death claim in Pennsylvania

1965Co., 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 465 , 36 A. 2d 252 (1944), which held, in disallowing a death claim, that: “Appellant seeks to avoid the bar of the statute on the ground that her petition was but an amendment to her first petition, filed within the statutory period.

1965Co., 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 465 , 36 A. 2d 252 (1944), which held, in disallowing a death claim, that: “Appellant seeks to avoid the bar of the statute on the ground that her petition was but an amendment to her first petition, filed within the statutory period.

1951Whether the release given upon settlement of the death claim relinquishes any rights to recover for accidental death, carrying with it double indemnity, depends upon the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the execution of the release. ‘The law is, that the words used in a release ought never to be extended beyond the consideration; otherwise it would make a release to the parties, what they never intended or contemplated’: Rapp v. Rapp, 6 Pa. 45 , at page 51.

1936“The law is, that the words used in a release ought never to *299 be extended beyond the consideration; otherwise it would make a release to the parties, what they never intended or contemplated”: Rapp v. Rapp, 6 Pa. 45 , at page 51.

2000Sporio, 553 Pa. at 49 , 717 A.2d at 528 .

2000Sporio, 553 Pa. at 49 , 717 A.2d at 528 .

1981In Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Chobanian, 19 Pa.Cmwlth. 632 , 339 A.2d 126 (1975), the Commonwealth Court, in construing a similar statute, 9 held that the sixteen month limitation period for the filing of a death claim under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, runs from the date of death, not from the date when the claimant knew that the death resulted from an occupational disease.

1981In Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Chobanian, 19 Pa.Cmwlth. 632 , 339 A.2d 126 (1975), the Commonwealth Court, in construing a similar statute, 9 held that the sixteen month limitation period for the filing of a death claim under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, runs from the date of death, not from the date when the claimant knew that the death resulted from an occupational disease.

1972The appellant has presented a very persuasive argument, and it is impossible not to be sympathetic with her plight, but this Court, in Swerden v. Lycoming Construction Company and Travelers Insurance Company, Insurance Carrier, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 534 , 284 A. 2d 854 (1971), has recently been confronted with this exact issue and has chosen to uphold Meyers, supra. In Toffalori, supra, it was held that the death claim was for a continuation of the occupational disease compensation payments which had already been awarded for total disability, and that the death was not the basis for the award

1972The appellant has presented a very persuasive argument, and it is impossible not to be sympathetic with her plight, but this Court, in Swerden v. Lycoming Construction Company and Travelers Insurance Company, Insurance Carrier, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 534 , 284 A. 2d 854 (1971), has recently been confronted with this exact issue and has chosen to uphold Meyers, supra. In Toffalori, supra, it was held that the death claim was for a continuation of the occupational disease compensation payments which had already been awarded for total disability, and that the death was not the basis for the award

1965Shrum v. Atlantic Crushed Coke Co., 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 377 , 142 A. 2d 792 (1958).

1965Shrum v. Atlantic Crushed Coke Co., 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 377 , 142 A. 2d 792 (1958).

1965“Strictness of pleading however in Workmen’s Compensation cases is not to be required.” Fehr v. Y.M.C.A., 201 Pa. Superior Ct. 107 , 192 A. 2d 143 (1963).

1965Guy v. Stoecklin Baking Co., 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 38, 47 , 1 A. 2d 839 (1938).” We do not have to treat the problem presented in this case as an' attempt by amendment to substitute a new cause of action as we prohibited in the Jones case, supra. Here we can treat the petition to amend as the filing of a death claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

1965Guy v. Stoecklin Baking Co., 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 38, 47 , 1 A. 2d 839 (1938).” We do not have to treat the problem presented in this case as an' attempt by amendment to substitute a new cause of action as we prohibited in the Jones case, supra. Here we can treat the petition to amend as the filing of a death claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

1938The question raised in these appeals is ruled by the case of Poles v. State Mutual Benefit Society, 129 Pa. Superior Ct. 297 , 195 A. 429 .

1938The question raised in these appeals is ruled by the case of Poles v. State Mutual Benefit Society, 129 Pa. Superior Ct. 297 , 195 A. 429 .

1938The same confusion is found in the arguments made in this case, although special emphasis is placed upon the principle described as “res adjudicata.” We think it clear that the award in the disability case was not res adjudicata in the death claim, for there is not here identity of the persons or parties to the action or identity of the thing sued for: Bucks v. American Cigar Box Lumber Co., 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 193 , 170 A. 373 .

1938The same confusion is found in the arguments made in this case, although special emphasis is placed upon the principle described as “res adjudicata.” We think it clear that the award in the disability case was not res adjudicata in the death claim, for there is not here identity of the persons or parties to the action or identity of the thing sued for: Bucks v. American Cigar Box Lumber Co., 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 193 , 170 A. 373 .