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5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Salmongreen2 sentences2017And as Scott testified, when he saw that Teresa’s gun was missing from the safe, he “thought the threat was serious.” Whether the threat “[was] true is irrelevant, since the crucial factors are that the statements were made and that they influenced the defendant[’s] behavior.” See State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 1980) (concluding testimony was not hearsay when it was offered, “not to prove the truth of what [the informant] said to defendants, but rather to show that [the informant] had made statements which induced defendants to commit the offense”). ¶ 23 The threat was not inadmissib 2017And as Scott testified, when he saw that Teresa’s gun was missing from the safe, he ‚thought the threat was serious.‛ Whether the threat ‚*was+ true is irrelevant, since the crucial factors are that the statements were made and that they influenced the defendant*’s+ behavior.‛ See State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 1980) (concluding testimony was not hearsay when it was offered, ‚not to prove the truth of what [the informant] said to defendants, but rather to show that [the informant] had made statements which induced defendants to commit the offense‛). ¶23 The threat was not inadmissibl | 1 | 1 |
Roach v. Edge (In Re Edge)green1 sentence1999“In general, a claim is considered to have arisen before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case if all of *220 the elements of liability arose before the [bankruptcy] petition date.” Collier on Bankruptcy, 553.03[l][b], at 553-14; see Rozel Indus., Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Rozel Indus.), 120 B.R. 944, 949 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990) (holding debt must be “absolutely owing” at time of filing of petition to be pre-petition item; however,'the amount of liability need not be specifically known or currently due, only that some definite liability has accrued); see also Gerth, 991 F.2d at | 1 | 1 |
United States of America, Acting Through the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service v. Willis R. Gerthgreen1 sentence1999“In general, a claim is considered to have arisen before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case if all of *220 the elements of liability arose before the [bankruptcy] petition date.” Collier on Bankruptcy, 553.03[l][b], at 553-14; see Rozel Indus., Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Rozel Indus.), 120 B.R. 944, 949 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990) (holding debt must be “absolutely owing” at time of filing of petition to be pre-petition item; however,'the amount of liability need not be specifically known or currently due, only that some definite liability has accrued); see also Gerth, 991 F.2d at | 1 | 1 |
Rozel Industries, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Rozel Industries, Inc.)green1 sentence1999“In general, a claim is considered to have arisen before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case if all of *220 the elements of liability arose before the [bankruptcy] petition date.” Collier on Bankruptcy, 553.03[l][b], at 553-14; see Rozel Indus., Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Rozel Indus.), 120 B.R. 944, 949 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990) (holding debt must be “absolutely owing” at time of filing of petition to be pre-petition item; however,'the amount of liability need not be specifically known or currently due, only that some definite liability has accrued); see also Gerth, 991 F.2d at | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Scott
green
2 sentences2020Accordingly, we apply Strickland to the facts at hand and ask whether counsel’s failure to argue that the threat was not hearsay “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 5 466 U.S. at 688 . ¶32 The court of appeals concluded that counsel was deficient because he “failed to correctly use the rules of evidence to support Scott’s defense.” State v. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶ 25 , 397 P.3d 837 . 2020Accordingly, we apply Strickland to the facts at hand and ask whether counsel’s failure to argue that the threat was not hearsay “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 5 466 U.S. at 688 . ¶32 The court of appeals concluded that counsel was deficient because he “failed to correctly use the rules of evidence to support Scott’s defense.” State v. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶ 25 , 397 P.3d 837 . | 2 | 2017–2020 |
Dowling v. Bullen
green
2 sentences2024It ruled that the Plaintiffs’ injuries related to or arose out of health care, and therefore their claims were subject to the Malpractice Act because Broadbent’s “alleged misconduct” occurred “in the course of obstetrical treatment.” The court reasoned this was so because Broadbent is an OB-GYN who was “purportedly performing OB-GYN services” during appointments addressing “obstetrical __________________________________________________________ 5 With respect to element (2)(a), the Plaintiffs do argue that Broadbent’s actions were not “on their behalf.” But because the Act’s definition is broad 2024It ruled that the Plaintiffs’ injuries related to or arose out of health care, and therefore their claims were subject to the Malpractice Act because Broadbent’s “alleged misconduct” occurred “in the course of obstetrical treatment.” The court reasoned this was so because Broadbent is an OB-GYN who was “purportedly performing OB-GYN services” during appointments addressing “obstetrical __________________________________________________________ 5 With respect to element (2)(a), the Plaintiffs do argue that Broadbent’s actions were not “on their behalf.” But because the Act’s definition is broad | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Scott
green
1 sentence2022I would hold that Scott is entitled to a new trial. 20140995-CA 29 2022 UT App 81 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Scott
green
2 sentences2022In fact, as our supreme court postulated in Scott II, “[t]he actual words of a weak threat could have hurt, rather than helped, Scott’s defense because the jury could have viewed his reaction as irrational and disproportionate.” 2020 UT 13, ¶ 45 , 462 P.3d 350 . 2022In fact, as our supreme court postulated in Scott II, “[t]he actual words of a weak threat could have hurt, rather than helped, Scott’s defense because the jury could have viewed his reaction as irrational and disproportionate.” 2020 UT 13, ¶ 45 , 462 P.3d 350 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2020Accordingly, we apply Strickland to the facts at hand and ask whether counsel’s failure to argue that the threat was not hearsay “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 5 466 U.S. at 688 . ¶32 The court of appeals concluded that counsel was deficient because he “failed to correctly use the rules of evidence to support Scott’s defense.” State v. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶ 25 , 397 P.3d 837 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Johnson v. Rutherford Hospital (In Re Johnson)
green
1 sentence1999(In re Johnson), 13 B.R. 185 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1981), which interprets code sections 553(a) and 524(a), Majors argues that because Scott’s claim for attorney fees, costs and damages is a claim made against her personally, rather than the bankruptcy estate, setoff is improper in this case. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.