entrapment instruction in Arkansas

2019The court held that a defendant “is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime.” Smoak v. State, 2011 Ark. 529, at 10 , 385 S.W.3d 257, 263 . 6 Because the circuit court committed an error of law in ruling that Mr. Gray was required to choose between the defenses of general denial and justification, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

2019The court held that a defendant “is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime.” Smoak v. State, 2011 Ark. 529, at 10 , 385 S.W.3d 257, 263 . 6 Because the circuit court committed an error of law in ruling that Mr. Gray was required to choose between the defenses of general denial and justification, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

2017Owens reasons that the evidence of whether payment was received is not relevant under Rule 401 because “when the defense of entrapment is invoked, it is necessarily assumed that the act charged was committed,” and “the only relevant issue in the case was whether or not entrapment had occurred.” He cites Young v. State, 308 Ark. 647 , 826 S.W.2d 814 , but Young was abrogated in 2011 by Smoak v. State, 2011 Ark. 529 , 385 S.W.3d 257 , which concluded that a defendant could, in fact, assert the entrapment defense even if he denies one or more elements of the crime.

2017Owens reasons that the evidence of whether payment was received is not relevant under Rule 401 because “when the defense of entrapment is invoked, it is necessarily assumed that the act charged was committed,” and “the only relevant issue in the case was whether or not entrapment had occurred.” He cites Young v. State, 308 Ark. 647 , 826 S.W.2d 814 , but Young was abrogated in 2011 by Smoak v. State, 2011 Ark. 529 , 385 S.W.3d 257 , which concluded that a defendant could, in fact, assert the entrapment defense even if he denies one or more elements of the crime.

1994It has been stated, however, that "due process outlaws only outrageous behavior, which is not merely distasteful but so fundamentally unfair as to be unconstitutional." U.S. v. Swanger, 679 F. Supp. 542 , 551 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (citations omitted).

1991In Morris v. State, 300 Ark. 340 , 779 S.W.2d 526 (1989), our supreme court recognized that the federal courts had adopted the rule that, even if a defendant denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment.

1991In Morris v. State, 300 Ark. 340 , 779 S.W.2d 526 (1989), our supreme court recognized that the federal courts had adopted the rule that, even if a defendant denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment.

1989The United States Supreme Court discussed the function of the entrapment defense in Sherman v. United States, supra: In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , this Court firmly recognized the defense of entrapment in the federal courts.

1987While we agree that the trial court is not required to give requested instructions where sufficiently covered by other instructions given, Cobb v. State, 265 Ark. 527 , 579 S.W.2d 612 (1979), we find basic differences between the entrapment instruction and the duress instruction.

1987While we agree that the trial court is not required to give requested instructions where sufficiently covered by other instructions given, Cobb v. State, 265 Ark. 527 , 579 S.W.2d 612 (1979), we find basic differences between the entrapment instruction and the duress instruction.

1987In Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512 , 487 S.W.2d 624 (1972) the supreme court held that even if an instruction could be said to have covered the matter in a general way, it is reversible error to refuse to give a specific instruction correctly and clearly applying the law to the facts of the case, unless no prejudice resulted.

1987In Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512 , 487 S.W.2d 624 (1972) the supreme court held that even if an instruction could be said to have covered the matter in a general way, it is reversible error to refuse to give a specific instruction correctly and clearly applying the law to the facts of the case, unless no prejudice resulted.

1980In Derrick v. State, 259 Ark. 316 , 532 S.W. 2d 431 (1976), the appellant claimed he had been unable to assert an entrapment defense because the court had refused his severance motion.

1980In Derrick v. State, 259 Ark. 316 , 532 S.W. 2d 431 (1976), the appellant claimed he had been unable to assert an entrapment defense because the court had refused his severance motion.