entrapment defense in District of Columbia

1993In Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 62 , 108 S.Ct. at 886 , the Court held that "even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment.” .Consequently, there is no reason to accept the government’s invitation to adopt a rule that a defendant charged with felony murder is barred from raising a defense of self-defense where he claims he was not present at the scene of the crime.

1993In Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 62 , 108 S.Ct. at 886 , the Court held that "even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment.” .Consequently, there is no reason to accept the government’s invitation to adopt a rule that a defendant charged with felony murder is barred from raising a defense of self-defense where he claims he was not present at the scene of the crime.

2024There was plainly evidence of government inducement here—as we have previously detailed in our prior decisions in this matter—so that if the jury had been instructed on entrapment it likely would have had to confront whether the government had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Richardson had a “predisposition to commit the crime.” Daniels v. United States, 33 A.3d 324, 328 (D.C. 2011) (“[T]he principal element in the defense of entrapment [i]s the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime,” which “focuses on whether the defendant was an ‘unwary innocent’ or, instead, an ‘unwary crimin

2011“Predisposition focuses on whether the defendant was an ‘unwary innocent’ or, instead, an ‘unwary criminal’ who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime.” Minor, 623 A.2d at 1188 (citing Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63 , 108 S.Ct. 883 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2011The entrapment defense is intended for the “protection of] an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law.” United States v. Law, 381 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 287 , 528 F.3d 888, 905 (2008) (quoting Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54 , 112 S.Ct. 1535 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he principal element in the defense of entrapment [i]s the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.” Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 .

2011The entrapment defense is intended for the “protection of] an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law.” United States v. Law, 381 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 287 , 528 F.3d 888, 905 (2008) (quoting Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54 , 112 S.Ct. 1535 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he principal element in the defense of entrapment [i]s the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.” Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 .

2011The entrapment defense is intended for the “protection of] an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law.” United States v. Law, 381 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 287 , 528 F.3d 888, 905 (2008) (quoting Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54 , 112 S.Ct. 1535 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he principal element in the defense of entrapment [i]s the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.” Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 .

2011The entrapment defense is intended for the “protection of] an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law.” United States v. Law, 381 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 287 , 528 F.3d 888, 905 (2008) (quoting Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54 , 112 S.Ct. 1535 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he principal element in the defense of entrapment [i]s the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.” Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 .

2024Sloan’s vouching for the informant’s reliability in providing information leading to arrests at the suppression hearing and testimony at trial about a series of substantial payments made to the informant for such tips, including in this case, that there was an established mutually beneficial relationship of at least two years standing between MPD and the informant. 12 This more than sufficed to trigger a careful Roviaro inquiry into the relevance of informant’s identity to the entrapment defense. citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) and Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 5

2024A functional analysis of who is an “agent” of the government furthers the objective of the entrapment defense, which is “designed to overcome” the “evil” that occurs when the government “plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted.” Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376 . “[T]he ‘purpose of the defense is to deter misconduct in enforcing the law.’” 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 9.8(a) (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.13).

2024See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant . . . because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced.”); State v. Bisson, 491 A.2d 544 , 547 n.1 (Me. 1985) (“The State’s argument is predicated on a misconception of the rationale for the entrapment defense.

2024See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant . . . because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced.”); State v. Bisson, 491 A.2d 544 , 547 n.1 (Me. 1985) (“The State’s argument is predicated on a misconception of the rationale for the entrapment defense.

2024Rather, we have said that the defense of entrapment is raised by evidence of inducement by a government agent or one acting at his direction” (citing Commonwealth v. Brzezinski, 540 N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (Mass. 1989), for the proposition that an informant’s actions may be attributed to the government where promises were made to the informant in exchange for assistance) (emphasis in original)); State v. Shropshire, 874 S.W.2d 634, 638-39 (Tenn. Crim.

2024Cir. 1963) (“The entrapment defense does not extend to inducement by a private citizen; yet it has found general application to cases where the officer acts through a private citizen, as in the case at bar[,]” where officer provided official funds and transportation to facilitate drug transaction). 8 See United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1975) (“If the supplier is a paid informer, the defense is available even if the informer entrapped the defendant on his own initiative, and regardless of whether any Government officer knows the source of the contraband.”); United St

2024Cir. 1963) (“The entrapment defense does not extend to inducement by a private citizen; yet it has found general application to cases where the officer acts through a private citizen, as in the case at bar[,]” where officer provided official funds and transportation to facilitate drug transaction). 8 See United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1975) (“If the supplier is a paid informer, the defense is available even if the informer entrapped the defendant on his own initiative, and regardless of whether any Government officer knows the source of the contraband.”); United St

2024Rather, we have said that the defense of entrapment is raised by evidence of inducement by a government agent or one acting at his direction” (citing Commonwealth v. Brzezinski, 540 N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (Mass. 1989), for the proposition that an informant’s actions may be attributed to the government where promises were made to the informant in exchange for assistance) (emphasis in original)); State v. Shropshire, 874 S.W.2d 634, 638-39 (Tenn. Crim.

2024Cf. Savage, 313 A.2d at 884 (noting that possession of weapon “extended over a considerable period of time and was clearly illegal,” such that possession of the weapon was knowing and voluntary rather than the result of an entrapping “artifice or stratagem”).

2024Richardson I at 5 & n.8 (noting that, unlike theft, “specific intent to steal is not [an] element of UUV” (citing Arnold v. United States, 467 A.2d 136, 139 (D.C. 1983)).

2024Silver’s “strategic” decision to forgo an entrapment instruction on this basis was grounded in an unreasonable mistake of law that Richardson was not entitled to such an instruction. “[A]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case,” at least when it is unreasonable, “is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.” Dorsey v. United States, 225 A.3d 724 , 730 n.4 (D.C. 2020) (quoting Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 (2014)).

2024Silver’s “strategic” decision to forgo an entrapment instruction on this basis was grounded in an unreasonable mistake of law that Richardson was not entitled to such an instruction. “[A]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case,” at least when it is unreasonable, “is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.” Dorsey v. United States, 225 A.3d 724 , 730 n.4 (D.C. 2020) (quoting Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 (2014)).

2024There was plainly evidence of government inducement here—as we have previously detailed in our prior decisions in this matter—so that if the jury had been instructed on entrapment it likely would have had to confront whether the government had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Richardson had a “predisposition to commit the crime.” Daniels v. United States, 33 A.3d 324, 328 (D.C. 2011) (“[T]he principal element in the defense of entrapment [i]s the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime,” which “focuses on whether the defendant was an ‘unwary innocent’ or, instead, an ‘unwary crimin

2024See Kigozi v. United States, 55 A.3d 643, 652 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e will not second-guess true tactical decisions.”).

2011The entrapment defense is intended for the “protection of] an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law.” United States v. Law, 381 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 287 , 528 F.3d 888, 905 (2008) (quoting Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54 , 112 S.Ct. 1535 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he principal element in the defense of entrapment [i]s the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.” Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 .

2011The entrapment defense is intended for the “protection of] an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law.” United States v. Law, 381 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 287 , 528 F.3d 888, 905 (2008) (quoting Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54 , 112 S.Ct. 1535 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he principal element in the defense of entrapment [i]s the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.” Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 .

1993The entrapment defense "centers on ... a person's predisposition to commit a crime, and not on the government's conduct." United States v. Whoie, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 263 , 925 F.2d 1481, 1483 (1991).

1993The entrapment defense "centers on ... a person's predisposition to commit a crime, and not on the government's conduct." United States v. Whoie, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 263 , 925 F.2d 1481, 1483 (1991).

1993As this court held almost twenty years ago, an entrapment instruction is not required by “a showing of police conduct which purportedly induced or instigated the commission of a crime merely by offering an opportunity to do so or by ‘playing along’ with one considering an illegal act.” Williams v. United States, 342 A.2d 367, 369 (D.C.1975) (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 , 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)); 11 see Kronstadt v. District of Columbia, 155 A.2d 76, 77 (D.C.Mun.App.1959).

1993As we explained in Williams, supra: [O]nly where creative governmental activity instills the criminal notion in an otherwise innocent individual may an entrapment defense properly lie.

1993A defendant claiming entrapment must be more than unaware of the fact that the subject activity will lead to his arrest; he must be wholly without criminal intent when he joins the police in the commission of a crime. 342 A.2d at 369 (emphasis added). [1] We said in Rease : A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when (1) all elements of the lesser offense are included within the offense charged, and (2) there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the lesser charge. 403 A.2d at 328 (citations omitted and emphasis added). [2] D.C.Code § 33-541(a) makes it a crime "knowi

1993As this court held almost twenty years ago, an entrapment instruction is not required by “a showing of police conduct which purportedly induced or instigated the commission of a crime merely by offering an opportunity to do so or by ‘playing along’ with one considering an illegal act.” Williams v. United States, 342 A.2d 367, 369 (D.C.1975) (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 , 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)); 11 see Kronstadt v. District of Columbia, 155 A.2d 76, 77 (D.C.Mun.App.1959).

1993As this court held almost twenty years ago, an entrapment instruction is not required by "a showing of police conduct which purportedly induced or instigated the commission of a crime merely by offering an opportunity to do so or by `playing along' with one considering an illegal act." Williams v. United States, 342 A.2d 367, 369 (D.C.1975) (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 , 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)); [11] see *1188 Kronstadt v. District of Columbia, 155 A.2d 76, 77 (D.C.Mun.App.1959).