice[s]" ( id. at p. 352, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ), and just plain old "sentences." ( Id. at p. 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 .) Moreover, the Scott rule has regularly been applied to bar a defendant from challenging for the first time on appeal other nonpunitive sentencing decisions, such as a trial court's failure to commit a defendant to the California Rehabilitation Center (e.g., Peo | 1 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2025(People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 , 46–47 [defendant did not forfeit Sixth Amendment claim by failing to object or request jury trial on aggravating circumstances because defendant must enter an “express waiver” of the constitutional right to a jury trial].) And “[a] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an 6 We deny Murray’s request made at oral argument for supplemental briefing on the issue. 12 upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal 2025(People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 , 46–47 [defendant did not forfeit Sixth Amendment claim by failing to object or request jury trial on aggravating circumstances because defendant must enter an “express waiver” of the constitutional right to a jury trial].) And “[a] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an 6 We deny Murray’s request made at oral argument for supplemental briefing on the issue. 12 upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Kaziangreen1 sentence2025(Estate of Friedman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 810 , 817– 818, italics added; see also Estate of Kazian (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 797, 802 [“The word ‘contest’ may mean ‘any legal proceeding which is designed to result in the thwarting of the testator’s wishes as expressed in his will.’ ”].) 11 To the extent this language might be read to suggest that any petition for reformation of unambiguous language necessarily constitutes a trust contest, we do not believe it can survive the Supreme Court’s 2015 elimination of “the historical rule that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to reform an unambiguous wil | 1 | 1 |
Radin v. Jewish National Fundgreen1 sentence2025(Estate of Friedman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 810 , 817– 818, italics added; see also Estate of Kazian (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 797, 802 [“The word ‘contest’ may mean ‘any legal proceeding which is designed to result in the thwarting of the testator’s wishes as expressed in his will.’ ”].) 11 To the extent this language might be read to suggest that any petition for reformation of unambiguous language necessarily constitutes a trust contest, we do not believe it can survive the Supreme Court’s 2015 elimination of “the historical rule that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to reform an unambiguous wil | 1 | 1 |
People v. Duvallgreen1 sentence2023(See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [“a writ of habeas corpus seeks to collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal judgment”].) Rather, a motion to vacate was an appropriate procedural mechanism for Scott to have sought relief. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stampsgreen2 sentences2023(See People v. Lopez, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 412, 416 [ordering conviction based on plea bargain vacated in light of amendment that “added an element the prosecution previously had no reason to prove”; remanding for further proceedings “to allow the district attorney the opportunity to prove” those elements]; People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 707 (Stamps) [“If he desires, defendant should be given the opportunity to seek” benefit of retroactive change in the law, though that could have “consequences to the plea agreement”].) The People propose that Scott’s motion was procedurally im 2023(See Stamps, supra, 9 5 We note also that the People did not challenge Scott’s motion on procedural grounds in the trial court, so those arguments were also forfeited. 7 Cal.5th at p. 705 [discussing Doe and § 1016.8].) Given that Assembly Bill 333’s changes to section 186.22 were (implicitly) intended by the Legislature to have retroactive effect on cases not yet final, Doe only supports Scott’s motion. | 1 | 1 |
| Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Cormangreen | 1 | 1 |
| McLeod v. Vista Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kochan v. Kochangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Salazar v. Thomasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oregon v. Icegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Belmontesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mustafaagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Blackgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McKinziegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McDermottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Valdezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Banksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| BROCKET v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stowellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rowlandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Fondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Terrellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Giordanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Norman v. Murphygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sperling
green
2 sentences2024Routine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.’ [Citation.] ‘[B]y encouraging counsel to intervene at the time sentencing choices are made, we hope to reduce the number of issues raised in the reviewing court in any form.’ [Citation.] “‘[T]he Scott rule applies when the trial court “clearly apprise[s]” the parties “of the sentence the court intends to impose and the reasons that support any discretionary choices” [citation], and gives the parties a chance to seek “clarification or change” [citation] by objecting to err 2024Routine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.’ [Citation.] ‘[B]y encouraging counsel to intervene at the time sentencing choices are made, we hope to reduce the number of issues raised in the reviewing court in any form.’ [Citation.] “‘[T]he Scott rule applies when the trial court “clearly apprise[s]” the parties “of the sentence the court intends to impose and the reasons that support any discretionary choices” [citation], and gives the parties a chance to seek “clarification or change” [citation] by objecting to err | 3 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Superior Court (Dorsey)
green
2 sentences2023This opportunity can occur only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly apprised of the sentence the court intends to impose and the reasons that support any discretionary choices.” In People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745 (Gonzalez), the court clarified that the Scott rule does not require that the trial court issue a tentative ruling on the sentence it intends to impose, “if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the 2023This opportunity can occur only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly apprised of the sentence the court intends to impose and the reasons that support any discretionary choices.” In People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745 (Gonzalez), the court clarified that the Scott rule does not require that the trial court issue a tentative ruling on the sentence it intends to impose, “if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the | 3 | 2003–2023 |
In Re Marriage of Berger
green
2 sentences2023Moreover, the court could otherwise properly consider the Morgan Stanley distributions and credit card payments as evidence supporting its implied finding that it would be “unjust or inappropriate” to apply the guideline formula under the facts in this case. (§ 4057, subd. (b)(3); Berger, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th 1070 .) All in all, the trial court’s order advanced the legislative goals of child support by ensuring that Scott pays for the support of his children according to his ability (§ 4053, subd. (d)); that the interests of his children are regarded as a top priority (id., subd. (e)); and t 2023Moreover, the court could otherwise properly consider the Morgan Stanley distributions and credit card payments as evidence supporting its implied finding that it would be “unjust or inappropriate” to apply the guideline formula under the facts in this case. (§ 4057, subd. (b)(3); Berger, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th 1070 .) All in all, the trial court’s order advanced the legislative goals of child support by ensuring that Scott pays for the support of his children according to his ability (§ 4053, subd. (d)); that the interests of his children are regarded as a top priority (id., subd. (e)); and t | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. De Soto
green
2 sentences2022In any event, we decline to do so under these circumstances because doing so would essentially render the Scott rule nugatory. 14 basis for the objection as it may exist in the mind of defense counsel.” (People v. de Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 .) The Claims Also Fail on the Merits Even if the issues were not forfeited, we would not find error. 2022In any event, we decline to do so under these circumstances because doing so would essentially render the Scott rule nugatory. 14 basis for the objection as it may exist in the mind of defense counsel.” (People v. de Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 .) The Claims Also Fail on the Merits Even if the issues were not forfeited, we would not find error. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Hicks
green
2 sentences2022“A trial court’s sentencing decision is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Hicks (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 496, 512 .) “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. 2022“A trial court’s sentencing decision is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Hicks (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 496, 512 .) “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Sviridov v. City of San Diego
green
2 sentences2019In a tentative opinion, the trial court agreed with Scott that a prevailing defendant in a FEHA action was entitled to costs-including postoffer costs under section 998-only upon a showing, not made here, that plaintiff's claims were frivolous. *233 However, before making its tentative decision final, and at the City's request, the trial court continued Scott's motion to tax costs pending the City's request for publication of this court's decision in Sviridov v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 514 , 521, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , which held that a court may award a prevailing defendant costs 2019In a tentative opinion, the trial court agreed with Scott that a prevailing defendant in a FEHA action was entitled to costs-including postoffer costs under section 998-only upon a showing, not made here, that plaintiff's claims were frivolous. *233 However, before making its tentative decision final, and at the City's request, the trial court continued Scott's motion to tax costs pending the City's request for publication of this court's decision in Sviridov v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 514 , 521, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , which held that a court may award a prevailing defendant costs | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Sandoval
red
2 sentences2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap 2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Ogg
green
2 sentences2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap 2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap 2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Browning
green
2 sentences1990In People v. Browning (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 117 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 293 ], the court concluded it was unreasonable under the Scott test to force an assault victim to undergo surgery to retrieve a bullet which the defendant claimed would be of a certain caliber, and thereby support his version of a shooting incident. 1990In People v. Browning (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 117 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 293 ], the court concluded it was unreasonable under the Scott test to force an assault victim to undergo surgery to retrieve a bullet which the defendant claimed would be of a certain caliber, and thereby support his version of a shooting incident. | 2 | 1980–1990 |
People v. Superior Court (Romero)
green
1 sentence2026Scott’s custody credits are not at issue in this appeal. 4 Scott’s motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 does not appear in the record on appeal. 5 Scott’s section 1170.126 petition is the subject of a prior opinion of this court. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Grunauer v. Friedman
green
1 sentence2025(Estate of Friedman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 810 , 817– 818, italics added; see also Estate of Kazian (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 797, 802 [“The word ‘contest’ may mean ‘any legal proceeding which is designed to result in the thwarting of the testator’s wishes as expressed in his will.’ ”].) 11 To the extent this language might be read to suggest that any petition for reformation of unambiguous language necessarily constitutes a trust contest, we do not believe it can survive the Supreme Court’s 2015 elimination of “the historical rule that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to reform an unambiguous wil | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Tillman
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351 , 353–354, 356; People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300 , 302–303.) “[T]he Scott rule applies when the trial court ‘clearly apprise[s]’ the parties ‘of the sentence the court intends to impose and the reasons that support any discretionary choices’ (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 ), and gives the parties a chance to seek ‘clarification or change’ (id. at p. 351) by objecting to errors in the sentence. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. French
green
2 sentences2025(People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 , 46–47 [defendant did not forfeit Sixth Amendment claim by failing to object or request jury trial on aggravating circumstances because defendant must enter an “express waiver” of the constitutional right to a jury trial].) And “[a] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an 6 We deny Murray’s request made at oral argument for supplemental briefing on the issue. 12 upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal 2025(People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 , 46–47 [defendant did not forfeit Sixth Amendment claim by failing to object or request jury trial on aggravating circumstances because defendant must enter an “express waiver” of the constitutional right to a jury trial].) And “[a] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an 6 We deny Murray’s request made at oral argument for supplemental briefing on the issue. 12 upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Staten
green
1 sentence2024(Staten, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 451 .) For these reasons, Scott’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 19 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Guerrero v. RJM ACQUISITIONS LLC green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships LLC green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Park v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ.
green
1 sentence2022We therefore deny Sado’s request to remand for attorney fees. 9 addition to the pleadings, we may consider affidavits concerning the facts upon which liability is based. [Citations.] We do not, however, weigh the evidence, but accept plaintiff’s submissions as true and consider only whether any contrary evidence from the defendant establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law. [Citation.]” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 .) Preliminarily, the trial court correctly concluded that, barring the application of an absolute privilege, | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Mills green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Chism green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Apprendi v. New Jersey green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Taylor green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Ortega green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Sloan green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Contreras green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Navellier v. Sletten green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Thomas v. Quintero green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Chapman v. California red | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Harris green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Mil green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In Re Nicholas H. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In Re Jesusa green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Erdelen green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Minder green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.