entrapment doctrine in Connecticut

1977In State v. McNally, 173 Conn. 197 , 377 A.2d 286 , we had recent occasion to discuss the doctrine of entrapment, the statute relating to it, General Statutes § 53&-15, 1 and our decisions on that defense since it was first argued in this court in State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 5 , 89 A.2d 219 .

1977In State v. McNally, 173 Conn. 197 , 377 A.2d 286 , we had recent occasion to discuss the doctrine of entrapment, the statute relating to it, General Statutes § 53&-15, 1 and our decisions on that defense since it was first argued in this court in State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 5 , 89 A.2d 219 .

1999As noted by the respondent, when the entrapment defense is raised, "the state may introduce evidence as to an existing course of similar criminal conduct on the part of the defendant, his already formed design to commit the crime is shown by his ready acquiescence in its commission." State v. Whitney , 157 Conn. 133 , 137 (1968).

1970In State v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133 , 249 A.2d 238 , we recently had occasion to discuss at length the doctrine of entrapment, and it is unnecessary to reiterate that discussion here.

2010Once that burden has been met, however, the burden shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 82 . “[T]he defense of entrapment raises a question of fact, and, where there is a claim of entrapment, the issue must be resolved by the trier . . . ,” 17 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) One Way Fare v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, 96 Conn. App. 780, 783 , 901 A.2d 1246 (2006). *786 In regard to the inducement prong of the entrapment defense, federal courts have held that a simple re

2010Once that burden has been met, however, the burden shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 82 . “[T]he defense of entrapment raises a question of fact, and, where there is a claim of entrapment, the issue must be resolved by the trier . . . ,” 17 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) One Way Fare v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, 96 Conn. App. 780, 783 , 901 A.2d 1246 (2006). *786 In regard to the inducement prong of the entrapment defense, federal courts have held that a simple re

1996See, e.g., State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 137 , 811 P.2d 1071 (1991); People v. Gillespie, 136 Ill. 2d 496, 501-503 , 557 N.E.2d 894 (1990).

1996See, e.g., State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 137 , 811 P.2d 1071 (1991); People v. Gillespie, 136 Ill. 2d 496, 501-503 , 557 N.E.2d 894 (1990).

1989“There is neither a true agreement nor a meeting of minds when an individual ‘conspires’ to violate the law with only one other person and that person is a government agent.” United States v. Escobar de Bright, supra. “In short, the formal requirements of the crime of conspiracy have not been met unless an individual conspires with at least one bona fide co-conspirator.” Id. “[T]he Sears [v. United States] rule [that a defendant cannot be found guilty of conspiring with an informant] responds to the same concern that underlies the entrapment defense: the legitimate law enforcement function of

1989“There is neither a true agreement nor a meeting of minds when an individual ‘conspires’ to violate the law with only one other person and that person is a government agent.” United States v. Escobar de Bright, supra. “In short, the formal requirements of the crime of conspiracy have not been met unless an individual conspires with at least one bona fide co-conspirator.” Id. “[T]he Sears [v. United States] rule [that a defendant cannot be found guilty of conspiring with an informant] responds to the same concern that underlies the entrapment defense: the legitimate law enforcement function of

1989“There is neither a true agreement nor a meeting of minds when an individual ‘conspires’ to violate the law with only one other person and that person is a government agent.” United States v. Escobar de Bright, supra. “In short, the formal requirements of the crime of conspiracy have not been met unless an individual conspires with at least one bona fide co-conspirator.” Id. “[T]he Sears [v. United States] rule [that a defendant cannot be found guilty of conspiring with an informant] responds to the same concern that underlies the entrapment defense: the legitimate law enforcement function of

1989“There is neither a true agreement nor a meeting of minds when an individual ‘conspires’ to violate the law with only one other person and that person is a government agent.” United States v. Escobar de Bright, supra. “In short, the formal requirements of the crime of conspiracy have not been met unless an individual conspires with at least one bona fide co-conspirator.” Id. “[T]he Sears [v. United States] rule [that a defendant cannot be found guilty of conspiring with an informant] responds to the same concern that underlies the entrapment defense: the legitimate law enforcement function of

1977In State v. McNally, 173 Conn. 197 , 377 A.2d 286 , we had recent occasion to discuss the doctrine of entrapment, the statute relating to it, General Statutes § 53&-15, 1 and our decisions on that defense since it was first argued in this court in State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 5 , 89 A.2d 219 .

1977In State v. McNally, 173 Conn. 197 , 377 A.2d 286 , we had recent occasion to discuss the doctrine of entrapment, the statute relating to it, General Statutes § 53&-15, 1 and our decisions on that defense since it was first argued in this court in State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 5 , 89 A.2d 219 .

1965At the same time that the court gave the approved charge from State v. Smith, supra, the court remarked to the jury, however, that possibly their inability to reach a verdict was due to the argument made by the defendant’s counsel about entrapment and that, if that were so, they should dismiss the subject from their minds since the defense of entrapment was inconsistent with the testimony of the defendant that he had not done the acts which the state claimed to have proved and therefore entrapment was not involved in the case.

1965State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60, 64 , 138 A.2d 786 ; State v. Wyman, 118 Conn. 501, 507 , 173 A. 155 ; State v. Mosca, 90 Conn. 381, 385 , 97 A. 340 . *585 As pointed out, the court did not grant the defendant’s request to charge on the doctrine of entrapment.

1965State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60, 64 , 138 A.2d 786 ; State v. Wyman, 118 Conn. 501, 507 , 173 A. 155 ; State v. Mosca, 90 Conn. 381, 385 , 97 A. 340 . *585 As pointed out, the court did not grant the defendant’s request to charge on the doctrine of entrapment.

1965State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60, 64 , 138 A.2d 786 ; State v. Wyman, 118 Conn. 501, 507 , 173 A. 155 ; State v. Mosca, 90 Conn. 381, 385 , 97 A. 340 . *585 As pointed out, the court did not grant the defendant’s request to charge on the doctrine of entrapment.

1965State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60, 64 , 138 A.2d 786 ; State v. Wyman, 118 Conn. 501, 507 , 173 A. 155 ; State v. Mosca, 90 Conn. 381, 385 , 97 A. 340 . *585 As pointed out, the court did not grant the defendant’s request to charge on the doctrine of entrapment.

1965State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60, 64 , 138 A.2d 786 ; State v. Wyman, 118 Conn. 501, 507 , 173 A. 155 ; State v. Mosca, 90 Conn. 381, 385 , 97 A. 340 . *585 As pointed out, the court did not grant the defendant’s request to charge on the doctrine of entrapment.

1965State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60, 64 , 138 A.2d 786 ; State v. Wyman, 118 Conn. 501, 507 , 173 A. 155 ; State v. Mosca, 90 Conn. 381, 385 , 97 A. 340 . *585 As pointed out, the court did not grant the defendant’s request to charge on the doctrine of entrapment.