death claim in Kansas

1937In the opinion this court said: “Conceding the correctness of the general rule and that the evidence of Doctor Miller was a disclosure of professional communications from his patient and of knowledge of his patient obtained in a professional way, and therefore privileged, it has been held in this state that not only may the patient himself waive this privilege (Armstrong v. Street Railway Co., 93 Kan. 493 , 144 Pac. 847 ), but after the patient’s death the privilege may be waived by his heirs at law (Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. 237 , syl. ¶ 6, 116 Pac. 898 ).

1937In the opinion this court said: “Conceding the correctness of the general rule and that the evidence of Doctor Miller was a disclosure of professional communications from his patient and of knowledge of his patient obtained in a professional way, and therefore privileged, it has been held in this state that not only may the patient himself waive this privilege (Armstrong v. Street Railway Co., 93 Kan. 493 , 144 Pac. 847 ), but after the patient’s death the privilege may be waived by his heirs at law (Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. 237 , syl. ¶ 6, 116 Pac. 898 ).

1937In the opinion this court said: “Conceding the correctness of the general rule and that the evidence of Doctor Miller was a disclosure of professional communications from his patient and of knowledge of his patient obtained in a professional way, and therefore privileged, it has been held in this state that not only may the patient himself waive this privilege (Armstrong v. Street Railway Co., 93 Kan. 493 , 144 Pac. 847 ), but after the patient’s death the privilege may be waived by his heirs at law (Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. 237 , syl. ¶ 6, 116 Pac. 898 ).

1937In the opinion this court said: “Conceding the correctness of the general rule and that the evidence of Doctor Miller was a disclosure of professional communications from his patient and of knowledge of his patient obtained in a professional way, and therefore privileged, it has been held in this state that not only may the patient himself waive this privilege (Armstrong v. Street Railway Co., 93 Kan. 493 , 144 Pac. 847 ), but after the patient’s death the privilege may be waived by his heirs at law (Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. 237 , syl. ¶ 6, 116 Pac. 898 ).

2002This court has stated that “a defendant will be found not responsible for the death which occurs during the commission of a felony only if an extraordinary intervening event supersedes the defendant’s act and becomes the sole legal cause of death.” State v. Lamae, 268 Kan. 544, 555 , 998 P.2d 106 (2000).

2002This court has stated that “a defendant will be found not responsible for the death which occurs during the commission of a felony only if an extraordinary intervening event supersedes the defendant’s act and becomes the sole legal cause of death.” State v. Lamae, 268 Kan. 544, 555 , 998 P.2d 106 (2000).

2001The Hulsey court stated: “Following the logic of the Ninth Circuit, the death presumption and burden shifting claims may be collapsed into one inquiry: whether the weighing equation as drawn ‘offends federal due process by effectively mandating death.’ The Court concludes that under the Arkansas statute under which petitioner was sentenced, it does.” 868 F. Supp. at 1103 .

2001The Hulsey court stated: "Following the logic of the Ninth Circuit, the death presumption and burden shifting claims may be collapsed into one inquiry: whether the weighing equation as drawn `offends federal due process by effectively mandating death.' The Court concludes that under the Arkansas statute under which petitioner was sentenced, it does." 868 F. Supp. at 1103 .

1947In the next place in Geisler v. Mutual Benefit H. & A. Ass’n, 159 Kan. 452, 454 , 155 P 2d 435 , we said “This assignment covers only payments which would have been payable to the insured during his lifetime. . . .” Finally, we find nothing in the record to sustain a conclusion the parties interpreted the contract as requiring notice to anyone in the event of a death claim.

1947In the next place in Geisler v. Mutual Benefit H. & A. Ass’n, 159 Kan. 452, 454 , 155 P 2d 435 , we said “This assignment covers only payments which would have been payable to the insured during his lifetime. . . .” Finally, we find nothing in the record to sustain a conclusion the parties interpreted the contract as requiring notice to anyone in the event of a death claim.

1944Judgment was rendered for claimant in the district court March 10, 1944, for $4,000 on account of the death claim, and an additional sum of $150 on account of burial and funeral expenses, “and interest on both of said amounts at the rate of'six percent per annum from February 27, 1943, and for the costs of this action.” Appellants complain of the part of this judgment allowing interest on the award, citing Richardson v. National Refining Co., 137 Kan. 473 , 21 P. 2d 307 , and Woods v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 141 Kan. 363 , 41 P. 2d 748 .

1944Judgment was rendered for claimant in the district court March 10, 1944, for $4,000 on account of the death claim, and an additional sum of $150 on account of burial and funeral expenses, “and interest on both of said amounts at the rate of'six percent per annum from February 27, 1943, and for the costs of this action.” Appellants complain of the part of this judgment allowing interest on the award, citing Richardson v. National Refining Co., 137 Kan. 473 , 21 P. 2d 307 , and Woods v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 141 Kan. 363 , 41 P. 2d 748 .

1944Judgment was rendered for claimant in the district court March 10, 1944, for $4,000 on account of the death claim, and an additional sum of $150 on account of burial and funeral expenses, “and interest on both of said amounts at the rate of'six percent per annum from February 27, 1943, and for the costs of this action.” Appellants complain of the part of this judgment allowing interest on the award, citing Richardson v. National Refining Co., 137 Kan. 473 , 21 P. 2d 307 , and Woods v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 141 Kan. 363 , 41 P. 2d 748 .

1944Judgment was rendered for claimant in the district court March 10, 1944, for $4,000 on account of the death claim, and an additional sum of $150 on account of burial and funeral expenses, “and interest on both of said amounts at the rate of'six percent per annum from February 27, 1943, and for the costs of this action.” Appellants complain of the part of this judgment allowing interest on the award, citing Richardson v. National Refining Co., 137 Kan. 473 , 21 P. 2d 307 , and Woods v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 141 Kan. 363 , 41 P. 2d 748 .

1914(Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kan. 484, 493 , 70 Pac. 369 ; Nickel v. Vogel, 76 Kan. 625 , 92 Pac. 1105 ; Ekblad, Adm’r, v. Hanson, 85 Kan. 541, 543 , 117 Pac. 1028 .) For the purpose of the appointment of an administrator for the prosecution of a death claim, the personal property left by the deceased may be merely nominal.

1914(Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kan. 484, 493 , 70 Pac. 369 ; Nickel v. Vogel, 76 Kan. 625 , 92 Pac. 1105 ; Ekblad, Adm’r, v. Hanson, 85 Kan. 541, 543 , 117 Pac. 1028 .) For the purpose of the appointment of an administrator for the prosecution of a death claim, the personal property left by the deceased may be merely nominal.

1914(Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kan. 484, 493 , 70 Pac. 369 ; Nickel v. Vogel, 76 Kan. 625 , 92 Pac. 1105 ; Ekblad, Adm’r, v. Hanson, 85 Kan. 541, 543 , 117 Pac. 1028 .) For the purpose of the appointment of an administrator for the prosecution of a death claim, the personal property left by the deceased may be merely nominal.

1914(Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kan. 484, 493 , 70 Pac. 369 ; Nickel v. Vogel, 76 Kan. 625 , 92 Pac. 1105 ; Ekblad, Adm’r, v. Hanson, 85 Kan. 541, 543 , 117 Pac. 1028 .) For the purpose of the appointment of an administrator for the prosecution of a death claim, the personal property left by the deceased may be merely nominal.

1914(Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kan. 484, 493 , 70 Pac. 369 ; Nickel v. Vogel, 76 Kan. 625 , 92 Pac. 1105 ; Ekblad, Adm’r, v. Hanson, 85 Kan. 541, 543 , 117 Pac. 1028 .) For the purpose of the appointment of an administrator for the prosecution of a death claim, the personal property left by the deceased may be merely nominal.

1914(Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kan. 484, 493 , 70 Pac. 369 ; Nickel v. Vogel, 76 Kan. 625 , 92 Pac. 1105 ; Ekblad, Adm’r, v. Hanson, 85 Kan. 541, 543 , 117 Pac. 1028 .) For the purpose of the appointment of an administrator for the prosecution of a death claim, the personal property left by the deceased may be merely nominal.

1914(Cox, Adm’r, v. Kansas City, 86 Kan. 298 , 120 Pac. 553 , and cases cited.) The claim for damages for causing the death of a person under section 419 of the civil code is not an estate of the deceased to be administered within this state.

1914(Cox, Adm’r, v. Kansas City, 86 Kan. 298 , 120 Pac. 553 , and cases cited.) The claim for damages for causing the death of a person under section 419 of the civil code is not an estate of the deceased to be administered within this state.