death claim in New Jersey

2010In so holding, we reasoned that "even though [the wrongful death] claim did not ripen or `accrue' until plaintiff's wife died, decedent's failure to bring a personal injury action before the statute of limitation[s] expired barred the action due to the death claim's derivative nature." Id. at 578 , 742 A .2d 572 (internal citations omitted).

2010In so holding, we reasoned that "even though [the wrongful death] claim did not ripen or `accrue' until plaintiff's wife died, decedent's failure to bring a personal injury action before the statute of limitation[s] expired barred the action due to the death claim's derivative nature." Id. at 578 , 742 A .2d 572 (internal citations omitted).

2000If any of the persons so entitled were dependent on the decedent at his death, they shall take the same as though they were sole persons so entitled, in such proportions, as shall be determined by the court without a jury, and as will result in a fair and equitable apportionment of the amount recovered, among them,____ Thus, as the Court noted in Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 200 , 254 A.2d 525 (1969), “It has long been settled that the recovery under the wrongful death statute forms no part of the estate of the deceased.” That is so because, The cause of action for wrongful death and the de

2000If any of the persons so entitled were dependent on the decedent at his death, they shall take the same as though they were sole persons so entitled, in such proportions, as shall be determined by the court without a jury, and as will result in a fair and equitable apportionment of the amount recovered, among them,____ Thus, as the Court noted in Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 200 , 254 A.2d 525 (1969), “It has long been settled that the recovery under the wrongful death statute forms no part of the estate of the deceased.” That is so because, The cause of action for wrongful death and the de

2000If any of the persons so entitled were dependent on the decedent at his death, they shall take the same as though they were sole persons so entitled, in such proportions, as shall be determined by the court without a jury, and as will result in a fair and equitable apportionment of the amount recovered, among them,____ Thus, as the Court noted in Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 200 , 254 A.2d 525 (1969), “It has long been settled that the recovery under the wrongful death statute forms no part of the estate of the deceased.” That is so because, The cause of action for wrongful death and the de

2000If any of the persons so entitled were dependent on the decedent at his death, they shall take the same as though they were sole persons so entitled, in such proportions, as shall be determined by the court without a jury, and as will result in a fair and equitable apportionment of the amount recovered, among them,____ Thus, as the Court noted in Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 200 , 254 A.2d 525 (1969), “It has long been settled that the recovery under the wrongful death statute forms no part of the estate of the deceased.” That is so because, The cause of action for wrongful death and the de

2001Co., 111 N.J.L. 333 , 168 A. 418 (E. & A.1933) (citation and footnote omitted)).

2001Co., 111 N.J.L. 333 , 168 A. 418 (E. & A.1933) (citation and footnote omitted)).

2000If any of the persons so entitled were dependent on the decedent at his death, they shall take the same as though they were sole persons so entitled, in such proportions, as shall be determined by the court without a jury, and as will result in a fair and equitable apportionment of the amount recovered, among them,____ Thus, as the Court noted in Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 200 , 254 A.2d 525 (1969), “It has long been settled that the recovery under the wrongful death statute forms no part of the estate of the deceased.” That is so because, The cause of action for wrongful death and the de

2000If any of the persons so entitled were dependent on the decedent at his death, they shall take the same as though they were sole persons so entitled, in such proportions, as shall be determined by the court without a jury, and as will result in a fair and equitable apportionment of the amount recovered, among them,____ Thus, as the Court noted in Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 200 , 254 A.2d 525 (1969), “It has long been settled that the recovery under the wrongful death statute forms no part of the estate of the deceased.” That is so because, The cause of action for wrongful death and the de

1999However, because paragraph 11 of the complaint asserted a potential claim under the wrongful death act, [6] in the interest of justice we will consider the issue. *576 The trial judge did not err by granting summary judgment, even considering the complaint to have asserted a wrongful death claim, because even though such a claim did not ripen or "accrue" until plaintiff's wife died, [7] see Duffy v. Ackerhalt, 138 N.J.Super. 119 , 350 A. 2d 283 (App.Div.1975), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 273 , 359 A. 2d 485 (1976), decedent's failure to bring a personal injury action before the statute of limitati

1999However, because paragraph 11 of the complaint asserted a potential claim under the wrongful death act, [6] in the interest of justice we will consider the issue. *576 The trial judge did not err by granting summary judgment, even considering the complaint to have asserted a wrongful death claim, because even though such a claim did not ripen or "accrue" until plaintiff's wife died, [7] see Duffy v. Ackerhalt, 138 N.J.Super. 119 , 350 A. 2d 283 (App.Div.1975), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 273 , 359 A. 2d 485 (1976), decedent's failure to bring a personal injury action before the statute of limitati

1999However, because paragraph 11 of the complaint asserted a potential claim under the wrongful death act, [6] in the interest of justice we will consider the issue. *576 The trial judge did not err by granting summary judgment, even considering the complaint to have asserted a wrongful death claim, because even though such a claim did not ripen or "accrue" until plaintiff's wife died, [7] see Duffy v. Ackerhalt, 138 N.J.Super. 119 , 350 A. 2d 283 (App.Div.1975), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 273 , 359 A. 2d 485 (1976), decedent's failure to bring a personal injury action before the statute of limitati

1999However, because paragraph 11 of the complaint asserted a potential claim under the wrongful death act, [6] in the interest of justice we will consider the issue. *576 The trial judge did not err by granting summary judgment, even considering the complaint to have asserted a wrongful death claim, because even though such a claim did not ripen or "accrue" until plaintiff's wife died, [7] see Duffy v. Ackerhalt, 138 N.J.Super. 119 , 350 A. 2d 283 (App.Div.1975), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 273 , 359 A. 2d 485 (1976), decedent's failure to bring a personal injury action before the statute of limitati

1996Thus, the California Supreme Court has held that an uninsurable policyholder should receive the face amount of his or her policies “less the premiums payable during his [or her] life expectancy, each reduced to its value at the time of cancellation.” Caminetti, supra, 142 P.2d at 747 ; accord Commissioner of Ins. v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 314 Mass. 558 , 50 N.E.2d 801, 807-08 (1943) (upholding award to policyholders of full value of disability insurance).

1996Thus, the California Supreme Court has held that an uninsurable policyholder should receive the face amount of his or her policies "less the premiums payable during his [or her] life expectancy, each reduced to its value at the time of cancellation." Caminetti, supra, 142 P. 2d at 747 ; accord Commissioner of Ins. v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 314 Mass. 558 , 50 N.E. 2d 801, 807-08 (1943) (upholding award to policyholders of full value of disability insurance).

1983McGlone v. Corbi, 59 N.J. 86 (1971).

1969The decedent’s personal claim is an asset of his estate; the death claim is not. 2 Although Levy thus noted that the deceased was obligated by statute to support the child, Levy has been read to entitle an illegitimate child to sue his natural father for support, R. v. R., 431 S. W. 2d 152 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1968), and to receive from the father the same measure of support as a legitimate child, Storm v. None, 57 Misc. 2d 342 , 291 N. Y.

1969The decedent’s personal claim is an asset of his estate; the death claim is not. 2 Although Levy thus noted that the deceased was obligated by statute to support the child, Levy has been read to entitle an illegitimate child to sue his natural father for support, R. v. R., 431 S. W. 2d 152 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1968), and to receive from the father the same measure of support as a legitimate child, Storm v. None, 57 Misc. 2d 342 , 291 N. Y.

1962Kotkin v. Caprio, 65 N.J.

1954Again, in Franklin Coal & Coke Co. v. Industrial Commission, 322 Ill. 23 , 152 N.E. 498 ( Sup. Ct. 1926), petitioner Trott and one Beam were fellow employees in a mine.