Scott motion in District of Columbia

1999Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Scott’s motion for a new trial. 8 One who invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must show that: “(1) [the occurrence is] of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the control (exclusive or joint) of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” Hailey, supra, 636 A.2d at 428 (quoting Otis Elevator Co. v. Tuerr, 616 A.2d 1254, 1258 (D.C.1992)) (quoting Otis Elevator C

1999Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Scott's motion for a new trial. [8] One who invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must show that: "(1) [the occurrence is] of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the control (exclusive or joint) of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." Hailey, supra, 636 A.2d at 428 (quoting Otis Elevator Co. v. Tuerr, 616 A.2d 1254, 1258 (D.C.1992)) (quoting Otis Elevator

1999Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Scott’s motion for a new trial. 8 One who invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must show that: “(1) [the occurrence is] of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the control (exclusive or joint) of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” Hailey, supra, 636 A.2d at 428 (quoting Otis Elevator Co. v. Tuerr, 616 A.2d 1254, 1258 (D.C.1992)) (quoting Otis Elevator C

1999Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Scott's motion for a new trial. [8] One who invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must show that: "(1) [the occurrence is] of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the control (exclusive or joint) of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." Hailey, supra, 636 A.2d at 428 (quoting Otis Elevator Co. v. Tuerr, 616 A.2d 1254, 1258 (D.C.1992)) (quoting Otis Elevator

1999Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Scott’s motion for a new trial. 8 One who invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must show that: “(1) [the occurrence is] of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the control (exclusive or joint) of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” Hailey, supra, 636 A.2d at 428 (quoting Otis Elevator Co. v. Tuerr, 616 A.2d 1254, 1258 (D.C.1992)) (quoting Otis Elevator C

1999Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Scott’s motion for a new trial. 8 One who invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must show that: “(1) [the occurrence is] of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the control (exclusive or joint) of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” Hailey, supra, 636 A.2d at 428 (quoting Otis Elevator Co. v. Tuerr, 616 A.2d 1254, 1258 (D.C.1992)) (quoting Otis Elevator C

1993See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, supra, 456 U.S. at 133-134 , 102 S.Ct. at 1574-1575 .

1993See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, supra, 456 U.S. at 133-134 , 102 S.Ct. at 1574-1575 .

1992“Objective reasonableness is all that is required by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition upon ‘unreasonable’ seizures ...; the officer’s asserted reason for his action is not controlling.” Marbury v. United States, 540 A.2d 114, 115-16 (D.C.App.1985); see also Alvarez v. United States, supra note 6, 576 A.2d at 717; Dunham v. District of Columbia, 442 A.2d 121 , 127 n. 8 (D.C.App.1982); United States v. Mitchell, 293 U.S.App.D.C. 24, 28 , 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1991). 8 While we are clearly governed by the Scott test in determining the validity of the traffic stop at issue here, there are differe

1992“Objective reasonableness is all that is required by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition upon ‘unreasonable’ seizures ...; the officer’s asserted reason for his action is not controlling.” Marbury v. United States, 540 A.2d 114, 115-16 (D.C.App.1985); see also Alvarez v. United States, supra note 6, 576 A.2d at 717; Dunham v. District of Columbia, 442 A.2d 121 , 127 n. 8 (D.C.App.1982); United States v. Mitchell, 293 U.S.App.D.C. 24, 28 , 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1991). 8 While we are clearly governed by the Scott test in determining the validity of the traffic stop at issue here, there are differe

1992“Objective reasonableness is all that is required by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition upon ‘unreasonable’ seizures ...; the officer’s asserted reason for his action is not controlling.” Marbury v. United States, 540 A.2d 114, 115-16 (D.C.App.1985); see also Alvarez v. United States, supra note 6, 576 A.2d at 717; Dunham v. District of Columbia, 442 A.2d 121 , 127 n. 8 (D.C.App.1982); United States v. Mitchell, 293 U.S.App.D.C. 24, 28 , 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1991). 8 While we are clearly governed by the Scott test in determining the validity of the traffic stop at issue here, there are differe

1992“Objective reasonableness is all that is required by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition upon ‘unreasonable’ seizures ...; the officer’s asserted reason for his action is not controlling.” Marbury v. United States, 540 A.2d 114, 115-16 (D.C.App.1985); see also Alvarez v. United States, supra note 6, 576 A.2d at 717; Dunham v. District of Columbia, 442 A.2d 121 , 127 n. 8 (D.C.App.1982); United States v. Mitchell, 293 U.S.App.D.C. 24, 28 , 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1991). 8 While we are clearly governed by the Scott test in determining the validity of the traffic stop at issue here, there are differe

1992“Objective reasonableness is all that is required by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition upon ‘unreasonable’ seizures ...; the officer’s asserted reason for his action is not controlling.” Marbury v. United States, 540 A.2d 114, 115-16 (D.C.App.1985); see also Alvarez v. United States, supra note 6, 576 A.2d at 717; Dunham v. District of Columbia, 442 A.2d 121 , 127 n. 8 (D.C.App.1982); United States v. Mitchell, 293 U.S.App.D.C. 24, 28 , 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1991). 8 While we are clearly governed by the Scott test in determining the validity of the traffic stop at issue here, there are differe

1992“Objective reasonableness is all that is required by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition upon ‘unreasonable’ seizures ...; the officer’s asserted reason for his action is not controlling.” Marbury v. United States, 540 A.2d 114, 115-16 (D.C.App.1985); see also Alvarez v. United States, supra note 6, 576 A.2d at 717; Dunham v. District of Columbia, 442 A.2d 121 , 127 n. 8 (D.C.App.1982); United States v. Mitchell, 293 U.S.App.D.C. 24, 28 , 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1991). 8 While we are clearly governed by the Scott test in determining the validity of the traffic stop at issue here, there are differe

1984See Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc). 2 Next, Williams and Scott claim on appeal for the first time that the trial court should have sua sponte instructed the jury not only at the time of its charge after all *1104 the evidence had been presented but also at the time appellants’ incriminating statements were received in evidence to consider each such statement only as to the guilt or innocence of its declarant.