entrapment defense in Delaware

2023Super. 1973); Butcher v. State, 906 A.2d 798 , 802–03 (Del. 2006). 45 identity.286 It claims that the confidential informant’s role changed after it dropped all of the charges in which the informant made controlled purchases from Cooper, shifting from being a participant in the crime to only helping the State establish probable cause for a search.287 The State argues that the Court followed appropriate disclosure protocols and, after a “thorough colloquy on the question of testifying in his own defense,” Cooper himself decided that he would not testify.288 The Court did not prevent Cooper from

2023Super. 1973); Butcher v. State, 906 A.2d 798 , 802–03 (Del. 2006). 45 identity.286 It claims that the confidential informant’s role changed after it dropped all of the charges in which the informant made controlled purchases from Cooper, shifting from being a participant in the crime to only helping the State establish probable cause for a search.287 The State argues that the Court followed appropriate disclosure protocols and, after a “thorough colloquy on the question of testifying in his own defense,” Cooper himself decided that he would not testify.288 The Court did not prevent Cooper from

2023Cooper chose not to call co-defendant Braxton.,229 a figure he claimed was willing and able to corroborate his entrapment defense and who also exercised his right not to 223 State’s Resp., at 11, D.I. 160. 224 Id. 225 Id. at 10 (citing D.I. 60). 226 Id. at 10–12 (citing Trial Tr., Feb. 27, 2019, Volume I, at 25:13–26:12). 227 Id. 228 Trial Tr., Feb. 21, 2019, at 31:16–18. 229 Trial Tr., Feb. 27, 2019, Volume I, at 37:1–16. 35 testify.230 Cooper cannot now claim prejudice from his own decisions which were all made after consultation with counsel.

2023Cooper chose not to call co-defendant Braxton.,229 a figure he claimed was willing and able to corroborate his entrapment defense and who also exercised his right not to 223 State’s Resp., at 11, D.I. 160. 224 Id. 225 Id. at 10 (citing D.I. 60). 226 Id. at 10–12 (citing Trial Tr., Feb. 27, 2019, Volume I, at 25:13–26:12). 227 Id. 228 Trial Tr., Feb. 21, 2019, at 31:16–18. 229 Trial Tr., Feb. 27, 2019, Volume I, at 37:1–16. 35 testify.230 Cooper cannot now claim prejudice from his own decisions which were all made after consultation with counsel.

2019But Briscoe’s appointed lawyer also participated in the trial, making (as mentioned) the opening statement, making several evidentiary objections, and moving to reopen the case to present testimony that would support an entrapment instruction. 29 Opening Br. 21. 30 Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 106 . 8 (15) It was against this backdrop that we held that, if the Superior Court denies an 11th-hour continuance request to retain substitute counsel, “the defendant must then choose between two constitutional options, either continuing with his existing counsel or proceeding to trial pro se.”31 Tingle now arg

2001(Feb. 28, 2001) (ORDER). [3] 538 A.2d 726, 734 (1988). [4] Del.Supr., 761 A.2d 6 (2000). [5] Del.Supr., 765 A.2d 1252 (2001). [6] For example, defense counsel stated: "Now, we understand that in a[sic] entrapment defense, that that's why we are having this argument, because we are using an entrapment defense ...." Appx. to Appellant's Op. Br. at A-31.

2001Similarly, in its ruling, the court noted that: "Under Rule 404(a)(1), ... when the defendant offers evidence of a pertinent trait of his character, which I think they are doing here by electing the entrapment defense, then the prosecution does have the right to rebut that." Id. at A-34. [7] The State's citation to State v. Porter, Del.Super., 587 A.2d 188 , (1990) is mistaken because the Superior Court's opinion does not refer to a specific defense objection to the admission of the contested evidence in the State's case-in-chief.

2001Similarly, in its ruling, the court noted that: "Under Rule 404(a)(1), ... when the defendant offers evidence of a pertinent trait of his character, which I think they are doing here by electing the entrapment defense, then the prosecution does have the right to rebut that." Id. at A-34. [7] The State's citation to State v. Porter, Del.Super., 587 A.2d 188 , (1990) is mistaken because the Superior Court's opinion does not refer to a specific defense objection to the admission of the contested evidence in the State's case-in-chief.

2001(Feb. 28, 2001) (ORDER). [3] 538 A.2d 726, 734 (1988). [4] Del.Supr., 761 A.2d 6 (2000). [5] Del.Supr., 765 A.2d 1252 (2001). [6] For example, defense counsel stated: "Now, we understand that in a[sic] entrapment defense, that that's why we are having this argument, because we are using an entrapment defense ...." Appx. to Appellant's Op. Br. at A-31.

2001Similarly, in its ruling, the court noted that: "Under Rule 404(a)(1), ... when the defendant offers evidence of a pertinent trait of his character, which I think they are doing here by electing the entrapment defense, then the prosecution does have the right to rebut that." Id. at A-34. [7] The State's citation to State v. Porter, Del.Super., 587 A.2d 188 , (1990) is mistaken because the Superior Court's opinion does not refer to a specific defense objection to the admission of the contested evidence in the State's case-in-chief.

1982Our earlier decisions reflected a hybrid approach to the entrapment defense: Was there "evidence of luring or positive pressure upon a defendant to commit a crime as to which he had no prior disposition?" See, Marvel v. State, Del.Supr., 312 A.2d 318 (1973); Crosby v. State, Del.Supr., 295 A.2d 709, 710 (1972).

1982Our earlier decisions reflected a hybrid approach to the entrapment defense: Was there “evidence of luring or positive pressure upon a defendant to commit a crime as to which he had no prior disposition?” See, Marvel v. State, Del.Supr., 312 A.2d 318 (1973); Crosby v. State, Del.Supr., 295 A.2d 709, 710 (1972).

1982United States v. Lentz, 624 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1980).

1982United States v. Lentz, 624 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1980).

1982Furthermore, it is often the case that "the sole proof of predisposition consists of evidence as to what the defendant did on the occasion in question, in response to the overtures of the government agents." United States v. Jannotti, 501 F.Supp. at 1191 .

1982Furthermore, it is often the case that “the sole proof of predisposition consists of evidence as to what the defendant did on the occasion in question, in response to the overtures of the government agents.” United States v. Jannotti, 501 F.Supp. at 1191 .

1982The plurality stated that “the entrapment defense focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime ... rather than upon the conduct of the government agent.” Id. at 488 , 96 S.Ct. at 1649 , quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 , 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1641 , 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1974).

1982The plurality stated that “the entrapment defense focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime ... rather than upon the conduct of the government agent.” Id. at 488 , 96 S.Ct. at 1649 , quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 , 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1641 , 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1974).

1982If it was, as the defendant alleges, so outrageous and overreaching as to violate the right to due process, or if the police conduct *1387 was "intolerable" and went "beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense", id. at 608, then her conviction cannot stand, United States v. Twigg, 3d Cir., 588 F.2d 373 (1978), notwithstanding our finding that she was predisposed to violate the law.

1982If it was, as the defendant alleges, so outrageous and overreaching as to violate the right to due process, or if the police conduct was “intolerable” and went “beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense”, id. at 608, then her conviction cannot stand, United States v. Twigg, 3d Cir., 588 F.2d 373 (1978), notwithstanding our finding that she was predisposed to violate the law.