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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1902–1995 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hull v. Adamsgreen1 sentence1953Thus in Hull v. Adams, 399 Ill. 347, 352, 356 , it is said: “But, as pointed out in all of the cases above cited, a devise to the testator’s heirs will not be construed as meaning a devise to those who are his heirs at the time of his death, although such construction would be prima facie correct, if it appears from the will, construed as a whole and with reference to all its provisions, that the testator used the words in an artificial sense as referring to those persons who would have been his heirs had he lived until some future time or until the happening of some subsequent event. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
De Los Reyes v. Travelers Insurance Companies
green
2 sentences1995The function of the court in construing an insurance policy is to ascertain and enforce the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement, and the construction given the policy should be a natural and reasonable one. (de los Reyes v. Travelers Insurance Cos. (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 353, 358 , 553 N.E.2d 301, 304 .) If we examine what the insured expected to receive in this case — death claim coverage and an enforceable antistacking provision — with what the insurer provided — no death claim coverage — we cannot conclude that the insured is harmed where (1) death claim coverage is implied 1995The function of the court in construing an insurance policy is to ascertain and enforce the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement, and the construction given the policy should be a natural and reasonable one. (de los Reyes v. Travelers Insurance Cos. (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 353, 358 , 553 N.E.2d 301, 304 .) If we examine what the insured expected to receive in this case — death claim coverage and an enforceable antistacking provision — with what the insurer provided — no death claim coverage — we cannot conclude that the insured is harmed where (1) death claim coverage is implied | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Goodson v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence1992In Goodson v. Industrial Comm’n (1989), 190 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Bryntesen v. Carroll Construction Co.
neutral
1 sentence1990App. 2d 167 , 184 N.E.2d 129 , aff’d (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 566 , 190 N.E.2d 315 .) A death claim under the Act can only be maintained by the widow and children in their individual capacities. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Gramse v. Royal Crest Enterprises, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1990(Gramse, 100 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Bryntesen v. Carroll Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1990App. 2d 167 , 184 N.E.2d 129 , aff’d (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 566 , 190 N.E.2d 315 .) A death claim under the Act can only be maintained by the widow and children in their individual capacities. 1990App. 2d 167 , 184 N.E.2d 129 , aff’d (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 566 , 190 N.E.2d 315 .) A death claim under the Act can only be maintained by the widow and children in their individual capacities. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Repinski v. Jubilee Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1986App. 3d 15, 25-26 , 405 N.E.2d 1383, 1391 .) The fact that eight months passed between the original injury and the death here does not rule out any connection between the original injury and the subsequent death of decedent. 1986(See Repinski v. Jubilee Oil Co. (1980), 85 Ill. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Geiger v. Geer
green
1 sentence1953(Geiger v. Geer, 395 Ill. 367 .) In each of the above cases relied upon by appellant the term “heirs” was held to mean “heirs” at the time of the testator’s death but the rule is consistently recognized that where the intention of the testator to refer to those who would have been his heirs had he died at a subsequent time is clearly manifest by the language used in the will, such intention will be given effect. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Estate of Mallory v. Burlington & Missouri River Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1937River Co., 53 Kan. 557 , 36 Pac. 1059 , that letters of administration were invalid when the apparent purpose for which they were issued was to enable the administrator to bring an action for the wrongful death of his nonresident intestate who left no property in that State. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Cox v. City of Kansas City
green
1 sentence1937The court, in passing upon the question of the right to revoke such letters of administration, used this language: “It is true, exclusive of the claim against the Company they were not of great value, but that is wholly an immaterial consideration so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned.” The Kansas Supreme Court in the case of Cox v. Kansas City, 86 Kan. 298 , 120 Pac. 553 , sustained a grant of letters of administration upon the estate of a nonresident decedent where it was obvious that the primary purpose of the appointment was to provide a plaintiff for the prosecution of a dea | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Wilson v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1937The court, in passing upon the question of the right to revoke such letters of administration, used this language: “It is true, exclusive of the claim against the Company they were not of great value, but that is wholly an immaterial consideration so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned.” The Kansas Supreme Court in the case of Cox v. Kansas City, 86 Kan. 298 , 120 Pac. 553 , sustained a grant of letters of administration upon the estate of a nonresident decedent where it was obvious that the primary purpose of the appointment was to provide a plaintiff for the prosecution of a dea | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Taylor v. Pegram
green
1 sentence1921(Taylor v. Pegram, 151 Ill. 106 ; Stetson v. Stetson, 200 id. 601; St. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
People ex rel. Keefe v. Women's Catholic Order of Foresters
green
1 sentence1902People v. Order of Foresters, 162 Ill. 78 -83, and cases cited; Stephenson v. Ins. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.