9 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Simmons v. Stategreen2 sentences1975We noted in Simmons, supra, on that very subject that: “In our jurisdiction, where the jury are the-judge of the law as well as the facts, we think that both questions pertaining to the issue of entrapment must be for the jury.” Simmons, 8 Md. 1975We noted in Simmons, supra, on that very subject that: “In our jurisdiction, where the jury are the-judge of the law as well as the facts, we think that both questions pertaining to the issue of entrapment must be for the jury.” Simmons, 8 Md. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Dean A. Evans and Eric K. Johnsongreen2 sentences2010Why did appellant respond to the “phone call?” What was it about that call or the caller that “ ‘blind[ed him] to his legal dutiest?]’ ” Sparks, 91 Md.App. at 86 , 603 A.2d 1258 (quoting United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir.1991)). 1992The most articulate statement of both the “what” and the “why” of this “lack of predisposition” aspect of the burden of production is that by Judge Richard Posner in United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714 (7th Cir.1991). | 1 | 2 |
Berlin v. Stategreen2 sentences1992In Berlin v. State, 12 Md.App. 48 , 277 A.2d 468 (1971), we ruled that in rebutting the entrapment defense the State was entitled to offer evidence of subsequent sales of controlled drugs. 1992In Berlin v. State, 12 Md.App. 48 , 277 A.2d 468 (1971), we ruled that in rebutting the entrapment defense the State was entitled to offer evidence of subsequent sales of controlled drugs. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Keith Edwin McGuiregreen2 sentences2011The State may also anticipate a defense that is not generated by the elements and present evidence to meet it in its case-in-chief, but only when the “defense is clearly raised in the defense’s opening statement and [the defense] obviously materializes through a defendant’s presentation of its own witnesses or through cross-examination of the government’s witnesses,” United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir.1992) (entrapment); see United States v. McGuire, 808 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir.1987) (finding that it was error for the district court to allow the government to introduce reb 2011The State may also anticipate a defense that is not generated by the elements and present evidence to meet it in its case-in-chief, but only when the "defense is clearly raised in the defense's opening statement and [the defense] obviously materializes through a defendant's presentation of its own witnesses or through cross-examination of the government's witnesses," United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir.1992) (entrapment); see United States v. McGuire, 808 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir.1987) (finding that it was error for the district court to allow the government to introduce reb | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael F. Goodapplegreen2 sentences2011The State may also anticipate a defense that is not generated by the elements and present evidence to meet it in its case-in-chief, but only when the “defense is clearly raised in the defense’s opening statement and [the defense] obviously materializes through a defendant’s presentation of its own witnesses or through cross-examination of the government’s witnesses,” United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir.1992) (entrapment); see United States v. McGuire, 808 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir.1987) (finding that it was error for the district court to allow the government to introduce reb 2011The State may also anticipate a defense that is not generated by the elements and present evidence to meet it in its case-in-chief, but only when the "defense is clearly raised in the defense's opening statement and [the defense] obviously materializes through a defendant's presentation of its own witnesses or through cross-examination of the government's witnesses," United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir.1992) (entrapment); see United States v. McGuire, 808 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir.1987) (finding that it was error for the district court to allow the government to introduce reb | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kevin Eric Curtingreen2 sentences2011The State may also anticipate a defense that is not generated by the elements and present evidence to meet it in its case-in-chief, but only when the “defense is clearly raised in the defense’s opening statement and [the defense] obviously materializes through a defendant’s presentation of its own witnesses or through cross-examination of the government’s witnesses,” United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir.1992) (entrapment); see United States v. McGuire, 808 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir.1987) (finding that it was error for the district court to allow the government to introduce reb 2011The State may also anticipate a defense that is not generated by the elements and present evidence to meet it in its case-in-chief, but only when the "defense is clearly raised in the defense's opening statement and [the defense] obviously materializes through a defendant's presentation of its own witnesses or through cross-examination of the government's witnesses," United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir.1992) (entrapment); see United States v. McGuire, 808 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir.1987) (finding that it was error for the district court to allow the government to introduce reb | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. James Adrian Ambrose, Alias Lilly Ambrosegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. James Lloyd McClaingreen | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Board of Trustees of McKendree Collegegreen1 sentence1981See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 , 97 S.Ct. 102 , 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Cantanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.1969); Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.1961); State v. Cox, 110 Ariz. 603 , 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Price v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. App. 1979); State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980). *374 In its brief, the State cites, as persuasive authority, several Fifth Circuit decisions which admitted hearsay evidence of prior criminal history and re | 1 | 1 |
| David v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bowser v. State
green
2 sentences1992He observed, at 50 Md.App. 372 -373, 439 A.2d 1 : “This Court has held evidence of similar criminal acts committed by a defendant admissible to rebut an entrapment defense, even where a defendant has not been convicted of nor even arrested for the other offenses, and even where the similar crimes occurred subsequent to the offense for which the defendant is being tried____ [Generally where a defendant is charged with the sale of narcotics, it is improper for the State to offer evidence of other unrelated sales. 1992Snead v. State, 234 Md. 63, 66 , 197 A.2d 920 (1964) (quoting Stewart v. State, 232 Md. 318 , 193 A.2d 40 ), observed, “The appellant had a past record of narcotics law violations, and thus was not a ‘previously law-abiding citizen.’ ” In Bowser v. State, 50 Md.App. 363, 372 , 439 A.2d 1 (1981), (footnote omitted), we observed, “The State may use various permissible methods to rebut an entrapment claim. | 2 | 1984–1992 |
Sparks v. State
green
2 sentences2010Why did appellant respond to the “phone call?” What was it about that call or the caller that “ ‘blind[ed him] to his legal dutiest?]’ ” Sparks, 91 Md.App. at 86 , 603 A.2d 1258 (quoting United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir.1991)). 2010Why did appellant respond to the “phone call?” What was it about that call or the caller that “ ‘blind[ed him] to his legal dutiest?]’ ” Sparks, 91 Md.App. at 86 , 603 A.2d 1258 (quoting United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir.1991)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Reiger v. State
neutral
1 sentence2009Sentencing Generally, a “sentencing court has ‘virtually boundless discretion’ in imposing a sentence.” Reiger v. State, 170 Md.App. 693, 697 , 908 A.2d 124 (2006), cert. denied, 397 Md. 397 , 918 A.2d 469 (2007). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Reiger v. State
green
2 sentences2009Sentencing Generally, a “sentencing court has ‘virtually boundless discretion’ in imposing a sentence.” Reiger v. State, 170 Md.App. 693, 697 , 908 A.2d 124 (2006), cert. denied, 397 Md. 397 , 918 A.2d 469 (2007). 2009Sentencing Generally, a “sentencing court has ‘virtually boundless discretion’ in imposing a sentence.” Reiger v. State, 170 Md.App. 693, 697 , 908 A.2d 124 (2006), cert. denied, 397 Md. 397 , 918 A.2d 469 (2007). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. DeGina
green
2 sentences2005On appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, the court was presented with two questions, very similar in substance to the ones now before this Court: “[F]irst, was it error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment over defendant’s consistent protestations that he was not advancing an entrapment defense, but was in fact putting forth a different defense, and second — if error — was the error harmless?” DeGina, 72 N.Y.2d at 771 , 537 N.Y.S.2d 8 , 533 N.E.2d at 1038 . 2005On appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, the court was presented with two questions, very similar in substance to the ones now before this Court: “[F]irst, was it error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment over defendant’s consistent protestations that he was not advancing an entrapment defense, but was in fact putting forth a different defense, and second — if error — was the error harmless?” DeGina, 72 N.Y.2d at 771 , 537 N.Y.S.2d 8 , 533 N.E.2d at 1038 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Regle v. State
green
2 sentences1992"It is upon this premise that the authorities all agree that if two persons are charged as conspirators and one is an entrapper, or merely feigns acquiescence in the criminal intent, there is no punishable conspiracy because there was no agreement on the part of the one to engage in a criminal conspiracy.” (citations and footnote omitted). 9 Md.App. at 355 , 264 A.2d 119 . 21 . 1992"It is upon this premise that the authorities all agree that if two persons are charged as conspirators and one is an entrapper, or merely feigns acquiescence in the criminal intent, there is no punishable conspiracy because there was no agreement on the part of the one to engage in a criminal conspiracy.” (citations and footnote omitted). 9 Md.App. at 355 , 264 A.2d 119 . 21 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Snead v. State
green
2 sentences1992Snead v. State, 234 Md. 63, 66 , 197 A.2d 920 (1964) (quoting Stewart v. State, 232 Md. 318 , 193 A.2d 40 ), observed, “The appellant had a past record of narcotics law violations, and thus was not a ‘previously law-abiding citizen.’ ” In Bowser v. State, 50 Md.App. 363, 372 , 439 A.2d 1 (1981), (footnote omitted), we observed, “The State may use various permissible methods to rebut an entrapment claim. 1992Snead v. State, 234 Md. 63, 66 , 197 A.2d 920 (1964) (quoting Stewart v. State, 232 Md. 318 , 193 A.2d 40 ), observed, “The appellant had a past record of narcotics law violations, and thus was not a ‘previously law-abiding citizen.’ ” In Bowser v. State, 50 Md.App. 363, 372 , 439 A.2d 1 (1981), (footnote omitted), we observed, “The State may use various permissible methods to rebut an entrapment claim. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Carlton v. United States
green
1 sentence1992Among the most common, are proof of prior convictions for similar offenses and evidence of similar criminal acts committed by the accused.” See also United States v. Tyson, 470 F.2d 381 (D.C.Cir.1972); Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.1952). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sorrells v. United States
green
2 sentences1992Although pioneered in the state courts, 4 it first achieved high-profile recognition in 1932 with the Supreme Court decision of Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed.2d 413 . 1992Although pioneered in the state courts, 4 it first achieved high-profile recognition in 1932 with the Supreme Court decision of Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed.2d 413 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sherman v. United States
green
2 sentences1992The Supreme Court revisited the subject twenty-six years later in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 , 78 S.Ct. 819 , 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). 1992The Supreme Court revisited the subject twenty-six years later in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 , 78 S.Ct. 819 , 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Osborn v. United States
green
2 sentences1992Entrapment was only a secondary issue in both Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 , 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963) and Osborne v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 , 87 S.Ct. 429 , 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966). 1992Entrapment was only a secondary issue in both Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 , 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963) and Osborne v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 , 87 S.Ct. 429 , 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Lopez v. United States
green
2 sentences1992Entrapment was only a secondary issue in both Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 , 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963) and Osborne v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 , 87 S.Ct. 429 , 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966). 1992Entrapment was only a secondary issue in both Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 , 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963) and Osborne v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 , 87 S.Ct. 429 , 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Oliver Smith
green
1 sentence1992Judge Powers held for this Court, at 12 Md.App. 60 , 277 A.2d 468 : “That such evidence may relate to offenses after as well as before the one on trial was pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Smith, 283 F.2d 760 (1960). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Francis William Groessel
green
1 sentence1992United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.1971), discussed the type of evidence that might suffice for this purpose. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. James L. Tyson
green
1 sentence1992Among the most common, are proof of prior convictions for similar offenses and evidence of similar criminal acts committed by the accused.” See also United States v. Tyson, 470 F.2d 381 (D.C.Cir.1972); Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.1952). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Stewart v. State
green
2 sentences1992Snead v. State, 234 Md. 63, 66 , 197 A.2d 920 (1964) (quoting Stewart v. State, 232 Md. 318 , 193 A.2d 40 ), observed, “The appellant had a past record of narcotics law violations, and thus was not a ‘previously law-abiding citizen.’ ” In Bowser v. State, 50 Md.App. 363, 372 , 439 A.2d 1 (1981), (footnote omitted), we observed, “The State may use various permissible methods to rebut an entrapment claim. 1992Snead v. State, 234 Md. 63, 66 , 197 A.2d 920 (1964) (quoting Stewart v. State, 232 Md. 318 , 193 A.2d 40 ), observed, “The appellant had a past record of narcotics law violations, and thus was not a ‘previously law-abiding citizen.’ ” In Bowser v. State, 50 Md.App. 363, 372 , 439 A.2d 1 (1981), (footnote omitted), we observed, “The State may use various permissible methods to rebut an entrapment claim. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Ferraro v. State
green
2 sentences1992In that first post-Sorrells case to be decided in Maryland, the Court of Appeals recognized the existence of the entrapment defense, pointing out that “This Court has never directly passed upon the defense of entrapment, because the question was not presented by any ruling in the record.” 200 Md. at 279 , 89 A.2d 628 . 1992In that first post-Sorrells case to be decided in Maryland, the Court of Appeals recognized the existence of the entrapment defense, pointing out that “This Court has never directly passed upon the defense of entrapment, because the question was not presented by any ruling in the record.” 200 Md. at 279 , 89 A.2d 628 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Price v. State
green
1 sentence1981See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 , 97 S.Ct. 102 , 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Cantanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.1969); Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.1961); State v. Cox, 110 Ariz. 603 , 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Price v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. App. 1979); State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980). *374 In its brief, the State cites, as persuasive authority, several Fifth Circuit decisions which admitted hearsay evidence of prior criminal history and re | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Cox
green
2 sentences1981See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 , 97 S.Ct. 102 , 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Cantanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.1969); Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.1961); State v. Cox, 110 Ariz. 603 , 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Price v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. App. 1979); State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980). *374 In its brief, the State cites, as persuasive authority, several Fifth Circuit decisions which admitted hearsay evidence of prior criminal history and re 1981See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 , 97 S.Ct. 102 , 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Cantanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.1969); Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.1961); State v. Cox, 110 Ariz. 603 , 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Price v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. App. 1979); State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980). *374 In its brief, the State cites, as persuasive authority, several Fifth Circuit decisions which admitted hearsay evidence of prior criminal history and re | 1 | 1981–1981 |
James Whiting v. United States
green
1 sentence1981See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 , 97 S.Ct. 102 , 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Cantanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.1969); Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.1961); State v. Cox, 110 Ariz. 603 , 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Price v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. App. 1979); State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980). *374 In its brief, the State cites, as persuasive authority, several Fifth Circuit decisions which admitted hearsay evidence of prior criminal history and re | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Gary Charles De Jong v. United States
green
1 sentence1981See United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.1973); DeJong v. United States, 381 F.2d 725 (9th Cir.1967). [11] The Webster majority opinion did indicate a possible exception to the general prohibition and indicated that in "rare circumstances" the government's "good faith, motive, and reasonableness" may assume unusual significance over and above the entrapment defense. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
United States v. Vincent J. Catanzaro
green
1 sentence1981See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 , 97 S.Ct. 102 , 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Cantanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.1969); Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.1961); State v. Cox, 110 Ariz. 603 , 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Price v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. App. 1979); State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980). *374 In its brief, the State cites, as persuasive authority, several Fifth Circuit decisions which admitted hearsay evidence of prior criminal history and re | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Jones
green
1 sentence1981See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 , 97 S.Ct. 102 , 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Cantanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3rd Cir.1969); Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.1961); State v. Cox, 110 Ariz. 603 , 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Price v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. App. 1979); State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980). *374 In its brief, the State cites, as persuasive authority, several Fifth Circuit decisions which admitted hearsay evidence of prior criminal history and re | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Ragland green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.