entrapment defense in Utah

2026“Entrapment is established as a matter of law when an entrapment defense—asserting the offense 20230563-CA 24 2026 UT App 96 State v. Kent was impermissibly induced—is sure to leave all reasonable minds reasonably doubting whether the commission of the offense was the product of a defendant’s inclination.” Hernandez, 2020 UT App 58, ¶ 6 .

2022See State v. Hatchett, 2020 UT App 61, ¶ 10 , 462 P.3d 1288 (“Only when reasonable minds could not differ can [the court] find entrapment as a matter of law.” (quotation simplified)); see also State v. Hernandez, 2020 UT App 58, ¶ 6 , 462 P.3d 1283 (stating that motions to dismiss criminal cases on entrapment grounds should be granted only where “an entrapment defense . . . is sure to leave all reasonable minds reasonably doubting whether the commission of the offense was the product of a defendant’s inclination”).

2025See Dickerson, 2022 UT App 56, ¶ 34 (stating that “whether the defendant actively pursues the commission of the crime despite opportunities to withdraw” is “highly relevant” to the entrapment inquiry). ¶26 All this evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict.

2022A jury finding that the defendant did not commit the offense would simply obviate the need to reach the entrapment defense. 20191052-CA 30 2022 UT App 56 State v. Dickerson Dickerson would be entitled to acquittal, not because he was entrapped, but because he did not act with the requisite mental state and is therefore factually innocent of the charged crimes.

2022See State v. Hatchett, 2020 UT App 61, ¶ 10 , 462 P.3d 1288 (“Only when reasonable minds could not differ can [the court] find entrapment as a matter of law.” (quotation simplified)); see also State v. Hernandez, 2020 UT App 58, ¶ 6 , 462 P.3d 1283 (stating that motions to dismiss criminal cases on entrapment grounds should be granted only where “an entrapment defense . . . is sure to leave all reasonable minds reasonably doubting whether the commission of the offense was the product of a defendant’s inclination”).

2022See State v. Hatchett, 2020 UT App 61, ¶ 10 , 462 P.3d 1288 (“Only when reasonable minds could not differ can [the court] find entrapment as a matter of law.” (quotation simplified)); see also State v. Hernandez, 2020 UT App 58, ¶ 6 , 462 P.3d 1283 (stating that motions to dismiss criminal cases on entrapment grounds should be granted only where “an entrapment defense . . . is sure to leave all reasonable minds reasonably doubting whether the commission of the offense was the product of a defendant’s inclination”).

2022See State v. Torres, 2000 UT 100 , ¶ 7 n.1, 16 P.3d 1242 (noting that the statute “has not been substantially altered since its enactment in 1973”).

2022See State v. Torres, 2000 UT 100 , ¶ 7 n.1, 16 P.3d 1242 (noting that the statute “has not been substantially altered since its enactment in 1973”).

2025When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed that Agent’s conduct did not 20230969-CA 14 2025 UT App 92 State v. Buranek “include[] persuasion or inducement which would be effective to persuade an average person” to entice Cassidy to have sex, Smith, 2024 UT 13, ¶ 36 (quotation simplified)—rather, the evidence showed that Agent “merely afford[ed]” Buranek an “opportunity to commit [the] offense,” Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1).

2024She __________________________________________________________ 77 Emily also clarified that she would “rather get cash” than accept a ride from Smith. 78 Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503 (emphasis added). 79 Smith compares “dangl[ing] connection in front of a lonely person” to “dangling bread in front of a starving person.” The State counters that “[t]he next person who dies of starvation from lack of sex will be the first.” 80 One detective testified at the entrapment hearing that “the vast majority” of people he contacts through the Emily persona will end the conversation immediately once they are to

2026But “if reasonable minds could differ on whether or not entrapment occurred, the court must deny the motion and allow the issue of entrapment to go to the jury.” Qayum, 2025 UT App 178, ¶ 32 (cleaned up). ¶60 Cases in which entrapment can be established as a matter of law are relatively rare, and historically they have fallen into “two types of cases.” See Dickerson I, 2022 UT App 56, ¶ 37 .

2026But “as regards sexual crimes, the attractiveness of the putative victim should not be viewed as a material factor in an entrapment analysis.” Qayum, 2025 UT App 178 , ¶ 42 n.6 (cleaned up).

2025We agree with the State that any discussion in Utah caselaw about the use of an attractive agent being a factor that could contribute to an entrapment finding has been limited to non-sexual crimes, see, e.g., State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 , 467–68 (Utah 1987), and that as regards sexual crimes, the attractiveness of the putative victim should not be viewed as a material factor in an entrapment analysis.

2020See State v. Torres, 2000 UT 100, ¶ 8 , 16 P.3d 1242 (“To prove the defense of entrapment, the evidence must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .” (cleaned up)); State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1987) (observing that an objective standard prompts entrapment as a matter of law when “offenses committed were not the product of defendant’s initiative or desire, but were induced by the conduct of the undercover officer”); State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975) (“[T]he only requirement on the defense of entrapment is that it be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt tha

2020See id. at 503 (“There is no provision or phraseology in [section] 76­2­303(1) which can be rationally construed as providing a ‘predisposition’ or ‘innocence’ requirement to constitute an entrapment defense.

1992In support of his argument, defendant cites State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), in which the supreme court interpreted the entrapment defense statute.

2026To prevail on a claim 20221006-CA 5 2026 UT App 60 State v. Slater of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, demonstrating both that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2025Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial.38 Like the Pretrial Justification Statute, the entrapment statute allows a defendant to file a motion asserting an affirmative defense, after which the court holds an evidentiary hearing to decide whether the defense applies.39 But unlike the Pretrial Justification Statute, the entrapment statute does not lay the burden of proof on either party or mention a “prima fa

2022The contrary view “would espouse the notion that when dealing with the criminal classes anything goes.” See id. (cleaned up). ¶28 In short, adoption of the objective standard eliminated any “‘predisposition’ or ‘innocence’ requirement to constitute an entrapment defense.” Id. at 503 . “[I]f the police conduct would create a substantial risk that a normal law-abiding person would be induced to commit a crime, entrapment has occurred regardless of the predisposition of the defendant.” State v. LaVesseur, 854 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (cleaned up). was predisposed to distribute a contr

2020See State v. Torres, 2000 UT 100, ¶ 8 , 16 P.3d 1242 (“To prove the defense of entrapment, the evidence must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .” (cleaned up)); State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1987) (observing that an objective standard prompts entrapment as a matter of law when “offenses committed were not the product of defendant’s initiative or desire, but were induced by the conduct of the undercover officer”); State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975) (“[T]he only requirement on the defense of entrapment is that it be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt tha

2020See State v. Torres, 2000 UT 100, ¶ 8 , 16 P.3d 1242 (“To prove the defense of entrapment, the evidence must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .” (cleaned up)); State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1987) (observing that an objective standard prompts entrapment as a matter of law when “offenses committed were not the product of defendant’s initiative or desire, but were induced by the conduct of the undercover officer”); State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975) (“[T]he only requirement on the defense of entrapment is that it be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt tha

2020See State v. Torres, 2000 UT 100, ¶ 8 , 16 P.3d 1242 (“To prove the defense of entrapment, the evidence must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .” (cleaned up)); State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1987) (observing that an objective standard prompts entrapment as a matter of law when “offenses committed were not the product of defendant’s initiative or desire, but were induced by the conduct of the undercover officer”); State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975) (“[T]he only requirement on the defense of entrapment is that it be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt tha

2019See Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86 , 107, 131 S.Ct. 770 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) ("Counsel was entitled to formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time and to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies.").

2019See Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86 , 107, 131 S.Ct. 770 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) ("Counsel was entitled to formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time and to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies.").

2015See State v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d 410 , 490 P.2d 890, 892 (1971) (concluding that failing to give an entrapment instruction was harmless error); State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (holding that the failure to instruct the jury on a defense of implied consent in an unlawful control of a vehicle was harmless error). 68 .

2015See State v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d 410 , 490 P.2d 890, 892 (1971) (concluding that failing to give an entrapment instruction was harmless error); State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (holding that the failure to instruct the jury on a defense of implied consent in an unlawful control of a vehicle was harmless error). 68 .

2015See State v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d 410 , 490 P.2d 890, 892 (1971) (concluding that failing to give an entrapment instruction was harmless error); State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (holding that the failure to instruct the jury on a defense of implied consent in an unlawful control of a vehicle was harmless error). 68 .

1993Id. at 520 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

1992BACKGROUND “Because an entrapment defense is highly factual in nature, we review the facts in detail.” State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 316 (Utah App.1987).

1992BACKGROUND "Because an entrapment defense is highly factual in nature, we review the facts in detail." State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 316 (Utah App.1987).