death claim in New York

2022Regardless of whether claimant is correct in this respect — which we do not decide on this appeal ( see Matter of Murphy v New York State Cts. , 201 AD3d at 1072 n) — no such claim would lie under Workers' Compensation Law article 8-A in any event insofar as decedent did not file the required registration forms during his lifetime ( see Workers' Compensation Law §§ 162 ["In order for the claim of a participant in World Trade Center rescue, recovery and clean-up operations to come within the application of this article, such participant must file a written and sworn statement with the (B)oard o

2020Footnote 2: We also note that, inasmuch as the limited duration of decedent's employment prior to his injury requires that the average weekly wage be calculated based upon the wages of a similarly employed worker ( see Workers' Compensation Law § 14 [2]; Matter of Sacco v Mast Adv./Publ. , 71 AD3d at 1367 ), the Board's finding that the carrier is necessarily prejudiced by its inability to cross-examine decedent due to his passing is misplaced as well as speculative.

2020Footnotes Footnote 1: Although claimant also appeals the denial of her application for Board review in the death claim, claimant has failed to raise any issue with respect to the denial in her brief and, accordingly, we deem that portion of her appeal to have been abandoned ( see Matter of Jones v Gardner Motors , 45 AD3d 1125 , 1125 n [2007]; Matter of Stromski v Jefferson Auto Body , 1 AD3d 643, 644 [2003]).

2008Co., 227 AD2d 216 [1996]).

2003Thus, on the death claim, when the medical evidence failed to support a finding that decedent suffered from a dust disease, the Board properly ascertained the liable employer and carrier pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 44 rather than section 44-a (see Matter of Matice v Groveton Papers Co., 85 AD2d 841 , 842-843 [1981], lv denied 57 NY2d 601 [1982]).

2001Utilization of a death benefit provision in a partnership agreement is an acceptable method of valuation of an interest in a law partnership (see, Harmon v Harmon, 173 AD2d 98, 106 ), but “[t]he valuation of a marital asset, particularly an intangible asset such as an interest in a professional partnership, must be founded in economic reality” (id., at 107).

2000This conversation allegedly occurred before summation and allegedly consisted of “unduly prejudicial information” which infiltrated jury deliberations and prejudiced the plaintiff at trial (see, People v De Lucia, 20 NY2d 275, 279 ; People v Loliscio, 187 AD2d 172, 179 ).

2000This conversation allegedly occurred before summation and allegedly consisted of “unduly prejudicial information” which infiltrated jury deliberations and prejudiced the plaintiff at trial (see, People v De Lucia, 20 NY2d 275, 279 ; People v Loliscio, 187 AD2d 172, 179 ).

1994Additionally, the defendant cannot claim prejudice as a result of the death of a defense witness, since the death occurred during a delay to which the defendant had consented and immediately after a delay of approximately one year caused by the motion practice of the defendant and his codefendant (see, People v Acevedo, 176 AD2d 1007 ).

1988The Board’s decision must be affirmed since "claims for disability and death benefits are clearly separate and distinct assertions of rights and thus separate claims for reimbursement are required” (Matter of Molina v Wave Crest Motel, 46 AD2d 957, 958 ).

1976True, the mother could have commenced a paternity proceeding during the less than three-month period of pregnancy and during the lifetime of the putative father. * But, because of the father’s death the requirement of an order of filiation during such limited time period as is present here denies to the infant forever fundamental rights "based upon an act or omission of a mother who may be totally lacking in sufficient sophistication to be competent to protect the legal rights of the infants.” (Matter of Johnson, 75 Misc 2d 502, 504 .) Under such circumstances, who then was in a position to pr

1968This distinction was recognized by Mr. Justice Callahan in writing for the court in Joseph v. McVeigh, ( 285 App. Div. 386, 391 , supra): “ Short Statutes of Limitation still prevail as to suits against municipalities upon these claims in most instances.

1965In this circumstance the asserted lien was merely an inchoate or general lien which created no priority as against the statutory lien of the United States (United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 ; Matter of Lincoln Chair & Novelty Co., 274 N. Y. 353 ; United States v. Kings County Iron Works, 224 F. 2d 232 ; Ann. 94 ALR 2d 748 ).

1965In this circumstance the asserted lien was merely an inchoate or general lien which created no priority as against the statutory lien of the United States (United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 ; Matter of Lincoln Chair & Novelty Co., 274 N. Y. 353 ; United States v. Kings County Iron Works, 224 F. 2d 232 ; Ann. 94 ALR 2d 748 ).

1965In this circumstance the asserted lien was merely an inchoate or general lien which created no priority as against the statutory lien of the United States (United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 ; Matter of Lincoln Chair & Novelty Co., 274 N. Y. 353 ; United States v. Kings County Iron Works, 224 F. 2d 232 ; Ann. 94 ALR 2d 748 ).

1959(Mulligan v. City of New York, 273 App. Div. 152 .) Settle order on notice at Chambers, Middletown, N. Y.

1959The law does not require such positiveness, especially in workmen’s compensation cases. '* * * This is especially true when dealing with a rather uncommon disease, when some caution on the part of a doctor is commendable, and where, as here, the opinion is fortified by detailed explanation and other facts in the record which add to its reasonableness and probable correctness. ’ ’ (Matter of Zaepfel v. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 284 App. Div. 693, 695-696 , affd. 309 N. Y. 962 .) In our view, it would work an unnecessary hardship upon all the litigants to remit this death claim, now nearly nine

1959The law does not require such positiveness, especially in workmen’s compensation cases. '* * * This is especially true when dealing with a rather uncommon disease, when some caution on the part of a doctor is commendable, and where, as here, the opinion is fortified by detailed explanation and other facts in the record which add to its reasonableness and probable correctness. ’ ’ (Matter of Zaepfel v. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 284 App. Div. 693, 695-696 , affd. 309 N. Y. 962 .) In our view, it would work an unnecessary hardship upon all the litigants to remit this death claim, now nearly nine

1954The majority in the Appellate Division wrote a brief memo which, citing Crapo v. City of Syracuse ( 183 N. Y. 395 ) and Matter of Mulligan v. County of Westchester ( 272 App. Div. 927 ), later to be discussed herein, said that the notice of claim filed by Mary Winbush was a nullity insofar as it attempted to cover the death claim of Viola Win-bush, since, at the time of its filing, there was no administratrix of Viola Winbush.

1954The dissenting Justices in the Appellate Division thought that, while only an administrator or executor can bring a wrongful death action, anyone, whether technically authorized or not, can validly file a notice of claim (citing Matter of Figueroa v. City of New York, 279 App. Div. 771 ), and that, in permitting the amendment in both its phases, Special Term did not abuse its discretion (citing Matter of Charlemagne v. City of New York, 277 App. Div. 689 , affd. 302 N. Y. 871 ).

1954No rights had accrued on the death claim until the death occurred.” (Matter of Jankowski v. American Magnesium Gorp., 283 App. Div. 840, 841 .) The employer’s liability rested wholly upon the new statute and the liability for the funeral bill was part of the death benefits payable under that statute.

1954The dissenting Justices in the Appellate Division thought that, while only an administrator or executor can bring a wrongful death action, anyone, whether technically authorized or not, can validly file a notice of claim (citing Matter of Figueroa v. City of New York, 279 App. Div. 771 ), and that, in permitting the amendment in both its phases, Special Term did not abuse its discretion (citing Matter of Charlemagne v. City of New York, 277 App. Div. 689 , affd. 302 N. Y. 871 ).

1954(Cf. Matter of Kunst v. General Brome Gorp., 264 App. Div. 494 , affd. 289 H.